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Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEFs), including the Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF), will play an increasingly important role in the 
U. S. National Military Strategy (NMS). Future NEF roles will be shaped by 
the demise of the Soviet Union, advances in weapons technologies, 
mounting fiscal and resource constraints, and the rise in requirements for 
U.S. involvement in regional crises. Designing the right MAGTF to respond 
across the spectrum of conflict requires a keen understanding of readiness and 
sustainment issues and their associated costs. This thesis calculates the tooth-
to-tail ratios of MAGTFs and uses them as a measurement of a force's 
readiness and sustainment capabilities. This thesis considers the readiness 
and sustainment requirements for particular MAGTFs performing various 
roles as outlined in the current NMS. 
The force structures of current notional and future MAGTFs are 
developed and analyzed and compared in terms of representative capital 
value and operating and support costs associated with raising and 
maintaining a specific MAGTF capability. The results provide one approach 
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A. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
Since the late 1980s, significant geopolitical events have occurred 
which have impacted directly on the force structure and missions of the 
Naval Services. The end of the Cold War and the diminished threat of global 
war has confronted the United States with the need for fundamental 
decisions concerning its future security requirements. In this new 
environment, the unique capabilities of integrated naval expeditionary forces 
have taken on greater importance. 
The decline of overt threats from a known enemy has led to increased 
domestic pressures to shift national resources away from defense and toward 
domestic economic concerns. Programs and weapon systems that were 
thought necessary during the Cold War are being reevaluated, and in many 
cases, scaled down or canceled. Personnel draw-downs are underway to 
reduce military forces to the level thought commensurate with the reduced 
danger. Military bases and facilities are undergoing significant realignment 
and, in many cases, are closed in order to comply with shrinking defense 
budgets. 
Technology is also undergoing rapid change. Recent rapid advances in 
weapons technology provided what many view as a significant force-
multiplier during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Many observers are referring 
to an impending "Military Technological Revolution" (MTR). This term 
refers to many aspects of military forces besides technology. It is a timely 
combination of innovative technologies, doctrines, and military 
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organizations that are reshaping the way in which wars are fought. (Mazarr, 
1993, p . 1) The MTR is based on three comparative advantages. First, the 
MTR will increase the effectiveness of forces through improvements in 
maneuver and speed of these forces. Second, the MTR represents a capability 
that no emerging threat can as yet challenge. Thirdly, the MTR will act as a 
force-multiplier , allowing forces to do more with less at more efficient cost. 
(Mazarr, 1993, p. 15) This MTR will ostensibly have the capability to reshape 
the way wars are fought. However, the choices made possible by the MTR 
will also be subject to budgetary, fiscal, and political constraints. This is true 
for the Marine Corps as well. 
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis was undertaken to provide a complementary work to that 
which was done by LCDR Paul F. Healy in June of 1994. His work, entitled 
"Planning and Investing for a Maritime Reconnaissance Strike Complex: The 
U.S. Navy in the 21st Century," investigates the likely changes to Naval 
Forces (to include Marine components) between now and the year 2015. This 
thesis explores in greater depth the changes likely to emerge in Marine Air 
Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) as components of Naval Expeditionary Forces 
(NEFs) . This thesis follows the same general approach as Healy in estimating 
force structures. A baseline structure for Marine expeditionary forces during 
the 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm time frame is first calculated and costed 
out, and then the same methods are applied to estimating and costing out the 
force structure of Marine expeditionary forces in the 21st Century. The year 
2015 is chosen as providing a good measure of change 25 years after the Desert 
Storm baseline. 
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Faced with a dynamic environmen t, affected by a myriad of economic, 
fi scal, political, social variables, how should the Marine Corps proceed to plan 
fo r, structure, and invest in its expeditionary forces of the future? What is 
the present notional baseline structure of expeditionary forces, and what is 
the cost to support these forces with logistical sustainment? Given an MTR, 
how might force structure and tooth-to-tail ratio of Marine Air Ground Task 
Forces (MAGTFs) be different? This thesis hopefully contributes some 
answers to these questions . 
One way to gaining an understanding of force structure requirements 
is by looking at force-to-support ratios, also known as the "tooth-to-tail" ratio. 
MAGTFs constitute the Marine components of NEFs. They are a reservoir of 
integrated combined arms combat power that is task-organized to execute a 
w ide range of global missions. Such a capability is fueled by a responsive and 
effective logistical support structure, i.e., the "tail" of the MAGTF. This 
chapter provides an overview of expeditionary warfare strategy development 
since World War II and its impact on MAGTF force structures and tooth-to-
tail ratios. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses these specific questions: 
1. What might be the force structure for a MAGTF configured for 
expedition~ry warfare in the early 21st Century? 
2. What will be the tooth-to-tail ratio of a MAGTF, how m ight this 
ratio differ from today's with regard to size, composition, and what will 
be the price tag of capital investment and operating support costs? 
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3. Assuming a continuing trend of diminished resources for 
procurement, operating, and support costs, how might the ratio of 
operating and support costs to capital value change? 
4. What challenges are encountered in attempting to estimate the 
tooth-to-tail ratio for MAGTFs, and how might these challenges be 
resolved to promote a better understanding of the relationships 
between logistics support costs, capabilities, and requirements for 
expeditionary forces? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis analyses the three different sizes of amphibious MAGTFs 
employed by the Marine Corps: the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF). Notional structures are estimated for each of the three to form a 
current Baseline.l Using this baseline, tooth-to-tail ratios are estimated, and 
future expeditionary force structures with their corresponding tooth-to-tail 
ratios are developed. Notional MAGTFs are designed to cope with so-called 
Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), but they are applicable also under current 
employment concepts to other contingencies, e.g., deterrence, peacekeeping, 
peacetime forward presence. The Bottom Up Review (BUR) provides the 
1There are three different MEB configurations. The CE, GCE and selected units from the ACE and 
CSSE fonn the assault echelon (AE) of an amphibious MEB and deploy aboard Navy amphibious shipping 
as a balanced force. The remaining forces of the amphibious MEB deploy as an assault follow-on echelon 
(AFOE). The Maritime prepositioning Force (MPF) MEB is slightly larger than an amphibious MEB and 
heavily equipped with annor and mechanized assets. It is capable of combat against a sophisticated 
mechanized force . The smallest MEB organization. the Norway airlanded MEB (NALM) is deployed in 
Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft to reception areas in central Norway prior to hostilities to 
facilitate rapid reinforcement of NATO' s northern flank . The Air Contingency Force MEB (ACF) is a 
shun-notice. airlifted. light MEB ready for deployment by strategic airlift. 
4 
direction that has shifted the focus of U.S. military strategy away from that of 
a global Soviet threat to one oriented toward the new dangers emerging from 
the post Cold-War. "Chief among the new dangers is that of aggression by 
regional powers ." (Aspin, Report on the BUR, 1993, p iii) .2 
A major interest of this thesis is to estimate the cost of achieving and 
maintaining a MAGTF capability now and in the future and to provide a 
view of MAGTF funding needs in the broad areas of personnel and 
equipment. 
E. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
This research is limited to unclassified sources only. Data are gathered 
from Department of Defense (DOD) documents, trade journals, books, articles, 
various studies and reports, and personal interviews. In determining 
operating and support costs, the Quick Cost Model and Marine Corps Cost 
Factors Manual is used. 
F. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Background 
Department of Defense Publication 1-02 "Dictionary of Military Terms" 
defines the term "Expeditionary Force" as an armed force organized to 
accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. An expeditionary force 
capability is a key element in maintaining a strong defense capability as 
2Regional rumgers include a host of threats: large scale aggression; smaller conflicts; internal strife 
caused by ethnic. tribal , or religious animosities; state-sponsored-terrorism; subversion of friendly 
governrnellls: insurgencies: and drug trafficking. 
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described in the current National Security Strategy. NEFs provide a credible 
overseas presence in peacetime that will deter aggression and facilitate United 
States contributions to multilateral peace operations. (National Military 
Strategy, 1993, p. 7) 
The role of MEFs in the national strategy assumes a special importance 
when one considers that oceans separate the United States from nine-tenths 
of the world's population. The United States has extensive overseas interests 
that are vulnerable; many are of vital importance and require that the United 
States be prepared to defend them. Under today's increasing budget 
constraints it is no longer feasible to maintain armed forces in every potential 
hotspot. Neither can the United States always count on a friendly reception 
at the locations it needs to deploy forces. By virtue of their versatility, 
forward positioning, and ability to assume a variety of alert postures, NEFs 
are an ideal instrument for crisis response.3 
The MAGTF is one of the two key components of the NEF. It possess 
the capabilities, built on mobility, flexibility and striking power, that enable 
the United States to respond to a conflict expeditiously and to halt it at the 
lowest possible level of violence on terms favorable to the United States. 
(Reassessing U.S. Strategic Forces: An Interim Report p. 7) The Marine Corps 
is tasked with providing forces to serve with the Navy in the seizure and 
defense of advanced naval bases and in the conduct of land operations that 
may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. (FMFRP 1-11, p. 1-1) 
3While certainly not a new concept, NEFs assume an increased importance resulting from the end of 
the Cold War and Navy's recognition of regional threats and adoption of a littoral strategy. The NEF focus 
is a commitment to forces designed to operate overseas and respond swiftly to crisis. Integrating Navy and 
Marine forces into NEFs provides the ability to extend seapower beyond the shoreline and influence events 
<L~hore. (Force 200 I, 1993, p. 20) 
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The Marine Corps is inherently an expeditionary military organization. 
It has the built-in capability to prepare and deploy logistically sustainable 
forces into areas with little or no existing U.S. logistical capability. Its forces 
provide a tremendous advantage and contribute to the balanced capabilities 
of U.S. fleets by virtue of the ability to conduct operations across the spectrum 
of naval warfare from the sea. 
The keys to MAGTF structure and capabilities are implicit in the 
requirement for amphibious operations. MAGTFs are designed for 
amphibious assaults that require a maximum build-up of combat power on a 
hostile shore without a prepositioned logistics infrastructure. The unique 
seabased capabilities of amphibious forces allow them to serve as the bridge 
for deploying forces in circumstances where a lack of land based facilities 
would otherwise preclude operations. Amphibious operations plan for, and 
utilize a variety of assets to project forces ashore, such as helicopters, surface 
landing craft, Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AA Vs), and Landing Craft Air 
Cushioned (LCACs) . 
Amphibious forces are sea-bases from which we operate 
naval forces . They are flexible, utilitarian, and independent of 
constraints associated with establishing bases on foreign soil. 
From them, we can conduct the full spectrum of operations 
ranging from humanitarian assistance to violent projection of 
naval power. Like all sea-based forces, they are available for use 
unencumbered by the political constraints of other nations. This 
broadens their value to the President as a ready contingency 
response force . They provide a capability in a crisis situation 
which enable the United States to send a signal, employ forces 
for security and protection of U.S. interests, or if the situation 
dictates, forcibly intervene. (Integrated Amphibious Operations 
& U.S. Marine Corps Air Requirements Study 1993, p. 3) 
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The United States is highly dependent on the use of the seas for its 
political, economic and military well-being. This dependence stems, in part, 
from the need for rapid access to potential trouble spots which, if not checked, 
can trigger serious regional instabilities, which, in turn, could affect the 
stability of the global political and economic system on which U.S. and allied 
prosperity depends. As the U.S. post-World War II overseas basing 
infrastructure continues to shrink, the presence of mobile naval forces near 
areas of potential crisis becomes relatively more important. The focus of the 
NEF includes operations in the littoral sea and land areas, and the projection 
of military power ashore. 
The importance and utility of NEFs since World War II have increased 
due to the rising number of problems encountered concerning basing access 
and restricted landing and overflight rights, the regional proliferation of 
sophisticated (and sometimes not-so-sophisticated) weapons has complicated 
the U.S. ability to exercise sea control when and where needed. (Palmar, 1981, 
p. 13) 
2. Organization of the MAGTF 
The Marine components of NEFs are highly specialized amphibious 
assault troops. Their, command, ground, aviation, and service support 
elements constitute a MAGTF. These task forces are capable of conducting 
sustained operations; they are logistically supported from their amphibious 
ships, and they are the principal means of projecting naval power ashore. 
MAGTFs possess sufficient combat service support capability to provide 
Combat Service Support functions, including: Supply, Maintenance, Services, 
Deliberate Engineering, Transportation, and Health Services. MAGTFs also 
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contain organic aviation assets that are equipped to support ground units in 
amphibious operations by way of: Offensive Air Support, Anti Air Warfare, 
Assault Support, Air Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Control of 
Aircraft and Missiles. 
The composition and size of MAGTFs may vary, but the organizational 
s tructures always include a single Command Element (CE) with subordinate 
Ground Combat Elements (GCE), Aviation Combat Elements (ACE), and 
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AVIATION GROUND COMBAT 
COMBAT COMMAND SERVICE 
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(ACE) (GCE) ELEMENT 
(CSSE) 
Figure 1.1 MAGTF Structure 
Note: lnfonnation for MAGTF taken from Fleet Marine Force Organization 
CFMFRP 1-11), Washington, D.C., HQMC, 2 March 1992. 
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3. MAGTF Capabilities 
The MAGTF is task-organized, meaning that senior commanders can 
alter the mix of personnel and equipment in a MAGTF to meet the objectives 
of a deployment, the size and capabilities of potential adversaries, and the 
weather and geography likely to be encountered. The CE provides a single 
headquarters for command and coordination of ground, air, and combat 
service support forces. The GCE may range in size from an infantry battalion 
to one or more divisions. The ACE may range in size from a reinforced 
helicopter squadron to one or more aircraft wings. Finally, the CSSE varies in 
size depending on the size and mission of the ground, and air components. 
The effectiveness of MAGTF hinges upon its ability to provide the 
commander with the ability to project naval power ashore. This is 
accomplished through the organic logistic and sustainment capabilities 
inherent to the various sizes MAGTFs. Current doctrine plans for 15-60 days 
of sustainment in low-to-mid intensity conflict scenarios. The combined 
arms capability of the MAGTF establishes a broad and complex area of 
influence, and therefore requires a flexible, and responsive logistics support 
system. The MAGTF is the only fully integrated combined-arms component 
in the U.S. armed forces with a self-sustaining logistics capability. (FMFM 4, 
Combat Service Support, p . 1-1.) 
The remainder of this chapter examines the development of MAGTF 
organization and missions from World War II to Desert Storm as it applies to 
expeditionary warfare strategy. This provides a basis for understanding the 
logistical sustainment and support requirements for MAGTFs. 
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G. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR II 
In the nearly 50 years since World War II the basic concepts for the 
organization and employment of amphibious MAGTFs have remained 
unchanged. During operations in the Solomon and Marshall Islands new 
methods were perfected which enabled Marine Aviation to function as part of 
an integrated air-ground task force. (Simmons, 1979, p . 2) 
The advent of nuclear weapons prompted many observers to believe 
that atomic weapons made amphibious operations obsolete. Marine Corps 
officers themselves agreed that the threat of nuclear attack against an exposed 
amphibious force demanded important doctrinal adjustments. (Clifford, 1973, 
p. 71) In 1946, Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, Fleet 
Marine Force, Pacific wrote: 
It is my opinion that future amphibious operations will 
be undertaken by much smaller expeditionary forces, which will 
be highly trained and lightly equipped, and transported by air or 
submarine, and movement accomplished with a greater degree 
of surprise and speed than has ever been heretofore visualized. 
In response to the dangers of atomic weapons, amphibious doctrine 
shifted away from the World War II reliance on heavy concentrations of 
ships and landing craft to dispersed assault techniques. It was fel t that the 
speed and flexibility gained through the use of helicopter operations offered a 
practical means of overcoming the effects of dispersion while likewise 
reducing the exposure to atomic weapons. This led to the emergence of 
"vertical envelopment" concepts. 
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1. Post World War II 
In 1945 the USMC maintained six divisions and a total end strength of 
4751000 men. After World War II many questioned the need of a force that 
"duplicated " Army capabilities. Proponents of the USMC were instrumental 
in inserting in the National Security Act of 1947 a requirement for three 
active USMC divisions. This Act directed that1 
The Marine Corps shall be organized/ trained and 
equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms/ 
together with supporting air components/ for service with the 
fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for 
the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the 
prosecution of a naval campaign. ("The Maritime Strategy/// p. 
23) 
2. The Korean War and "Massive Retaliation// 
President Truman had sought to stabilize defense spending/ but the 
outbreak of the Korean War/ the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb/ and 
the decision to commit the United States to NATO forced the abandonment 
of such expectations. (Lewis1 1990 1 p. 21) The outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 dealt a strong blow to air power enthusiasrs claim that the next war 
would be fought with atomic weapons and that amphibious warfare had been 
rendered obsolete. (Enthoven1 1971 1 p. 165) General MacArthur/s Inchon 
landing displayed the inherent flexibility of amphibious forces and also the 
value of the Marine Corps and its ability to conduct amphibious operations. 
Title 10, U.S. Code amended the National Security Act and legislated 
the size of the Corps to be three combat divisions, three aircraft wings, and 
other supporting elements. It also directed that the Marine Corps would be a 
ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international 
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disturbances short of large-scale war. This basic force structure established the 
"force-in-readiness" concept which led to the modern-day MAGTF concept. 
("The Amphibious Warfare Strategy", p. 25) 
During and after Korea, the concept of the air-ground team emerged in 
doctrinal and policy statements. (Simmons, 1979, p. 3) The integration of the 
helicopter greatly expanded the MAGTF's mobility and sustainability by 
providing it with the capability to conduct surface and airborne ship-to-shore 
operations simultaneously. 
3. The Decade of the 1960s and "Flexible Response" 
Under the Eisenhower administration, spending for conventional 
defense was held down in favor of reliance on a nuclear capability. During 
the early 1960s, however, it had become widely recognized that a nuclear 
balance of terror had been established, that nuclear weapons existed mainly 
for deterrence, and that "real" war would be fought with conventional 
means. The upshot was a revitalization of conventional forces. The new 
resulting strategy, called "Flexible Response," rejected the nuclear-
dominated concept doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" in favor of a primary 
reliance on conventional warfighting forces. (Enthoven, 1971, p. 273) At the 
force programming level, Flexible Response called for sufficient forces to fight 
two-and-a-half major wars in Europe and Asia simultaneously, and a smaller 
war in the Mid-East. This concept was important for development, because it 
acknowledged the need for flexible response capabilities in "limited" 
contingencies. (Lewis, 1990, p. 87) 
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4. The Impact of Vietnam 
The Marines role in Vietnam was very different from what their 
"organizational essence" had dictated. Instead of carrying out amphibious 
operations to lay-the-doormat for heavy Army follow on forces, the Corps 
was employed in sustained, Army-like land combat operations.4 Toward the 
end of the conflict, the Nixon Doctrine modified the two-and-a-half war 
strategy to one of planning for a one-and-one-half war conflict. (Laird, 1970, p. 
10) 
The post-Vietnam focus for military, including Marine planners, 
became Europe. This "Europe-first" preoccupation effectively reduced the 
Navy's role to the provision of sea control and convoy escort for the 
reinforcement of forces, including Marines to Europe. Meanwhile, plans to 
rehabilitate and rebuild the Navy had been disrupted by the pressing 
requirements of the Vietnam War. By 1976, the size of the Navy' s general 
purpose fleet had shrunk from 984 ships in 1967 to 467 ships. The size of the 
amphibious fleet had decreased commensurately. By the end of the 1970s the 
"NATO-first" preoccupation of U.S. defense planners came increasingly 
under criticism. The extension of Soviet military activities into Angola, 
Afghanistan and Ethiopia, to name a few countries, served to warn U.S. 
leaders that Europe was not the only region in which the Soviets could pose a 
threat. 
4Prior to the Vietnam War MAGTFs were fonnall y designated as expeditionary forces. This 
designati on was changed in the early periods of the war to "amphibious" in deference to Vietnamese 
uneasiness to the tenn "expeditionary". (Progress and Purpose, 1973, p. 112) MAGTFs were again 
fonnally redesignated as "expeditionary" in 1989 to more closely refl ect the Corps employment strategy. 
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5. "The Maritime Strategy" 
In the late 1970s the United States realized that the greatest threat to its 
security and well being lay in the perceived quest for world domination by the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had emerged after World War II as a 
superpower exhibiting ambitions beyond the context of Europe. The 
conventional might of the Soviet Union and its expansion of naval power to 
the world's oceans demanded serious consideration by defense planners. 
Related to the extensions of the Soviet Union's global reach was the growing 
number of Third World conflicts. It was recognized that the fundamental 
component to success in deterring war with the Soviet Union depended on 
the United States ability to stabilize and control escalation in Third World 
crisis. The Maritime Strategy was developed as a dynamic concept to enable 
intelligent planning for the global use of naval forces in countering and 
deterring the Soviet Threat. Preparation for global war was recognized as the 
critical element in deterring the Soviet Union, also the peacetime and crisis 
response operations were seen as crucial contributions to deterrence. The 
Maritime Strategy saw sea power as being relevant across the spectrum of 
conflict, and provided a framework for considering all uses of maritime 
power. (The Maritime Strategy, 1986, p . 4) 
In January of 1980 the "Carter Doctrine" declared the oil supplies of the 
Persian Gulf a vital American interest. As a consequence, the Carter 
Administration began to explore ways by which existing forces could be 
deployed quickly to the Gulf region, and be logistically sustained. This set the 
stage for a revalidation of the need for a global focus in military contingency 
planning. Spurred by the potential of conflict in the Persian Gulf, defense 
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planners developed the so-called Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). It was soon 
realized that naval expeditionary forces provided a viable means of 
establishing credible U.S. military capabilities in the Persian Gulf region. 
(Quinlan, 1983, p. 26) 
6. "The Amph ibious Warfare Strategy" 
A key goal during this time was to further international stability 
through the support of regional balances. (The Maritime Strategy, 1986, p. 5) 
The heart of the evolving Maritime Strategy was crisis response. It was 
predicted that war with the Soviets would most likely result from a crisis that 
escalates out of control. Therefore the United States' ability to contain and 
control crisis was an important factor in preventing global conflict. In 1985 
the "Amphibious Warfare Strategy" was published as a compliment to the 
Navy's "Maritime Strategy." Though oriented to address the phased 
employment of amphibious forces in a global conventional conflict the 
Amphibious Warfare Strategy recognized the utility of employing 
amphibious forces in low-intensity conflicts in Third World countries. (The 
Amphibious Warfare Strategy, 1986, p . 25), The complementary concept of 
"crisis response" and "forward presence" and the emergent new missions of 
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, played a key role in developing 
the employment strategy for amphibious forces in the 1990s. 
7. " ... From The Sea" 
The 1992 Navy-Marine Corps paper " .. . From the Sea" defined the 
concept which has taken the Navy away from its cold war preoccupation with 
16 
an oceanic war against the Soviets, to planning for regional confli cts in 
littoral waters. The new direction for the Navy and Marine Corps was to 
provide the nation with NEFs, shaped for joint operations, capable of 
operating from forward deployed sea-bases which were tailored for national 
needs. (. .. From The Sea, 1992, p. 2) NEFs were described as being; swift to 
respond to short notice crisis, structured to build power from the sea when 
required, able to sustain support for long-term operations, and unrestricted by 
the need for transit or over-flight approval from foreign governments in 
order to enter the scene of action. The stage for this shift of focus from oceans 
to littorals had already been set in a speech by President Bush in August 1990 
and the experience of the Gulf War immediately afterward. 
In times of increasing global instability the presence of U.S. NEFs, 
acting as a deterrent, are a key element in this Nation's national security 
strategy. If deterrence fails, forward presence provides a rapid response 
capability. Since most of the world's population lives within 50 miles of the 
sea, and 75 percent of the urban areas containing U.S. embassies, outside 
allied or formerly Warsaw Pact territory, are within 150 miles of the sea, · 
naval power projection capabilities are particularly useful in applying U.S. 
military might at appropriate places and times. (Mundy, 1993, p. 15) 
8. "Forward ... From The Sea" 
The unpu_blished draft of "Forward ... From The Sea," updates and 
expands " .. . From The Sea" . The Department of Defense's focus on new 
dangers to include aggression by regional powers requires the ability to rapidly 
project military power to protect vital U.S. interests and defend friends and 
allies. (Forward ... From The Sea, 1994, p . 1) Forward-deployed NEFs will be 
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used to provide the critical operational linkages between peacetime 
operations and the initial requirements of a developing crisis or major 
regional contingency. (Forward ... From The Sea, 1994, p . 2) 
H. SUMMARY 
In this introductory chapter, the development of Marine Expeditionary 
Forces since World War II and their evolving role in the national military 
strategy has been briefly discussed. In the next chapter the impact of the BUR 
and the new National Security Strategy (NSS) on MAGTF organization and 
force structure is addressed. 
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II. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE STRUCTURE 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE EXPEDITIONARY ROLE 
The experience of the United States in the Gulf War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union were responsible for a fundamental change in the strategic 
environment. (National Security Strategy of the U.S. , 1993, p. 12) To confront 
these new changes the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States 
was based on the four "cornerstones": Strategic Deterrence, Forward 
Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution. This strategy was developed 
in response to the reorientation of U.S. strategic planning toward regional 
dangers and uncertainty. It entailed an increased emphasis on power 
projection tied to local sea control. This role was highlighted also in " ... From 
the Sea", a joint product of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps described the change 
in focus from an open ocean "blue water" strategy to one that emphasized 
power projection operations in the littoral areas of the world. (" .. . From The 
Sea," 1992, p. 1) Based on " ... From the Sea," the Marine Corps has articulated 
"Operational Maneuver From the Sea" which set forth the Navy and Marine 
Corps' concept for the projection of naval power ashore. ("Operational 
Maneuver From The Sea," 1993, p. 2) A key point in both documents was the 
emphasis on the capabilities of expeditionary forces to tailor their 
composition and structure to meet the Nation's needs. The ability to task-
organize forces to provide the required capabilities and flexibility in 
projection is the cornerstone ability of the MAGTF. 
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B. THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW 
Initiated in March 1993, the Bottom Up Review (BUR) provides a 
blueprint for planning and implementing a national military strategy for the 
21st Century. It announced that U.S. force planning is to be based on three 
fundamental principals. First, U.S. forces, alone or allied with friendly 
countries, must possess the capabilities to fight and win two nearly 
simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). Second, the United States 
must retain its status as a world power, and not turn to isolationism. Thirdly, 
the United States must maintain the fighting readiness of its armed 
forces .(Aspin, 1993, pp . 1-2) 
To meet the challenges of fighting two near simultaneous MRCs, NEFs 
must be efficient and effective. They must fight smarter and be able to exploit 
opportunities and employ complex weapons systems. Smaller, leaner, more 
maneuverable forces that are capable of forcible entry and self-sustainment, 
will replace the larger, less flexible forces of the past. NEFs will be called on to 
achieve objectives in littoral areas using resources tailored for the mission. 
Operations must be seamlessly planned, executed and supported to break the 
cohesion and integration of enemy defenses while avoiding attrition style, . 
head-on attacks. The mobility and sustainability of NEFs will serve as a force 
multiplier which allows for smaller sized forces possessing equal or greater 
capabilities of much larger forces of the past. 
NEFs of t~e fu ture will treat the sea as maneuver space and will rely on 
overwhelming tempo. This capability will demand the ability to apply 
sustainable forces operating at a high momentum to achieve total power 
projection with the already demonstrated technology of the Landing Craft Air 
Cushion (LCAC), Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V), and 
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tilt-rotor technology of the V-22 Osprey. Ships will be used as assembly areas 
and logistics bases which allow the MAGTF to maneuver from over the 
horizon. Speed and mobility will become dependent upon the ability to keep 
logistics responsive. The sustainment requirements under the new strategy 
will greatly stress the organic logistics capabilities of MAGTFs. 
The BUR proposes that the military threats the United States will most 
likely face are regional. The BUR proposes a balanced force mix for 
addressing the danger of a major regional war at a cost that will not 
undermine the national economy. Using a "building block" concept the BUR 
defines four broad classes of military operations: MRCs; smaller scale conflicts 
or crises, overseas presence, and deterring attacks by weapons of mass 
destruction. Due to their relative freedom of maneuver, NEFs are considered 
the "weapon of choice" in many contingencies that, for political reasons, e.g., 
sovereignty, may be inappropriate for the insertion of land-based forces. Yet, 
NEFs face the difficult problem of how to achieve the required capabilities 
under the new strategy when U.S. defense spending as a percentage of gross 
national product will fall to the lowest level since the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor. (Stockton, 1992, p . 4) 
For the Marine Corps the challenge is to redefine its force structure to 
accomplish its role as effectively as possible within the constraints imposed by 
shrinking defense budgets. (Krulak, 1992, p. 14) 
C. THE RESTRUCTURING 
Many respected defense analysts have argued that the way to improve 
the fighting effectiveness of the armed forces is not to reallocate huge defense 
budgets but instead to restructure the way the services are organized, 
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equipped and employed. (Barlow, 1981, p . 13) The Marine Corps began the 
restructuring process in August of 1991, the key concern being how to keep 
Marine forces relevant, ready, and capable, while at the same time complying 
with the need to become even leaner and more efficient in the future . 
(Krulak, 1992, p. 14) It was felt that even with the changing world situation, a 
need still existed for an expeditionary force like the Marines. The Marine 
Corps Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) decided to build a force that 
maintained the MAGTF capabilities vice develop new capabilities. One point 
was made clear when the Marine Corps briefed the national leadership on its 
restructuring plan: further reductions in endstrength would degrade current 
MAGTF capabilities and cause an increase in the current operating tempo. 
(Krulak, 1992, p . 15) 
1. The Restructuring Plan 
The restructuring plan did not leave one aspect of Marine Corps 
organization untouched. The Marine Corps is composed of two major 
groups, Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) and non-FMF. FMF units are the 
operating forces available for deployment. They are composed of combat and 
combat service support units that compose the MAGTF. Non-FMF Units are 
the supporting establishment which provides services from embassy duty to 
education, and recruiting. These forces are not available for composition in 
MAGTFs. Three active and one reserve Marine divisions help make up the 
FMF. 1st Marine Division is located at Camp Pendleton, CA; 2d Marine 
Division is located at Camp Lejeune, NC; 3d Marine Division is located on 
Okinawa, Japan; and the 4th Marine Division (reserve) is headquartered in 
New Orleans, LA with units located throughout the United States. 
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In response to direction stemming from the BUR, the Marine Corps 
looked extensively into ways of reducing overhead costs for both FMF and 
non-FMF units . The BUR determined, and the Secretary of Defense 
validated, the types and sizes of naval forces needed to execute the NSS. 
Specifically, it was agreed that a Marine Corps capable of fielding three MEFs 
along with the accompanying amphibious assault ships will comprise the 
core of Marine expeditionary force capabilities. 
The force structure reorganization for the FMF must be closely 
coordinated with the Navy to meet the problem of not only declining 
personnel and budget pools but also the declining availability of amphibious 
lift. In order to be able to provide the flexible response capabilities outline in 
the BUR, the MAGTF personnel and equipment levels must be compatible 
with available amphibious shipping. Once a mission is assigned to the 
MAGTF it must be capable of responding quickly, arrive on station in an 
expeditious manner, and once there, be capable of sustaining itself logistically. 
Forces of the future will need to exhibit less raw military strength (mass, 
firepower, etc.), but be tailored instead to influence the direction of 
geopolitical events. (Rothrock, 1993, p. 2) 
The new Marine Corps will be different. It will be smaller; 
yet, in many ways it will be more efficient as a warfighting team-
leaner, more mobile, more flexible , and more complementary in 
joint operations. Each element of the MAGTF has been given 
enhanced capabilities to meet the needs of the future. (Krulak, 
June 1992). 
Though smaller, the FMF will remain a balanced combined arms team 
with full sustainment capability. This includes the ability to deploy 
substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where prepositioned 
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equipment or adequate bases and support infrastructure are not available. 
This requires that the MAGTF force structure be reduced vertically vice 
horizontally. 
The current p rogram for amphibious lift calls for shipping to be capable 
of moving the assault echelons of two and a half MEBs instead of the current 
three. Future plans are to procure new but fewer amphibious ships. The 
goal is to maintain two to three Amphibious Ready Groups (ARCs), each 
with an embarked MEU, to be on station to provide forward presence. 
D. THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
The NSS of Engagement and Enlargement published in July of 1994 
recognized that while the threat of war among major powers and nuclear 
annihilation have receded dramatically troubling uncertainties and clear 
threats remain. These threats arise largely from the unstable political and 
economic transitions in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the worldwide resurgence of 
militant nationalism and religious and ethnic conflicts. (National Security 
Strategy, 1994, p. 1) Without active U.S. leadership and engagement abroad, 
the threats will grow and opportunities narrow. Current NSS is based on 
enlarging the democracy base and deterring and containing threats to the 
United States and its allies . The three central components to the strategy of 
engagement and enlargement are: efforts to enhance security by maintaining 
a strong defensive capability and promoting cooperative security measures; 
efforts to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; efforts to 
promote democracy abroad. Enhancing U.S. security requires developing and 
maintaining a strong defense capability of forces ready to fight. A strong 
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defense will arise from the deployment of robust and flexible military forces 
that can accomplish a variety of tasks such as; providing a credible overseas 
presence, and contributing to multinational peace operations. To meet these 
requirements successfully, U.S. forces must be capable of responding quickly 
and effectively. This ability requires qualified and motivated personnel, 
modern, well-maintained equipment, and sufficient sustainment capabilities. 
("National Security Strategy", 1994, p. 7) 
E. IMPACT OF THE MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 
Given the present nature of the world, NEFs must be efficient with far 
fewer resources. With reduced force levels and budgets at the lowest level 
since World War II, forces will pay huge penalties for inefficiencies. (Strategic 
Review, 1994, p. 13) The MTR provides one solution to the problem of 
matching increased demands to declining resources. Technological 
advancements in combat systems, space systems, and Command Control and 
Communications (C3I) systems are expected to provide the force-multipliers 
for lighter and more maneuverable force packages. Fiscal constraints will 
deny the luxury of redundant capabilities, and will require the joint 
integration of operations and logistics. The past decade marked a revolution 
in military technology that has enhanced not only the forces of the United 
States but also many Third World countries . Third World regional problems 
have raised dire questions concerning the future requirements for projecting 
, 
and protecting U.S. forces in Third World regions. 
The MTR has the potential to provide force multipliers that will allow 
the Navy and Marine Corps to restructure their amphibious forces around 
leaner more cohesive and flexible forces requiring reduced maintenance and 
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logistics support. The character of high-technology U.S. Expeditionary Forces 
with high ratios of combat to support personnel makes it difficult to sustain 
any prolonged operation of mid to high intensity tempo. Such operations are 
handicapped by the lack of large, shore-based, logistical infrastructures. 
However, when one reviews the types of operations that NEFs have been 
involved in the past decade a spectrum of conflict can be constructed. Figure 
















Level Of Violence 
Figure 2.1 Spectrum of Conflict 
Note: Chart derived from The Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval Institute, january 
1986, p. 8. 
26 
An important factor that impacts on logistical sustainment is that of 
forcible entry capability. The question of how much forcible entry capability 
to maintain and how to provide the necessary logistical structure to support it 
are extremely difficult to answer. The N avy and Marine Corps advocate that 
15-60 days sustainment will be necessary for forcible entry capable units 
operating in a low to mid intensity environment depending on the type of 
MAGTF. (Concepts and Issues, 1994) 
Expeditionary logistics require that amphibious ships and their escorts 
remain close enough to the land operation to provide continuous support. 
This concept contributes to a smaller foo tprint and logistics tail ashore. 
Helicopters, V-22 aircraft, and LCACs will be used to provide an "air-sea-
bridge" between the maneuver forces ashore and their sea-based logistics base. 
NEFs may benefit from improved equipment possessing greater reliability 
and requiring less maintenance. Also, containerized, prepackaged resupplies, 
combat loaded for easy access and distribution after delivery, will facilitate the 
rapid resupply and sustainment of forces ashore. 
While technologically complex weapons systems promise greater 
lethality and cost effectiveness they can be obtained only at the price of far 
fewer numbers of deployed weapons. One aspect of the MTR to remember is 
that advanced and complex systems require highly trained personnel to 
operate and maintain them. The combination of high Operating and Support 
(O&S) requirements directly impact on the tooth-to-tail ratio of a force. This 
issue is examined in chapters three and four. The MTR can expect to yield 
some lowering of manning levels due to higher engineered reliability. 
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E. SUMMARY 
As the result of a diminished Soviet threat, the United States has the 
opportunity to trim its defense commitments to accommodate other national 
priorities. A program of restructuring is underway to modernize and reduce 
the defense force structure to one that is more affordable. It is obvious that 
the new national security strategy will have a major impact on the size and 
capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps. NEFs in power projection roles 
will be central to this new strategy. Its success will depend, in part, on logistics 
and the inherent costs related to force sustainment. Logistical agility can be 
achieved by an increase in tactical mobility through the acquisition of 
lightweight armored fighting vehicles and an operational doctrine of 
maneuver warfare and the development of a sea-based logistical capabilities 
able to supply and maintain ground forces ashore. (Record, 1983, p. 3) 
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III. NOTIONAL MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the baseline force structures for notional MAGTFs are 
developed. From these baselines personnel strengths are determined 
according to the functional combat or support roles they perform, and the 
resulting tooth-to-tail ratios are calculated. Next, an analysis of personnel 
concentrations in logistics functional support areas is conducted to determine 
their contribution to the MAGTF "tail". Lastly, personnel and equipment 
costs for units within the MAGTF are calculated. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Marine forces are formed into MAGTFs for operations and exercises 
and, whenever possible, training. This practice promotes teamwork and 
coordination among the elements, and fosters the combined arms concept. 
While this concept provides tremendous organizational flexibility and 
integrated force projection capabilities, it also places a premium on the CSSE's 
ability to create and provide a flexible and responsive logistics apparatus. 
The current restructuring program in the Marine Corps is an effort to 
reorganize existing forces for optimal efficiency. The current plans for force 
reductions and an austere budget environment are in effect placing a 
premium on forces capable of operating with a "large tooth and small tail." 
In order to achieve and maintain acceptable tooth-to-tail ratios the United 
States must structure expeditionary forces to yield enhanced flexibility and 
capabilities while consuming less resources to do so than in the past. 
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The increased emphasis and use of NEFs in U.S. national strategy will 
force planners to reexamine the direct relationship between force projection 
capability and the logistical requirements to conduct sustained operations, or 
more simply put, readiness versus sustainability. Readiness and 
sustainability can be defined in the following terms. 
Readiness is the ability of forces, units, weapons systems, 
or equipments to deliver the outputs for which they were 
designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ without 
unacceptable delays). Sustainability is defined as the ability to 
maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity 
to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of 
providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, 
material, and consumables, necessary to support military effort. 
(JOINT PUB 1-02) 
This analysis views readiness as a function of sustainment, and 
sustainment as a function of readiness.s The tooth-to-tail ratio serves as a 
measurement of this relationship, and highlights the mutual dependence 
that exists between readiness and sustainability. The relationship between 
readiness and sustainability, as evidenced in tooth-to-tail ratios, will become 
increasing important indicator of expeditionary force capability in the future. 
C. NOTIONAL BASELINE STRUCTURES 
In order to effectively examine and analyze the tooth-to-tail ratio of 
MAGTFs it is necessary to develop a notional MAGTF force structure which 
can serve as a baseline. It will also facilitate the extrapolation of MAGTF-2015 
force structure. This baseline model is formed, based on accepted MAGTF 
5While sustainability is defined as the ability to maintain a certain level and duration of 
activity this analysis uses the term sustainment to describe the specific level of support, in terms of 
d<~ys of org-<mic support, a MAGTF possesses. 
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organizational concepts. From this notional force the tooth-to-tail ratio and 
the resulting capabilities of the notional force can be determined and used as a 
baseline for developing and measuring capabilities of future forces . 
Before 1991, MAGTFs consisted of three basic types: the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU); the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB); and the 
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). As the result of the BUR and the work of 
the Marine Corps Force Structure Planning Group, several changes to 
MAGTF organizations were made. One change was the decision to dissolve 
standing MEB headquarters staffs. The MEB structure evolved into what is 
currently termed a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF). In recent years 
there has been continuing debate over when it is appropriate to use the term 
MEB. It may develop into a term that describes a degree of capability as in "a 
MEB sized" force rather than an actual standing organization. The MEF 
possesses the permanent headquarters staff and remains the premier 
expeditionary capability.6 The term MEF (forward) may come to describe 
operations entailing a MEB size capability. The SPMAGTF will replace the 
MEB in planning terminology. (Interview with Maj. Stratman) Pending this 
evolution, this chapter discusses the composition of three notional MAGTFs: 
the MEU, MEB, and MEF. Including the MEB size force will help to quantify 
and analyze the tooth-to-tail ratios that result from "small", "medium", and 
"large" expeditionary capabilities. A brief explanation of organization and 
logistics sustainment capabilities of each is followed by a description and 
structure break~own of their respective Combat Service Support Elements. 
6The Marine Corps maintains three standing MEF headquarters. A MEF would be fully 
constituted from FMF units as the mission and task organization dictate. This analysis uses a notional 
MEF structure which reflects the current concepts for MEF force structure and capabilities. 
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D. COMPARATIVEANALYSIS 
Due to the sensitive nature of actual unit end strengths, the figures 
presented in this analysis are approximations based on open source data. 
Regardless of size or name, all MAGTFs are expeditionary. They are tailored 
for a specific mission and threat requirement, and must therefore have a 
flexible structure. As a result, estimates of MAGTF organizations above the 
MEU level become increasingly speculative and have therefore no exact 
Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs ). As such, it is difficult to 
determine the composition of the CSSEs in terms of transportation, 
engineering, C3I, ammunition handling, health, services, and maintenance. 
With these factors to consider, the estimates developed in this thesis must be 
viewed as approximations to be employed in selected planning and budget 
exercises. 
It is important to note that for planning purposes MEBs and MEFs may 
be divided into parts or echelons. The degree that this division occurs is 
dependent on the availability of assault amphibious shipping, which is 
affected by ship maintenance, and the exact task organization chosen for a 
given MAGTF. Generally speaking, at a minimum the Assault Echelon (AE) 
is comprised of that part of the MAGTF and its associated supplies that are 
needed to sustain it for an amphibious landing and the first 15 days of 
operations. Commercial ships and other modes of transportation are to carry 
personnel, equipment and supplies for the Assault Follow-On Echelon 
(AFOE) . Aircraft would transport personnel, supplies, and equipment of the 
Fly-In Echelon (FIE). The AFOE and FIE would carry enough supplies to 
support the MEB and MEF for an additional 15 to 45 days, respectively, thus 
achieving a sustainment capability of 30 days for a MEB and 60 days for a MEF. 
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This analysis assumes a 100% availabili ty of existing assault amphibious 
shipping and therefore does not break down MAGTFs into echelons. It also 
assumes that MAGTFs possess their full sustainment capabilities; 15 days for a 
MEU, 30 days for aa MEB, and 60 days for a MEF. 
1. Notional MEF Organization 
The MEF is the principal Marine Corps warfighting MAGTF. It is built 
around a Division/Wing team and can range in size from less than one, to 
multiple divisions and aircraft wings along with one or more Force Service 
Support Groups (FSSGs). Designed for 60 days of sustainment, a MEF will 
n ormally deploy in echelon with the lead elements designated as the MEF 
(Forward). It possesses 60 days of sustainment, and it is supported from its 
seabase. The MEF along with assigned n aval forces and assault amphibious 
shipping make up the Amphibious Task Force (ATF). The ATF possesses 




(GCE) (ACE) (CSSE) 
MARINE Marine FSSG 
DI VISION Aircraft Wing 60 days of 
Sustainment 
Figure 3.1 Notional MEF Organization 
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2. Notional MEB Organization 
The MEB is task-organized to accomplish specific missions for which 
the MEF or MEU would be inappropriate. It is normally built around a 
Regimental Landing Team (RL T) and a provisional Marine Aircraft Group 
(MAG) of attack and support aircraft, and a Brigade Service Support Group 
(BSSG) . The RLT is comprised of four maneuver battalions, three infantry 
battalions and one tank battalion. Tactical mobility is provided by Assault 
Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs), transport helicopters (CH-46E, CH-53A/D, 
CH53E) and trucks. Fire support is provided by a reinforced artillery 
battalion. The MEB possesses thirty days of sustainment and it is supported 
from its seabase. The MEB and assigned naval forces and assault amphibious 
shipping make up an Amphibious Task Force (ATF). The ATF possesses 




(GCE) (ACE) (CSSE) 
Regimental Marine BSSG 
Landing Aircraft 30 days of 
Team Group Sustainment 
Figure 3.2 Notional MEB Organization 
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3. Notional MEU Organization 
The MEU is normally built around a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), a 
composite helicopter squadron, a MEU Service Support Group (MSSG), and a 
command element. In some cases the squadron may contain VSTOL AV-8B 
aircraft. A MEU is deployed as an immediately responsive seabased MAGTF 
to meet forward presence and limited power projection requirements. The 
MEU provides an immediate crisis reaction capability and possess a limited 
capability for forcible entry. It possesses 15 days of sustainment and it is 
supported from its seabase of assault amphibious shipping. The MEU, along 
with the assigned naval forces and assault amphibious shipping constitute 
the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The ARG possesses approximately 3 
to 4 ships. The MEU fills the role of a forward deployed element of a MEB, 
which would be constituted as required. Currently, MEUs are the basic lead 
elements that are deployed on a continuous basis. They form, train, deploy, 
and then disband according to current rotation plans. Three MEUs are 
required to keep one deployed. These plans ensure total rotations of 
personnel and equipment about every six months. Figure 3.3, on the 





(GCE) (ACE) (CSSE) 
Battalion Composite MSSG 
Landing Squadron 15 days of 
Team Sustainment 
Figure 3.3 Notional MEU Organization 
E. MAGTF SUST AINABILITY 
A fundamental characteristic of a MAGTF is its ability to operate for 
extended periods as an expeditionary force, relying on organic resources for 
sustainment. All MAGTFs have an inherent self-sufficiency for pre-planned 
periods. Table 3.1, on the following page, lists the different sustainment 
levels for MAGTFs. Larger MAGTFs have a deeper, broader, and more 
capable support capability thanks to increased organic assets. 
MEU 115 days 
MEB l3o days 
MEF l 6o days 
SPMAGTF I As the situation reauires 
Table 3.1. MAGTF Sustainment Capabilities 
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MAGTFs can augment their organic sustainability by using external 
support from Navy organizations, wartime host nation support agreements, 
inter-service support agreements, and in theater cross service support. 
This analysis will only focus on the inherent organic sustainment capabilities 
of the MAGTFs. There are no textbook prescriptions for forming composite 
MAGTFs. Depending on size and organization, they possess different levels 
of offensive and sustainment capabilities. However, a key component built 
into the unit's structure is "mergibility." This basic capability exists to 
facilitate the combining and integration of units to constitute higher level 
MAGTFs. 
This chapter examines how support structures contribute to the combat 
capability of MAGTFs. Within MAGTFs, functional purposes cannot be 
based solely on unit designation. Marines assigned to the GCE are not only 
combatants; they may serve as supplymen, drivers, mechanics, or they may 
have a combination of these duties. Multiplicity of functions may also be true 
of the unit as a whole. But the line must be drawn somewhere, even though 
it may result in oversimplifications. This analysis uses a straightforward 
method for computing tooth-to-tail ratios . Once MAGTFs are broken down 
into the basic units that form its structure, a macro level classification can be 
made which further breaks down the component units of the CE, GCE, ACE 
into either combat or support roles . Personnel strengths are developed for 
units and the resulting tooth-to-tail ratios are calculated. This method has 
the advantage of. being generally applicable in across-the-board comparisons 
as it uses data reasonably estimated from available sources. 
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F. TOOTH-TO-TAIL RATIO 
1. Tooth-to-Tail Defined 
This analysis defines the tooth-to-tail ratio as the number of combat 
troops in the MAGTF supported by a certain number of support troops from 
the CSSE of the MAGTF. This ratio is computed by determining the number 
of personnel (Marine and Navy) assigned to combat roles in a MAGTF and 
dividing that figure by the total number of personnel assigned to support 
roles in that MAGTF. Therefore, 
Tooth-to-Tail ratio= (C/5), 
where; C=total combat forces strength, S=total support forces strength. 
2. Structure of Support Units 
The manpower strengths associated with support functions are 
computed by totalling the personnel strengths of units contributing to the 
functional support areas such as Supply, Maintenance, Transportation. The 
measurement is used to determine the relationships between the logistic 
support functions and different MAGTF configurations. 
G. BASIC CONCEPTS 
Combat power could be estimated by calculating the number of 
weapons operators per 1,000 men. The advantage of this method is that it 
presents a narrowly defined picture of the force's tooth-to-tail ratio. In 
practice, this method is extremely difficult to use because of the detailed 
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analysis required down to the small unit level. A simpler method is to 
measure the quantity of weapons and equipment which give the force its 
firepower. Once the combat power and the support element for a unit are 
estimated, a comparison can be made which relates the level of combat power 
for a force with the level of its accompanying support element. A drawback to 
this method is that it fails to address how the overall support structure is 
employed to operate the weapons. Yet, support structure is obviously 
important. This method does provide information as to how the tooth-to-tail 
ratios relate to combat power and capability. At issue is the relationship 
between the capability of a force, the tooth-to-tail ratio which is a product of 
that capability, and the costs to maintain and operate that force. 
In assessing the implications of these methods, it is necessary to have 
an analytical framework that allows for meaningful comparisons. One 
helpful approach in tooth-to-tail assessment is to view the MAGTF structure 
in a baseline form, evaluating major capabilities against support planned to 
sustain those capabilities. The issue then becomes one of determining how 
much capability the MAGTF derives from its combat forces as a result of an 
increment of support. 
H. FUNCTIONS 
In applying this baseline approach, it is useful to recognize that several 
support functions must exist for a MAGTF to perform its missions. Using 
this approach the support functions then can be translated into the MAGTF's 
actual capability to project combat power ashore. A measure of a unit's 
combat power thus can be gained by determining its capability to perform 
critical support functions. The latter include: 
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1. Ammunition Handling: the ability to store ammunition safely until 
breakout involves specific skills. Handling, packaging and transporting 
of ammunition resupplies is critical in the sustainment of combat 
operations. 
2. Supply: the supply system provides the MAGTF with the requisite 
materials for conducting combined arms operations. The needs of the 
supported units are the basis of the supply effort. 
3. C3I: a MAGTF must have effective C3I for developing a course of 
action. Real-time communications will be made possible through the 
use of satellite communications equipment. Portable navigational 
devices such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) will allow for 
pinpoint navigation and position locationing of forces, greatly 
enhancing the commanders ability to effectively employ and control 
his forces . Advances in data processing and communications utilizing 
satellite data-links provide the commander with direct 
communications to the National Command Authority. Space data-
links will allow the commander to access information from source 
based reconnaissance assets . These enhanced C3I capabilities provided 
will be critical for implementing/ coordinating maneuver and logistics 
ashore with the seabased infrastructure. 
4. Engineering: engineering provides the capability of the force to 
conduct construction, demolition and obstacle removal, engineer 
reconnaissance and explosive ordnance disposal. 
5. Transportation: a MAGTF must have adequate transportation to 
project naval power ashore. Once ashore, transportation assets provide 
the ability to maneuver and sustain forces. Adequate mobility is a 
critical capability for lightly armed expeditionary forces and serves as a 
40 
force-multiplier by virtue of its contribution to maneuver. The 
MAGTF must also have the capability to receive, absorb and transport 
adequate munitions, POL and other stocks while avoiding establishing 
a larger than necessary footprint ashore, and an excessive requirement 
for combat and support forces to operate and guard supply points. 
6. Health: health services are a critical aspect of logistics planning and 
operations that is often neglected but can have a tremendous drain on 
assets . It comprises health maintenance, casualty collection, treatment 
and evacuation. 
7. Services: adequate service support is necessary to provide for 
routine administration, disbursing, postal, legal, civil affairs, graves 
and registration. This function contributes to combat performance by 
providing a means to process casualties and replacements. For 
purposes of this analysis services include those units whose activities 
consist of a number of support activities that can not be categorized 
into one specific functional area of support. 
8. Maintenance: maintenance support is necessary to repair broken or 
damaged weapons and equipment and return it to serviceable status as 
rapidly as possible. Due to amphibious lift limitations NEFs will not 
have the luxury of large stocks of replacement weapons and 
equipment. 
A picture of a MAGTF' s force projection capability can be gained by 
examining its capability to perform the requisite support functions . In this 
context, it is useful to recognize that the current employment plans for NEFs 
that emphasize mobility, flexibility, and quick response demand higher 
performance in these functions. For example, real-time C3I is particularly 
important in force projection operations characterized by speed and 
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maneuver; transportation is needed to provide increased mobility and 
maneuver; and greater logistic support is needed to permit the sustainment 
of expeditionary forces. Efficient maintenance and a rapid individual 
replacement system are critical to maintaining the flexibility and momentum 
of operations. 
I. MAGTF MANPOWER 
1. Allocation 
A good starting point is to analyze how manpower is allocated between 
combat and support. A basic Marine Corps tenet is that every Marine is a 
rifleman. This means that all Marines exist to support the infantryman in 
combat. (Mundy, Concepts and Issues, 1994, p. i) For the purposes of this 
analysis, however, "combat" personnel are defined as those personnel who 
perform combat roles, e.g., infantry, artillery, tactical aviation. Support 
personnel are defined as those personnel performing roles in one of the 
functional areas of support, e.g., Supply, Transport, C3I. On a macro level the 
"tail" of a MAGTF can be composed of personnel from the CE, GCE, ACE, and 
CSSE. Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 display the personnel slice for notional MAGTFs 
and the resultant tooth-to-tail ratios. 
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ELEMENT I STREN GTH l % 0FMAGTF 
CE I 111 I 5 
GCE I 1,407 I 59 
ACE I 552 I 23 
CSSE I 325 I 14 
TOTAL I 2,395 I 100 
COMBAT I 1,495 I 62 
SUPPORT I 902 I 38 
TOOTH-TO-TAIL I 1.66:1 I 
Table 3.2. Notional MEU Strength. 
Information for Table 3.2 taken from, Aeet Marine Force Organization 1992 (FMFRP 1-11), and 
Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO P7000.14), 19 June 1991, and author's estimate. 
ELEMENT I STRENGTH I % 0FMAGTF 
CE I 734 I 5 
GCE I 5,265 I 32 
ACE I 7,530 I 46 
CSSE I 2693 I 17 
TOTAL I 16,222 I 100 
COMBAT I I) ,429 I 58 
SUPPORT I 6,793 I 42 
TOOTH-TO-TAIL I 1.39:1 I 
Table 3.3. Notional MEB Strength. 
Information for Table 3.3 taken from, Aeet Marine Force Organization 1992 (FMFRP 1-11), and 
Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO P7000.14), 19 June 1991 , and author's estimate. 
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ELEMENT I STRENGTH I % 0FMAGTF 
CE I 2,192 I 5 
GCE I 19,232 I 42 
ACE I 14,292 I 31 
CSSE I 9,815 I 22 
TOTAL I 45,501 I 100 
COMBAT I 21,505 I 47 
SUPPORT I 23,996 I 53 
TOOTH-TO-T A fL I 0.90:1 I 
Table 3.4. Notional MEF Strength. 
Information for Table 3.4 taken from, Fleet Marine Force Organization 1992 (FMFRP 1-11), and 
Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO P7000.14), 19 June 1991, and author's estimate. 
2. Functional Analysis 
A difficult question is whether larger manpower concentrations in the 
functional areas of service support buy significantly greater combat capability. 
Some insights can be gained by examining how these assets seem to 
contribute to the percentage of force strength. Table 3.5, on the following 
page, depicts units comprising the CSSE or "tail" of the MAGTF. Units have 
been divided into the functional areas of CSS. 
I Amrro Sut:mlyj C31 J Engineers Trans. Health Services I Maint. Total 
MEU 114 52 1219 1144 347 27 65 134 902 
MEB 142 I no l1542 lsoo 11215 1139 12104 1 ~31 16,793 
MEF 1405 13007 I 55o5 I 3409 12R93 11211 5773 11793 123 993 
Table 3.5 MAGTF Personnel Breakdown By CSS Functional Area 
Information for Table 3.5 taken from, Fleet Marine Force Organization 1992 (FMFRP 1-11), and 
Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO P7000.14), 19 june 1991, and author's estimate. 
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Table 3.5 shows that as the size of the MAGTF goes up, the number of 
personnel assigned to CSSE functional areas increases. The MEU possesses 
the larges t tooth-to-tail ratio , indicating a relatively high readiness vice 
sus tainability. In all CSS functional areas the MEU, when compared to the 
MEB and MEF, is rather austerely supported. Assets appear to be sufficient to 
support limited operations of short duration and intensity. The functional 
areas can provide the force with necessary supplies and equipment to begin 
an operation and have sufficient forces for limited resupply. In terms of total 
personnel strength, the MEB is 6.77 times larger than the MEU. In the 
m easured functional areas, the MEB size force shows an increase in CSS 
personnel strengths above that of the MEU by the factors displayed in Table 
3.6. Moving from the MEU structure to the MEB structure shows an increase 
in size factors which add to the sustainability of the MAGTF in greater 
proportion than to its readiness. This is shown in the MEB's tooth-to-tail 
ratio of 1.39. Of particular note are the large increases in Supply, C3I, and 
Services , while Health, Transportation, and Maintenance show increases 
comparable to the increase in Personnel size. Ammunition and 
Transportation show much smaller increases. The MEF is 19 times larger 
than a MEU. In the measured functional areas the MEF size force shows an 
increase in CSS personnel strengths above that of the MEU by the factors 
displayed in Table 3.6. When moving from the MEU structure to the MEF 
structure, particularly large increases are found in the areas of Ammunition 
Handling, Supply, Health, Services, and Maintenance. C3I and Engineering 
show smaller increases compared to the increase in personnel of the MEF 
over the MEU. Especially notable is the small growth in Transportation. The 
data shows an increase in support areas contributing to sustainment and a 
smaller increase in readiness reflected in the MEF's tooth-to-tail ratio of .90. 
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I Ammo I Supply I C31 I Eng. ! Trans. I Health I service I Maint. 
MEU/MEB 1 .33 l .o72 1.142 1 .1so 1 .286 1.194 1.031 1.147 
MEB / MEF 1.104 1.239 1.280 1.235 1.419 1.115 1.364 1 .129 
MEU / MEF I .o35 I .o17 1.040 1.042 I .12o 1.022 I .o11 I .019 
Table 3.6 Ratios of Personnel Strengths for CSS Functional Areas 
Note: Table 3.6 shows the relative increases in personnel per CSS functional area when 
comparing a MEU to MEB and MEF size MAGTFs. 
Table 3.7 depicts the MAGTF functional areas of CSS. Each functional 
support area is displayed as a percentage of total CSS strength for each 
MAGTF. 
I Ammo I Supply I C3I I Eng. I Trans. I Health I Service I Maint. 
MEU 11.6 15.8 124.3 116.0 138.5 1 3.o 1 7.2 1 3.8 
MEB 1.6 110.6 122.7 111.8 117.9 12.0 131.0 13.4 
MEF 11.7 I 12.s 122.9 114.2 112.1 l5.o 124.1 I 7.5 
Table 3.7 MAGTF CSS Functional Areas as a Percentage of Support 
Of particular note is the relatively large percentage of CSS structure 
allocated to C3I for all three MAGTFs. For the MEU, C3I accounts for 24% of 
CSS and Transportation accounts for 39% of CSS. For the MEB C3I and 
Services account for 51% of CSS and for the MEF C3I and Services account for 
47% of CSS structure. These results indicate that the increase in CSS 
structure, as one moves from a small to a medium and to a large 
expeditionary capability, are concentrated in command and control and 
services. Supply accounts for roughly 10% of CSS structure for the MEB and 
12% for the MEF. Transportation accounts for roughly 18% of CSS for the 
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MEB and 12% for the MEF. In moving from a small to a medium and then 
large exp editionary capability a shift in the percentage of personnel assigned 
to combat and support functions occurs. Figure 3.4 is provided to help 
visualize the change in balance between combat and support structure as one 





















Percentage of Strength 
Combat vs. Support 
R COMBAT 
+SUPPORT 
MEU MEB MEF 
Personnel Strength 
Figure 3.4 Shift in Combat vs. Support Troops for Notional MAGTFs 
(Horizontal Axis not to scale) 
3. Indications of Performance 
This analysis has treated manpower as the primary indicator of 
resources inves tments and performance. However, additional observations 
can be made in comparing MAGTF weapons densities . Tactical aviation 
asse ts are counted as w eapons systems as their primary purpose in supporting 
the MAGTF is to provide close air support of ground forces ashore. Weapons 
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density in this case is defined as the number of major weapons per 1,000 men 
in a MAGTF. Table 3.8, on the following page, displays the quantities of 
major weapons systems possessed by the notional baseline MAGTF. 
I MEU I MEB I MEF 
Tanks M60A1 I 4 I 14 I 44 
AAV I 12 I 47 I 208 
LAY I 8 I 27 I 110 
155 HOW I 4 I 36 I 96 
105 HOW I 4 I -- I --
81mm Mortar I 8 I 24 I 72 
60mmMortar 12 I 36 I 108 
MK-19 MG 26 I 114 I 600 
TOW Msl Lr 8 I 48 I 144 
DRAGON Lr 24 I 72 I 216 
.50Cal MG 20 I 138 I 435 
M60MG 50 I 206 I 601 
HAWK Msl Lr -- I 8 I 116 
STINGER Lr 5 I 45 I 90 
AV-8B 6 I 40 I 60 
F! A-18 -- I 36 I 72 
A-6E -- I 10 I 10 
EA-6B -- I 6 I 6 
CH-53 4 I 28 I 44 
AH-1W 4 I 12 I 24 
CH-46E 12 I 48 I 60 
UH-1N I 4 I 12 I 24 
Table 3.8 Notional MAGTF Major Weapons 
Note: Information for Table 3.8 taken from,Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global 
Capability (FMFRP 2-12), Washington, D.C., HQMC, April 1991, and author's estimate. 
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A quick measure of a unit's combat power can be derived from the 
quantity of weapons it possesses, the assumption being that higher weapons 
densities equate to increased combat power. Increases in weapons densities 
also imply a need for greater functional support. In order to compare the 
combat power of different MAGTFs the number of major ground weapons 
per MAGTF is calculated. These figures do not include aircraft because MEUs 
do not possess many of the tactical aircraft common to the MEB and MEF 
(F / A-18, A-6) and comparisons would not be equitable. Table 3.9 shows 
major ground weapons densities for MAGTFs. 
MAGTF MEU MEB MEF 
Manpower Strength 12,395 116,222 145,501 
Number of Major Weapons 1185 1815 12,740 
W pns Density 177.24 150.24 160.22 (# Wpns/1 O<XJ Troops) 
Wpns Density 123.75 86.44 127.41 
(#Wpns / 1000 Combat Troops) 
Table 3.9 Major Ground Weapons Density per MAGTF 
Table 3.9 presents two different weapons densities for each of the three 
MAGTFs. The Weapons density per 1,000 men is based on the number of 
total personnel in a MAGTF. The weapons density per 1000 combat troops is 
based on the number of combat personnel assigned to MAGTFs. It is 
interesting to note that the densities calculated using total personnel are 
highest for MEUs at 77.24, decreases to 50.24 for MEBs, and increases again to 
60.22 for the MEF. In the MEU's case, these results may indicate a high 
readiness in terms of potential combat power and a lesser capability for 
sustainment. The MEB results may indicate a higher level of sustainment for 
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existing weapons relative to potential combat power. In the case of the MEF, 
the results may indicate greater balance in higher levels of readiness and 
sustainment. When using densities calculated from combat personnel 
strengths the densities show the same pattern of decreasing from the MEU to 
the MEB and then in creasing from the MEB to the MEF. Using this method 
the weapons densities for the MEF actually exceed the densities for the MEU. 
The use of a particular density method depends on what is being 
measured. Because NEFs are task-organized from a variety of units to 
perform a specific mission the more appropriate measure of their combat 
power can be arrived at by using the densities calculated using total personnel 
strengths . If the intent is to measure and compare combat power between 
units the densities calculated using combat troop strength may be more 
appropriate. 
Another area to look at in order to compare combat power is the 
number of assets available per MAGTF for transportation and mobility . 
Table 3.10, on the following page, shows transportation densities for each 
notional MAGTF. 
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MACTF I MEU j MEB j MEF 
Manpower Strength 12,395 116,222 145,501 
Total Trucks l2o I so 1127 
Truck Density(# Trucks /1000 troops) 18.35 13.08 12.79 
Truck Density(# Trucks /1000 combat troops) 113.38 15.30 15 .90 
Transport Helos 116 176 1104 
Helo Density(# Helos/1000 troops) 16.68 14.68 12.29 
Helo Density(# Helos/1000 combat troops) 110.70 18.06 14.84 
LCAC 16 124 178 
LCAC Density(# LCAC / 1000 troops) l 2.so 11 .48 11.71 
LCAC Density (# LCAC / 1000 combat troops) 14.01 12.54 13.63 
Table 3.10 Transportation Density per MACTF 
Note: Figures on equipment taken from Fleet Marine Force Organization 1992, (FMFRP 1-11), 
Washington, D.C., HQMC, 2 March, 1992, and author's own estimate. 
Again, it is interesting to note the effect that increases in MAGTF size 
have on the calculated densities. In examining these differences one would 
not expect to find the MAGTF density changes depicted in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 Notional MAGTF Densities/1000 Troops 
Nll te: (Strengths not to scale) Figure 3.5 is based on information extracted from Reet Marine 
Force Organization 1992, (FMFRP 1-11), Washington, D.C., HQMC, 2 March 1992, and author's 
es timate. Densities are calculated using total personnel strength per MAGTF. 
These results tend to indicate that the task-organizations used to 
es tablish the MAGTFs "building block" concept is not linear. For example; 
three MEUs can n ot fo rm a MEB because of a shortfall in command and 
support units . This example is also applicable when trying to form a MEF 
fro m three MEBs. The disparities in densities may be explained by examining 
the MAGTF force structure. In moving from the MEU to the MEB, and again 
from the MEB to the MEF, the MAGTF organization enjoys a significant 
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increase in support troops and a comparatively smaller increase in combat 
troops and weapons. The resultant changes in densities are graphically 
displayed in Figure 3.5. Appendix F contains a detailed analysis and further 
elaboration on the changes in MAGTF densities. 
It is important to note that the percentage changes of personnel in each 
CSS functional area which were previously discussed play an important role 
in density differences. The CSS structure change is in fact a summation of the 
functional area structure changes. Each MAGTF is structered slightly 
differently to achieve different sustainment and combat capabilities. Tables 
3.6 and 3.7, display the increase in CSS structure by functional area. From 
these tables one can gain an understanding of the different factors 
contributing to the changes in MAGTF densities. For example; in comparing 
the personnel increases when moving from the MEB to the MEF there is a 
smaller overall increase in number of transportation assets compared to 
larger increases in non-transportation related CSS. In moving from the MEB 
to the MEF the percentage of transportation related CSS increases at a greater 
rate causing an increase in densities. 
4. Assault Amphibious Shipping 
Assault amphibious shipping is a key component of the NEF. Put 
simply, amphibious ships are the sea-bases from which naval forces operate. 
This thesis has estimated the assault amphibious shipping requirements for 
notional MAGTFs, using current assaul t amphibious shipping assets and 
respective capacities. The results are shown in Table 3.11, on the following 
page. A detailed discussion of amphibious lift is presented in Chapter IV. 
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/ LH I LPD I LSD I LST / LCAC 
MEU 11 11 11 11 16 
MEB Is 14 Is 17 124 
MEF 114 In 113 118 178 
2.5 MEBs 112 /w /13 117 /60 
Table 3.11 Estimated Amphibious Ship Mix For Notional MAGTFs 
Note: Information for Table 3.11 taken from "Integrated Operations & U.S. Marine Corps Air 
Requirements Study," Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 26 September 1993, and 
author's estimate. 
J. DEVELOPMENT OF COST 
Having established a baseline structure for notional MAGTFs and the 
corresponding tooth-to-tail ratios, the next step in this analysis is to estimate 
the cost of achieving and maintaining the tooth-to-tail ratios of MAGTFs. 
1. Introduction To Costing 
During times of shrinking defense budgets and resources, accurate cost 
estimation plays an increasingly important role in allocating resources. This 
is also true for the cost associated with an expeditionary MAGTF capability. In 
developing cost estimates for this analysis the internal cost factors developed 
by the Marine Corps are used in this thesis. The Marine Corps Cost Factors 
Manual (MCO P7000.14) is the standard handbook of all the accepted cost 
factors used by the Marine Corps. These cost factors apply specifically to 
organic Marine Corps units. The cost factors pertain to classes of personnel 
and types of equipment and are designed to facilitate the rapid estimation of 
selected costs for planning, programming, cost and economic analysis. The 
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information contained in the Cost Factors Manual is generally only applicable 
to the peacetime Marine Corps. Wartime consumption rates could be 
considerably different than those listed in the manual and would have to be 
estimated using an operational tempo factor for adjustments. (Vessey, 1994) 
The costs, therefore, represent the peacetime costs of maintaining a wartime 
capability. 
K. MILITARY CAPITAL 
1. Measures of Capital 
The next step in this analysis is to estimate the capital value (value of 
total assets in inventory) of MAGTFs, including planes, equipment and 
weapons authorized by a unit's Table of Authorized Equipment (T /E). This 
thesis is in agreement with Healy's observation that, "in presenting the topic 
of military capital, several key concepts need to be represented and 
understood. They are: investment, capital stock, capital services value, 
benefit, and the treatment of R&D costs." (Healy, 1994, p. 44) 
a. Investment 
"Investment" is the value of the durable military asset as 
acquired for a particular year. (Hildebrandt, 1990, p. 160) Marine Corps 
investment costs for development are detailed in the form of research and 
development accounts covered by Navy appropriations "Blue Dollars" 
(RDT&E,N) . It is important to note that Marine Corps aircraft and associated 
ground support equipment are bought with Navy dollars; their acquisition 
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costs for weapons and equipment are spelled out annually under Aircraft 
Procurement, Navy (APN). 
b. Capital Stock 
"Capital stock" measures the value of durable assets held in 
inventory. This inventory can represent capital goods that were acquired in 
past years but are still in service and rendering benefits. (Hildebrandt, 1990, p . 
161) The value of the capital stock is measured in constant dollar, i.e., the 
amount that would be required to replace a durable asset. 
c. Capital Service Value 
"Capital service value" is a measurement of a durable asset's 
"value" during a particular year. (Hildebrandt, 1990, p. 161) It is necessary to 
consider capital services value in light of current force structure 
reorganizations and its relation to the recapitalization of force structure: 
(Healy, 1994, p . 45) For this analysis, capital services value will take into 
account both the capital stock value and the service life of durable assets. 
d. Benefit 
W~1en acquiring additional durable assets it is necessary to 
consider not only the cost of the asset but also the benefits yielded throughout 
the asset's service life. (Hildebrandt, 1990, p . 161) In procuring an additional 
unit of military equipment, it is expected to yield benefits over its service life. 
By taking into account constant dollar value the unit's annual benefits per 
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procurement dollar can be calculated .7 The following formula is used to 





~ ~ = 1 ( 1 -+- r) 
Where r is the discount rate, 1 is the service life, and B the annual benefits per 
procurement dollar.8 If the discount rate, accounting for the time value of 
money, is 0 (r=O) the formula for benefit specializes to B = 1/l. This indicates 
that the annual benefit received per dollar invested is inversely related to the 
service life of the asset. (Hildebrandt, 1990, p. 162) 
e. R&D Cost 
Research and development (R&D) costs are not considered part 
of the capital services value of MAGTFs, they are considered a "sunk cost" of 
a previous period. 
2. MAGTF Capital Stock 
Table 3.12 displays the aggregate capital stock value ofT IE equipment 
of the three notional MAGTFs. Equipment includes, crew weapons, vehicles, 
7 Constant dollars remove the effects of inflation and facilitate the comparison of capital 
values across time. 
8tt is assumed that the last procurement dollar spent is equal to the annual benefits received from 
I 1 
that procurement dollar: 1 = B L. 1 
r=I (i+r) 
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and individual and personal equipment possessed by baseline MAGTFs. The 
numbers and types reflect systems that are rated by TIE for the notional units 
and do not include aircraft and related ground support equipment. 
a. Equipment 
Unit equipment costs for Marine Corps units are composed of 
the procurement cost of the unit's T /E, including individual equipment and 
personal weapons, and organizational equipment (vehicles, crew weapons 
etc.), purchased under Marine Corps Appropriations. These figures show the 
average replacement cost of each item of equipment, and do not include 
assault amphibious ships or aircraft and ground support equipment costs.9 
I MEU I MEB I MEF 
CE 1 $5.96 1 $20.45 1 $85.43 
GCE 1 $29.1 1 $132.45 1 $603.61 
ACE 1 $2.25 1 $135.71 1 $278.74 
CSSE 1 $7.48 1 $66.70 1 $222.88 
TOTAL I $44.7l) I $355.31 I $1,190.66 
Table 3.12 Capital Stock Values For Organic Equipment Rated by USMC Units 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model. (CRM 93-158). (Alexandria, VA. 
Center for Naval Analysis, August 1993), Table 2. and Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO 
P7000.14), Washington, D.C., HQMC, 14 June 1991 Table 4B1. Costs do not include ship, aircraft 
and their ground support equipment, or the peacetime operating stock of spare parts. Costs in 
millions of FY 91 dollars. 
9APN support costs associated with spares, support equipment, and peacetime operating stocks 
can be estimated by applying a factor of 26 percent of the aircraft weapons system procurement costs. 
(Eskew, 1993, p . 9) 
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b. Aircraft 
Aviation unit T I E costs, which include the cost of equipment 
procured with Navy Appropriations ("Blue Dollars"), represent the average 
total procurement or replacement costs of the current aircraft . To gain a 
fuller understanding of costs it is useful to take into account the impact of 
training and maintenance requirements and their impact on a unit's ability to 
achieve a certain state of readiness. 
A certain number of aircraft are needed for training purposes to 
achieve and maintain readiness of personnel. This requirement is 
compensated for by a percentage factor for each type of aircraft. (Naval Combat 
Aircraft: Issues and Options, 1987, p. 38) Extra aircraft are required to achieve 
a certain readiness objective for a unit. These aircraft serve to cover aircraft 
that are in a maintenance vice operational status. This is the "pipeline" 
demand, and is accounted for using a percentage factor for each type of 
aircraft . (Naval Combat Aircraft: Issues and Options, 1987, p. 38) 
c. Aircraft Requirement Calculations 
In addition to the aircraft rated by a MAGTF's T /E "extra" aircraft 
are needed to support the training of pilots and maintenance personnel as 
w ell as provide a reserve of aircraft to sustain operations. These "extra" 
aircraft play an important role in providing and maintaining a certain 
readiness. These "extra" aircraft therefore must be factored into total aircraft 
requirements. An example of this calculation for the AV-8B aircraft follows . 
Aircraft Requirements = number of Primary Aircraft Authorized (P AA) + 
training requirements + maintenance requirements. (Naval Combat Aircraft; 
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Issues and Options, 1987, p . 38)10 Table 3.13 presents the combined cost of the 
aircraft needed to support the deployed MAGTFs. 
A/ CTYPE I MEU I MEB MEF 
AV-HB I $226.80 1 $1 ,411.2o 1 $2,1 16.80 
F/ A-lH I -- I $1,771.20 $3,542.40 
A-6E 1 -- I $628.60 I $628.60 
EA-68 1-- 1 $316.80 $31 6.8 
CH-53 1 $135.60 I $836.20 $1,310.80 
AH-1W I $58.80 I $156.80 I $31 3.60 
CH-46E 1 $255.oo 1 $1,o2o.oo 1 $1,275.oo 
UH-1N I $58.80 I $156.80 $303.80 
TOTAL I $735.oo I $6 297.6o I $9 8o7.8o 
Table 3.13 Capital Stock Value Of Aircraft 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model. (Crm 93-158). (Alexandria, VA., 
Center For Naval Analysis, August 1993), Factors obtained from Naval Combat Aircraft: Issues 
and Options. Congress of the United States, CBO, November 1987, p . 38. All costs in millions of 
FY 91 dollars. 
d. Assault Amphibious Shipping 
Estimated capital stock values for assault amphibious ships are 
shown in Table 3.14, on the following page, and reflect the cost of the 
estimated ship mix requirements for the notional MAGTFs depicted in Table 
3.11. 
1 0 An example for the MEU A V -88 is: 
l .!H l/ (1.00-.20)=1.25, 1.25 /(1.00-.10)=1.39, l.3Y x 6 = 8.34. Any fracti onal requirements for an aircraft 
must be rounded up to a whole number which results in the adjusted inventory amount, 9.00. (Refer to 
Appendix C for detailed calculations 
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Ship Type I Unit Cost I MEU I MEB I MEF 
LPH / LHA / LHD 1 $850 1 $85o 1 $4,250 1 $11 ,9oo 
LPD 1 $330 1 $330 1 $1,320 1 $3,630 
LSD 1 $250 1 $250 1 $1,250 1 $3,250 
LST 1 $103 1 $103 1 $721 1 $1,854 
LCAC 1 $20 1 $120 1 $480 1 $1,560 
TOTAL I I $1,653 I $8 021 I $22,194 
Table 3.14 Capital Stock Values for Assault Amphibious Shipping 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model. (CRM 93-158). (Alexandria, VA. 
Center for Naval Analysis, August 1993), Table 2. Due to different possibilities for ship mix 
units costs are averages for ship types. All costs in millions of FY 91 dollars. 
Table 3.15 depicts the aggregate capital stock values for notional MAGTFs. 
(Costs in millions of FY 91 dollars) I MEU MEB MEF 
T I E Equipment and Weapons 1 $44.79 1 $355.31 1 $1 ,190.66 
Aircraft 1 $735 1 $6,297.6 1 $9,807.8 
Assault Amphibious Shipping 1 $1,653 $8,021 $22,194 
TOTAL I $2,433 $14 674 $33 193 
Table 3.15 Estimated Aggregate Capital Stock Value For Notional MAGTFs 
3. Capital Services Value for MAGTFs 
If it is assumed that amphibious ships have a 40 year service life, 
aircraft a 20 year service life, and TIE equipment and weapons a 15 year 
service life, the Qggregate capital services value for three notional MAGTFs 
can be estimated. (DOC, 1993, p. M-17) Recapitalization is emphasized by 
assuming the discount rate is zero and the annual benefit received per dollar 
invested is inversely related to the service life of the asset. Capital services 
value can be estimated by dividing the capital stock value of an asset by its 
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service life (B=l/1). Table 3.16 shows the aggregate annual capital services 
values for MAGTFs. 
I UNIT COST MEU MEB MEF 
Tanks M60A1 1 $1.5 1 $.387 1 $1.37 1 $4.37 
AAV 1 $.969 $.773 1 $3.03 $13.4 
LAY 1 $.762 $.41 $1.4 $5.6 
155 HOW 1 $.553 1 $.15 1 $1 .3 1 $3.5 
105 HOW 1 $.o21 1 $.ooo4 I $0 I $0 
R1mm Mortar 1 $.013 1 $.oo7 1 $.o22 1 $.066 
60mmM ortar 1 $.o11 1 $.oo9 1 $.028 1 $.09 
Mk-19 MG 1 $.oo9 1 $.016 1 $.07 1 $.36 
TOW Msl Lr 1 $.115 1 $.oo4 1 $.025 1$.07 
DRAGON Lr 1 $.014 $.023 $.07 1 $.21 
HAWK Msl Lr 1 $.517 $0 $.276 1 $.552 
STINGER Msl 1 $.027 1 $.oo1 $.005 $.011 
.50Cal MG 1 $.015 1 $.o2 $.14 $.44 
M60MG 1 $.oo3 1 $.o11 1 $.05 1 $ .14 
AV-8B 1 $25.2 $11.34 1 $70.56 1 $105.84 
F I A-1 R 1 $36.9 I $0 1 $88.56 1 $177.o 
A-6E 1 $44.9 I $0 1 $31.43 1 $31.43 
EA-6B 1 $39.6 I $0 1 $15.84 $15.84 
CH-53 1 $22.6 $6.78 $41.81 1 $65.54 
AH-1W 1 $9.8 1 $2.94 . 1 $7.84 1 $15.68 
CH-46E 1 $17 1 $12.75 1 $51.0 1 $63.75 
UH-1N I $Y.8 1 $2.94 1 $7.84 1 $15.20 
TOTAL I $38.56 $323.00 $519.00 
Table 3.16 Aggregate Annual Capital Services Values For MAGTF Weapons and Aircraft 
Costs estimated from Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO P7000.14), Washington, D.C., 
HQMC, 14 june 1991 Table 4B1. Costs in millions of FY 91 dollars. 
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Table 3.17 shows the capital services value for amphibious shipping. 
SHIP TYPE I UNIT I MEU I MEB I MEF 
LPH / LHA / LHD 1 $21.25 1 $21.25 1 $106.2 1 $297.5 
LPD 1 $8.25 1 $8 .25 1 $33.o 1 $90.75 
LSD 1 $6.25 1 $6.25 1 $31.25 1 $81.25 
LST 1 $2.58 1 $2.58 1 $18.o 1 $46.35 
LCAC 1$1.3 1 $8 .o 1 $32 1 $104 
TOTAL I I $46.o8 I $220.45 I $619.85 
Table 3.17 Estimated Capital Services Value for Amphibious Ships 
(Costs in millions of FY 91 dollars) 
Table 3.18 depicts the aggregate capital services values for notional MAGTFs. 
I MEU I MEB MEF 
T I E Equipment I $2.98 I $23.68 I $79.38 
Major Weapons I $1.81 I $7.78 I $28.84 
Aircraft I $65.75 I $363.85 $542.24 
Amphibious Ships I $46.08 I $220.45 $619.85 
TOTAL I $116.6 I $616 I $1,270 
Table 3.18 Aggregate Capital Services Values for Notional MAGTFs (millions of$) 
(Costs in millions of FY 91 dollars) 
When one compares the MAGTF' s capital stock value in Table 3.16 
with their aggregate capital service value in Table 3.18, it becomes apparent 
that simply maintaining a constant inventory level of durable military assets 
requires a significant annual investment to replace the consumed benefit for 
the previous period. As capital services value equals the capital stock value 
divided by the service life, it represents the annual investment needed in 
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procurement to maintain the existing inventory. It does not contain the cost 
of operating and supporting the equipment. These costs are discussed later. 
L. OPERATING AND SUPPORT (O&S) COSTS 
O&S costs reflect the costs of operating, maintaining, and supporting a 
fielded system. O&S costs can be described as the value of efforts undertaken 
to achieve, and sustain a desired state of readiness. Table 3.19 shows O&S cost 




Other Mission Personnel 
UNIT-LEVEL CONSUMPTION 
POL/Energy Consumption 
Consumable Materials/Repair Parts 
Depot Level Repairables 
Training Munitions 
INTERMEDIATE/DEPOT MAINTENANCE (External to Unit) 
Maintenance 
Consumable Materials/Repair Parts 
CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 
Interim Contractor Support 
Contractor Logistics Support 
SUSTAINING SUPPORT 
Support Equipment Replacement 
Modification Kit Procurement/Installation 
Other Recurring Investments 
Sustaining Investment Support 





Table 3.19 O&S Cost Elements 
Information taken from, Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group, Mny 1992, p. 4-2 
64 
Many cost elements are not considered in the calculation of O&S costs 
because they can be considered one-time acquisition costs or contribute to 
sustainability rather than readiness. Several examples of these type costs are; 
ROT &E and military construction. (Hildebrandt, 1990, p . 6) In studying the 
O&S costs one can simplify the task of analysis by dividing O&S costs into two 
groups; direct O&S costs and indirect O&S costs. Direct O&S costs are seen as 
those variable costs elements which directly impact on O&S costs and vary 
with incremental changes in force structure and operating tempo. Indirect 
O&S costs are seen as those cost elements that do not vary with the 
incremental changes in force structure or operating tempo. 
A main interest of this analysis lies in the identification of the cost 
associated with achieving and maintaining a MAGTF capability in peacetime. 
One method that can be used to simplify this task is to focus on the direct 
O&S costs and using them as representative estimates for measuring and 
comparing the cost of achieving and maintaining a certain MAGTF capability. 
In pursuing this interest the following list of representative elements were 
identified and selected from the Cost Factors Manual as being particularly 
useful in defining and estimating direct O&S costs for MAGTFs. (Vessey, 
1994) These are displayed in Table 3.20 on the following page. 
This analysis was unable to estimate depot level maintenance costs for 
ground equipment and weapons possessed by the MAGTF because 
maintenance records are not kept by unit, only by equipment item. This data 
is reflects depot level maintenance data for the total numbers of each item 
held in the Marine Corps inventory. Depot level maintenance was factored 
into the aviation and assault amphibious shipping O&S costs obtained from 
the Revised Fiscal Requirements Model. 
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GROUND COMBAT EQUIPMENT 
MISSION PERSONNEL 
Navy and Marine Corps 





ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 
Table 3.20 Elements Contributing to Direct O&S Costs 
This analysis employs two different methods of estimating O&S costs 
for MAGTFs. First, the Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual is used to calculate 
representative O&S costs related to operating and maintaining a notional 
MAGTF. The Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual contains selected 
information concerning cost elements that account for significant portions of 
direct O&S costs for MAGTFs. (Vessey, 1994) When combined with the direct 
O&S costs for amphibious ships obtained from the Revised Fiscal 
Requirements Model, a representative estimate of direct O&S costs for 
notional MAGTFs can be made. A benefit of using this method in this 
analysis is that it provides a simple and quick method of calculating a 
representative portion of the direct costs associated with operating and 
maintaining a particular size MAGTF. These representative estimates can 
then be used as a basis for comparison between the MAGTFs. 
One may gain a better appreciation for the complexity involved in 
estimating O&S costs by using an analogy that likens O&S cost estimations to 
the determina tion and application of overhead costs in business operations. 
The larger the operation being performed the greater the number of indirect 
support variables contributing support to the operation, and the greater the 
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impact on total costs that these support variables have. This is to say that for 
analyzing relatively small operations direct costs will provide a good picture 
of the incremental costs associated with performing that operation as the 
indirect "overhead costs" may not significantly contribute to the incremental 
cost of operations. However, as the size of the operation increases so does the 
requirements for input from additional support resources. These support 
resources begin to comprise a larger portion of total operating costs and 
preclude the use of direct costs as an effective estimate of total costs of 
operating. 
The task of estimating MAGTF 0&5 costs using the Cost Factors 
Method becomes increasingly difficult for the MEBs and MEFs due to the 
increases in force structure and impact of indirect O&S costs on the total O&S 
cost structure. The larger MAGTFs, especially the MEF, begin to comprise a 
significant portion of the total Marine Corps active duty endstrength and 
equipment. As such they account for a significant portion of total Budget 
Authority (O&M) and manpower appropriations for the Marine Corps. For 
this reason the Quick Cost Model is used as a second method to calculate O&S 
costs for this analysis. The Quick Cost Model, described in detail later in this 
chapter, is the model used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to 
calculate O&S costs. This model is suitable for estimating O&S costs for 
larger MAGTFs due to its ability to link indirect O&S costs to major force 
program elements. For MEF size MAGTFs the Quick Cost Model provides a 
more comprehensive and accurate picture of the 0&5 costs because it takes 
into consideration those elements listed in Table 3.19 and their support costs 
as they relate to program elements. Again, it is important to include these 
costs when estimating MEF size force costs. However, when dealing with 
smaller size MAGTFs, which constitute a much smaller portion of total 
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Budget Authority (O&M) manpower for the Marine Corps, the cost factors 
method may provide a reliable es timate of variable direct costs for cost 
analysis and budget exercises. 
1. Cost Factors Method 
a. Mission Personnel and Training 
Military Personnel costs are computed using annual workyear 
rates computed from the Navy's Revised Fiscal Requirements Model. The 
Marine Corps officer and enlisted workyear rates are $59,116 and $24,971, 
respectively. The Navy officer and enlisted workyear rates are $63,761 and 
$27,408, respectively. Personnel costs are calculated by multiplying the 
number of personnel in the MAGTF by the appropriate workyear rate. These 
numbers reflect the personnel cost of the unit at authorized strength. They 
are based on FY91 average man-year rates from the President's FY91 Budget 
Submission for USMC / USN officer and enlisted personnel. (Refer to 
Appendix A for data). Training costs for MAGTFs include funded operations 
and port visit services. Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) are funds used to 
send advance parties to locations to coordinate for training, conferences, port 
visits . (lstLt Pitts, 21 Sept, 1994) 
b. Unit Level Consumption 
(1.) Maintenance Costs. These costs take into account the 
maintenance costs for individual equipment which are calculated by 
multiplying the number of personnel in the unit by the average annual 
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individual equipment maintenance cost of $448. Maintenance costs do not 
take into account the cost of upgrading, replenishment, replacement of 
ground equipment and weapons conducted at depot level maintenance 
facilities. (lstLt Pitts, 21 Sept, 1994) 
(2.) Training Ordnance. These costs take into account the 
cost of high-usage training ammunition and ordnance for ground combat 
units expended annually to achieve readiness objectives established for 
deployed MAGTFs. (1stLt Pitts, 21 Sept, 1994) 
(3.) POL/Fuel. These costs take into account fuel 
consumption factors for MAGTF ground vehicles and equipment. Fuel 
allowances are computed based on equipment operating and consumption 
rates for an allotted number of operating days ashore for each MAGTF. (lstLt 
Pitts, 21 Sept, 1994) 
(4.) Aircraft. The average annual O&S costs for aircraft 
can be estimated using the following equation. 
O&S Aircraft=( cost/ flight hr)x(Ann. flight hrs)+(cost of rework)=Ann. cost of 
aircraft, (Ann. cost of aircraft)x(operating ratio)x(operating tempo)= 
O&S / aircraft.ll Calculations take into account fuel, depot level repair and 
maintenance costs. (Eskew, 1993, p. 19) 
11 The operating ratio is determined by dividing the time each aircraft is operationally 
capable by the sum of the time the aircraft is operationally capable and the time the aircraft is not 
operationally capable. The operating tempo is the average amount of time each aircraft was utilized 
in fl ying activities. An Op Tempo factor of 1.0 reflects 1991 flying hours. (Eskew, 1993, p. 19) 
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(5.) Assault Amphibious Shipping. The average annual 
O&M costs for amphibious shipping can be estimated using the following 
equation. (Eskew, 1993, p. 20) Detailed estimates are displayed in Appendix D. 
Ship O&M Costs ={(OFF strength x work year rate)+(ENL strength x work year 
rate)}x(steaming hrs under way)x(op tempo factor)x(fuel cost per steam hr 
under way)+(steaming hrs not under way)x(fuel costs per steaming hr not 
under way)+(depot level maintenance costs) 
Table 3.21 and 3.22 depict estimated costs for notional MAGTFs. 
IMEU MEB MEF 
PERSONNEL I $65.9 I $834.7 $1,270.6 
MAINTENANCE I $1.6 $3.2 I $27.6 
TRNG ORDNANCE I $2.1 I $6.4 I $25.2 
POL/FUEL I $.013 I $.051 I $.302 
AIRCRAFT O&S I $so.o I $440.5 I $623.8 
ASSL T. AMPHIB. SHIP O&S I $56.2 $280.6 I $765.9 
TOTAl 0&-S I ct2nr. 'tl ."lhh I <t2 7n 
Table 3.21 Estimated O&S Costs for MAGTFs 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model, (CRM 93-158).(Alexandria, VA. 
Center For Naval Analysis, August 1993), Table 2. and Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO 
P7000.14), Washington, D.C.,HQMC, 14 June 1lJ91. Cost in millions of FY 91 dollars. 
I (Costs in millions of FY 91 $) I MEU MEB I MEF 
CapStkVal I $2,433 $14,674 I $33,193 
CapSvcVal I $117 I $616 I $1,270 
O&S Costs I $206 $1,566 I $2,713 
! Tnnth-tn-T;Jil I ~.66:1 I 1.39_:1 I .90:1 
Table 3.22 Selected MAGTF Costs 
Custs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model, (CRM 93-158).(Alexandria, VA . 
Center For Naval Analysis, August 1993), Table 2. and Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO 
P7000.14), Washington, D.C.,HQMC, 14 June 1991, and historical data . 
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7. Quick Cost Model 
a. Overview 
The Quick Cost Model approach to O&S cost estimation becomes 
relevant for the MEF size MAGTF. MEFs account for a significant portion of 
total Budget Authority (O&M) and manpower appropriations for the Marine 
Corps. The model's ability to link indirect O&S costs to major force program 
elements provides a more comprehensive and accurate picture of total O&S 
costs than can be achieved by using the Cost Factors Approach. 
The Quick Cost Model takes changes to Primary Defense Forces (e.g., 
numbers of divisions, airplanes, ships, etc.) and calculates costs for Primary 
units and all Supporting units . These costs are provided in terms of Budget 
Authority (BA) or Total Obligational Authority (TOA), and Manpower. 
(Vassar, 1989, p. 3) The Quick Cost Model is fully compatible to the Defense 
Resources Model (DRM) used by the Congressional Budget Office. 
Unclassified data is obtained from budget year data of the Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP). This unclassified "Baseline" file is created by 
aggregating FYDP Program Elements (PEs) into DRM Aggregate Elements 
(AEs) and Resource Identification Categories (RICs) into Resource Identifiers 
(Ris). This process or "roll-up" creates a file which is further processed to 
"disaggregate" certain AEs into additional AEs. (Vassar, 1989, p. 3) 
b. Aggregate Elements (AEs) 
AEs are broken down into Primary AEs, changes in the resources 
in Primary AEs are directly related to changes in its force level. Related AEs 
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are proportional to certain resource changes in certain resources of all 
primary and related AE, and other AEs. All are listed in Appendix D. For the 
purposes of this analysis, AEs are grouped in three categories; primary, 
related, and support (with support consisting of auxiliary and other AEs). The 
model cost calculations are hierarchical in nature, where changes to AEs in a 
support category depend on changes to certain resources at a higher level. 
The "certain resources" varies with support category and are called "Proxies". 
The proxies which directly influence changes in a particular AE are divided 
into seven categories. Changes to an AE are a function of what proxies affect 
it. How the proxies change is based on changes to force structure inputed into 
the model. Proxy sources appear at the top of the left hand side table in 
Appendix A, and the higher categories over which they are summed appear 
in the middle table. A related AE does not support all Primary AEs, only the 
certain ones it is "linked "to. (Vassar, 1989, p . 9) 
c. Fixed-Variable Percent 
When a resource change is computed for an AE it is multiplied 
by a "fixed/variable percent" quantity. This is the percent an AE would 
decrease by if all resources in higher categories were removed. Primary AEs 
are assumed to have a fixed/variable percent of 100. 
For example; if there were no primary AEs in the model, there would 
be no need for Primary AE resources. Related AEs fall between 80 and 100 
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percent, and Support AEs from 0 percent to appropriate set percents. (Vassar, 
1989, p. 10) The fixed/variable percent factors are derived from historical data 
pertaining to the impact of force structure changes on O&S costs in the post 
World War II era. For this analysis the primary AEs represent a Marine 
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Division, associated aircraft representing a Marine Aircraft Wing, and support 
elements. These forces comprise roughly one-third of the Active Marine 
Corps. Likewise, the primary AE comprised of 56 Assault Amphibious Ships 
represents a significant portion of Navy ship assets. When dealing with 
primary AEs that represent a large portion of total force structure, the 100% 
fixed /variable may not be appropriate. The author's personnel knowledge 
and experience with logistics indicates that the selection of appropriate 
fixed /variable percent warrants further research. When dealing with a 
primary AE that comprises a large percentage of force structure it is important 
to consider the support received from a broad base of support AEs. Removing 
a primary AE would not wholly affect the need for all related support AEs, 
which are also supporting other primary AEs. 
d. Internal Factors 
Each AE has 13 internal factors which are listed in Appendix A. 
Each internal factor is a linear combination of from one to seven Ris. 
The Internal Factors are part of the Force Cost Equation for Primary, Related, 
and Support AEs. Force Cost calculations are hierarchical beginning with 
Primary then proceeding to Related and then Support AEs. Changes to O&S 
costs resulting from changes to force stru cture are attained by compiling 
changes to the Primary, Related, and Support AEs and then summing them 
together. (Vassar, 1989, p. 12) 
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M. COST PRESENTATION 
One of the major focuses of this analysis is to determine the tooth-to-
tail ratios for MAGTFs and the related costs of achieving these ratios. As 
discussed, this analysis utilizes the Quick Cost Model, used by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as one method, to estimate O&S costs for a 
notional MEF. The Quick Cost Model breaks O&S costs down into three basic 
AEs discussed earlier: Primary, Related, and Support. These costs can be 
viewed as the costs of achieving and maintaining MAGTF readiness. The 
Primary AEs (e.g., Divisions, Aircraft, Assault Amphibious Ships) consist of 
that portion of manning (MPMC, RPMC, MPN, RPN) and operating (O&M, 
MC,N, APMC, APN) required for direct support. The APN contribution is 
not for individual aircraft procurement, but for direct support items which 
are funded in the APN account. The Related AEs include the accounts listed 
above (MPMC, RPMC, MPN, RPN, O&M, MC, N, APN) but pertain to indirect 
rather than supporting roles (e.g., command and control). The Support AEs 
include the accounts listed above, and also the remainder of the 
appropriations accounts (e.g., MCON, MCNR, FH, N&MC, etc.) that are 
needed to house dependents, build and operate maintenance facilities, etc. 
Several categories such as Investment, RDT&E, are not estimated by the 
model. For purposes of this analysis the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BR&C) account is excluded. Table 3.23 provides a summary of the Quick Cost 
Model results for a MEF. 
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Element I Primary AE I Related AE I Support AE I Total AE (millions $) 
MarDiv w / AC I $1159.2 1 $444.o 1 $709.0 1 $2,312.2 
AsltAmph. 1 $1413.1 1 $171.2 1 $765.9 1 $2,349.4 
Total O&S I I I I $4,661.6 I 
Table 3.23 Quick Cost Model O&S Costs Estimates for a Notional MEF 
Costs generated from the Quick Cost Defense Resources Model, Computer Software Model-
Copyright, Thomas B. Vassar, 1989. 
Now that the MAGTF Capital Stock Value, Capital Service Values and 
O&S costs have been estimated, the ratio of these costs for a given force 
structure can be developed. A macro view of the relationship can be seen 
using the formulas (O&S Costs/Cap SvcVal), and (CapSvcVal/CapStkVal). 
Table 3.24 shows the calculated ratios for the three MAGTFs using costs 
estimated by the Cost Factors Method. 
I MEU I MEB I MEF 
CapSvcVal/CapStkVal 1 .048 1.042 1.038 
O&S / CapStkVal 1 .o8s 1.107 1.082 
O&S / CapSvcVal 11.76 12.54 12.14 
Too th-to-Tail 11.66:1 11.39:1 I .90:1 
Table 3.24 Selected MAGTF Costs 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model, (CRM 93-158).(Alexandria, VA. 
Center For Naval Analysis, August 1993), Table 2. and Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO 
P7000 14), Washington, D.C.,HQMC, 14 June 1991, and historical data. All costs in millions of 
FY 91 dollars. 
Table 3.25, on the following page, presents a summary of cost ratios for a MEF 
size MAGTF using the Quick Cost Model. 
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Element 1 CapSvcVal / CapStkVal I O&S / CapStkVal j O&S / CapSvcVal 
MEF I .038 I .140 I 3.671 
Table 3.25 O&S To Capital Value Ratios For Notional MAGTFs 
Costs generated from the Quick Cost Defense Resources ModeL Computer Software Model-
Copyright, Thomas B. Vassar, 11J81J. 
These ratios serve a useful purpose in that they summarize the various 
costs associated with achieving and maintaining a MAGTF and its related 
tooth-to-tail. The first ratio relates Capital Services Value to Capital Stock 
Value of a particular size MAGTF and describes the average annual 
investment (in terms of a percentage of total capital value) required to 
maintain a constant inventory of capital equipment. The second ratio relates 
the O&S cost to the Capital Stock Value of a particular size MAGTF and 
describes the annual cost of operating and supporting a given force as a 
percentage of the MAGTF's total capital value of equipment. The third ratio 
relates the O&S costs to the Capital Services Value of a particular size MAGTF 
and compares the cost of operating and supporting a force to the cost of 
maintaining a constant inventory of capital equipment. Table 3.24 depicts the 
relative significance of direct O&S costs utilizing the Cost Factors Method and 
Table 3.25 depicts the significance of direct and indirect O&S costs utilizing the 
Quick Cost Model. The ratios produced by both methods point out the 
significant impact that O&S costs can play in achieving and maintaining a 
MAGTF capability. When comparing the total O&S costs of the MEF, 
estimated by the Quick Cost Model to the direct O&S costs of the MEF 
estimated by the Cost Factors Methods the results show that total O&S costs 
(direct and indirect) generated by the Quick Cost Model are 1.7 times greater 
than the direct O&S costs generated by the Cost Factors Method. Again, this 
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difference in O&S costs estimates results from the inclusion of indirect O&S 
costs, assigned to the various program elements inputed into the Quick Cost 
Model. 
N. SUMMARY 
This chapter examines on a macro level, the notional organizational 
s tructure for MAGTFs and what is required in terms of personnel and 
equipment to field them. The tooth-to-tail ratios are helpful when used as a 
monitoring device to establish and demonstrate trends in MAGTF force 
structure, as well as a measure of a MAGTF's readiness and sustainment. 
This analysis has shown that as one moves from a small to a medium 
and to a large expeditionary capability e.g., from a MEU to a MEB to a MEF a 
shift occurs in the levels of readiness and sustainment possessed by each 
MAGTF. The various investment and support costs involved with 
achieving a desired readiness and sustainment capability must be carefully 






To facilitate the task of describing MAGTF-2015 and estimating its 
capabilities this analysis examines several major factors that will impact on 
future MAGTF structure and capabilities. First, likely missions are examined 
and discussed in terms of their impact on future expeditionary force 
requirements and capabilities. Secondly, the impact of operating in an 
environment of fiscal constraint balanced with the benefits gained from 
advances in technology and equipment modernization programs as they 
impact on expeditionary force capabilities are discussed. Thirdly, the 
es timated impact of reductions in assault amphibious shipping on 
amphibious MAGTF capabilities and force structure are examined and 
analyzed. 
A picture of MAGTF-2015 is achieved by extrapolating from the 
notional baseline MAGTF. The extrapolation takes into account the major 
factors just discussed to arrive at a macro level picture of MAGTF-2015. 
B. FORCESTRUCTURE 
This chapter recognizes and addresses the pivotal role played by NEFs 
in the NSS and how this role will impact on force structure for MAGTF-2015. 
In order to perform this analysis the following implicit assumptions are 
m ade. First, the basic configuration for MAGTFs, (e.g., CE, GCE, ACE, CSSE), 
will remain unchanged. Second, The NSS will remain focused on the ability 
of our force to engage in two, near simultaneous, MRCs. Third, current 
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levels of sustainment for MAGTFs remain unchanged. Lastly, future 
missions and employment of the NEFs will not require major departures 
from current authorized active forces endstrength for the Marine Corps. 
1. The Nature of Future War 
The simple act of downsizing MAGTFS will not solve the budget issue 
nor will it provide a forward deployed force capable of a timely and effective 
initial response. An important factor impacting on the downsizing of forces 
is the added risk to personnel that it causes. Risk comes from degradation of 
combat power. Even minor loss of American Servicemen's lives may 
become so unacceptable to the point of being a major factor to consider in the 
planning and implementation of foreign policy. (O'Keefe, SGL, 26 July 1994) 
2. Organizational Structure 
In the author's judgement MAGTF-2015 will possess the same basic 
combined arms structure that has proved effective for the past four decades. 
Looking at the personnel strengths and representative major weapons 
systems of MAGTFs over the past four decades one can see that the structure 
and composition has remained remarkably stable despite changes to Marine 
Corps endstrength. The consistent factor contributing to stability is the 
amphibious expeditionary role performed by MAGTFs. Taking this stability 
into account, and the continuation of the expeditionary role, a good argument 
can be made for consistency in structure. Some changes will occur in 
amphibious lift and mobility assets, as the result of shrinking budgets and as 
defense planners organize expeditionary forces to face the new missions at 
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hand . What will these missions be and what is the composition of forces that 
are required to deal with them? How will the tooth-to-tail ratio change for 
future forces? This chapter attempts to answer these questions. 
C. MISSIONS FOR MAGTF-2015 
Revolutionary changes in technology, making weapons systems more 
lethal and more accessible to Third World countries, will continue to 
contribute to the need for crisis response capabilities. Due to geopolitical and 
socioeconomic factors there will likely be an increase in the occurrence and 
frequency of global "hotspots" that require force projections short of war. 
Limited actions, support to land operations, and show-the-flag missions will 
predominate while the probability of a large blue-water naval conflict will be 
slight. (Odom, 1992, p. 5) 
1. Peacetime Engagements 
In the three years immediately following Desert Storm, NEFs have 
deployed 17 times for crisis situations short of war. ( Mundy,Concepts and 
Issues, 1994, p. 5) The instances of these "Peacetime Engagements" has shown 
dramatic growth. One can expect to see an increase in operations occurring 
on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, reflecting the following types of 
operations: 
1. Disaster Relief 
2. Humanitarian Assistance 
3. Counter Drug Operations 
4. Arms Control/Treaty Compliance 
5. United Nations Security Forces 
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The NEF's unique capabili ties put them in a position to empower NMS 
in peacetime and war. Even when we are not close to going to war 
amphibious forces are used. (RAdm Durr, SGL, NPS, 16 August, 1994) 
2. Requirements and Tradeoffs 
How can forces bound to a fixed force strength effectively confront 
increasing numbers of commitments? Competing requirements for limited 
resources will make tradeoffs inevitable. Achieving the strategic objectives of 
forward presence, deterrence, and promotion of peace in a declining resource 
environment will force NEFs to take advantage of every opportunity to 
enhance efficiency and to exploit the leverage of technology. Specifically this 
will require that the following or similar actions be taken: 
1. Review functions and capabilities and divest those which are not 
essential to mission accomplishment. 
2. Adopt an aggressive neck-down strategy to reduce material and 
manpower functions. 
3. Modernizing through the exploitation of new technologies. 
3. Multipurpose/Multirole 
Guided by the requirements of flexibility, and constrained by dwindling 
budgets and amphibious lift limitations, MAGTF-2015 will take advantage of 




In performing the role of forward presence MAGTF-2015 will see 
employment as a crisis response, stop-gap force, which uses the sea to exploit 
opportunities. Emphasizing maneuver, speed, agility, and a small footprint 
its comparative advantage lies in not becoming engaged in sustained and 
costly land operations. 
1. Implications For The Future 
What then are the implications for future MAGTF force structure? 
Likely force structure parameters for MAGTFs should include: 
1. Limit the density of forces tha t are exposed to enemy lethality by 
investing in sufficient maneuver capability. 
2. Limit the footprint ashore and thus limit its exposure. 
3. Mold the force to achieve the capabilities required by "peacetime 
engagements" rather than total war. 
4. Assure continued U.S. naval supremacy in the Amphibious 
Objective Area (AOA). 
2. Achieving Objectives 
NEFs will achieve their objectives either completely from their sea base 
or through the establishment of a tailored forces ashore. 
A timely initial response is key. Forces must be structured 
for war not peace. Then if peace turns to crisis quickly, you will 
have the capability to make good a credible presence and 
response. (RAdm Durr, SGL,NPS,16 Aug 1994) 
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E. PRINCIPLES 
1. Operational Maneuver From The Sea 
"Operational Maneuver From The Sea" sets forth several basic 
principals under which MAGTFs will operate: 
1. Focus on a strategic objective. 
2. Use the sea as maneuver space. 
3. Create overwhelming tempo. 
4. Pit strengths against weaknesses. 
5. Rely on intelligence, deception, and flexibility. 
Such employment demands flexibility and momentum, both of which 
will be achieved through the use of ships as assembly areas to begin 
maneuver from over the horizon. 
2. The Logistical Challenges 
Crucial challenges will be faced by the MAGTF CSSE as it tries to 
support increased mobility, maneuver and sustainment in a much more 
fluid environment. Sustainment requirements will stress logistics 
capabilities. Speed and mobility equal to that of the combat forces is essential 
to keep logistics responsive to the dynamic needs. The flow of CSS must be 
controlled, efficient, secure, and timely. 
The structure of the Marine Corps ground forces must be modified to 
produce enhanced tactical mobility, which is necessary to implement 
maneuver doctrine. (Lind, Reforming the Military, p. 26) 
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3. The Neck-down Strategy 
The ongoing trend of significantly reduced budgets will severely limit 
investments in the capabilities and responsive programs needed to meet the 
challenges of the next century. MAGTFs will have to review all functions 
and capabilities and divest themselves of those which are no longer essential 
to accomplish the mission. This strategy of divesting itself of unnecessary 
capabilities can be described as a "neck-down" process to reduce material and 
manpower assets. This neck-down will be made possible because some 
capabilities, such as the Multiple Launch Rocket s 'ystem (MLRS), are available 
as support from other services, such as the Army. Efforts will include 
extending the service life of existing systems vice developing and producing 
new ones. Implementation of these principles will help minimize resource 
requirements and the logistical infrastructure to sustain them. The 
effectiveness of any force structure will change as circumstances evolve and 
adversaries act to counter the most dangerous attributes of the force as they 
perceive it. Force structure must evolve to fit the changing conditions in 
which it will operate. (Peters,1993, p. 154) 
F. POWER PROJECTION CAP ABILITIES 
1. Tactical Mobility 
In developing MAGTF-2015, it is important to recognize the particular 
impact that tactical mobility will have on future MAGTF structure. Tactical 
mobility will likely be enhanced by three key platforms on the cutting edge of 
technology. First, to revolutionize the movement by air from ship to shore is 
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the MV-22 OSPREY which is planned replace the CH-46 and CH-53 helicopter 
fleets. Second, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) is 
planned to replace the current Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV). Third, 
the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) will continue to provide high speed 
surface transportation of personnel and equipment from ship to shore. 
2. Enhancements 
These enhancements to maneuver and mobility open new windows to 
the projection of naval power ashore. MAGTFs of the future will be capable 
of a more rapid response to crisis, and will also be able to meter that response 
from quick and light to sustained and overwhelming combat power from 
bases at sea. 
G. MAGTF FORCE SIZE 
MAGTF-2015 will consist of the same basic force structure elements as 
today's MAGTF (CE,GCE,ACE,CSSE). Its capabilities will roughly be measured 
in terms of forward deployed MEUs which posses the ability to merge into a 
MEB size or larger force. MAGTF-2015 does not suggest any reduction in the 
overall size of the Marine Corps.9 
YThe ahility of the Marine Corps to implement national foreign policy objectives is directly related to its size. 
The BUR validated Marine Corps active duty end strength at 174,000. Further end strength reduction will have a 
negative effect on capabilities and will stretch thin its ability to field MAGTFs with significant end strength and to 
maintain a satisfactory deployment tempo and will degrade the crisis response capability. (Mundy, Concepts & 
Issues. li.J94) 
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H. EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 
In addition, the proliferation of sophisticated threat systems 
throughout the world will mandate a series of modernization requirements 
for MAGTF weapons and equipment. In recent years, the Navy and Marine 
Corps have invested in improvements that increase the speed and 
maneuverability of the equipment responsible for transporting troops and 
equipment from ship to shore. This analysis addresses several key programs 
that exploit technological advancements and enhance the capabilities of 
expeditionary forces. 
1. Aircraft 
The current policy is to integrate about 20% of Marine tactical air into 
Navy Carrier Wings. This results in the operational control of these aircraft 
being shifted from the MAGTF Commander for use in close air support of the 
MAGTF to the Navy Task Force Commander for use as he sees fit. (Concepts 
& Issues, 1994, p . 2-12) For example, directed missions might include strike 
interdiction missions or defense of the carrier battle group vice close air 
support of forces operating ashore. 
a. Advanced Aircraft 
The Marine Corps' long range aviation plan aims to reduce the 
number of aircraft types in its inventory. It is planned that an advanced short 
take-off and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft, based on tilt rotor technology 
developed for the V -22, will replace the F I A-18 and A V -8B, and meld the best 
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of both. Helicopter I tilt-rotor aircraft will provide the MAGTF with tactical 
and logistical air support. (Integrated Amphibious Operations & U.S. Marine 
Corps Air Requirements Study) 
b. Medium Lift Alternative (MLA) 
For the past three years, the MV-22 has been the Marine Corps 
number one acquisition priority. The MV-22 is looked on as a replacement 
for the 40 year old technology in the current medium lift fleet of CH-46E and 
CH-530 helicopters . The MV-22's combination of range, speed and payload 
almost triples the current capabilities offered by helicopters. The MV-22 is 
designed to have a top speed of over 240 knots, and to carry 24 combat loaded 
troops, compared to the CH-46E's top speed of 140 knots and 18 combat loaded 
troops. The MV-22 will allow naval ships adequate stand-off distance to 
respond to systems such as shore-to-ship missiles, enhanced observation, 
underwater mines, and other developing threats. A more probable near-term 
plan may be to utilize the Service Life Extension Plan (SLEP) to extend the 
life-span into subsequent models of existing aircraft. Figure 4.1 shows a 
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KC-130R ~ KCX 
Figure 4.1 USMC Long-term Aviation Plan 
Note: Information for Figure 4.1 taken from "Integrated 
Amphibious Operations & U.S. Marine Corps Air 
Requirements Study", Washington, D.C., Department of 
the Navy, 26 September 1993, and author's estimate. 
2. Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) 
Designed to replace the current Amphibian Assault Vehicle (AAV), the 
AAA V will serve as the principal means of tactical surface mobili ty for the 
MAGTF. Operationally, it will satisfy multiple mission area needs, such as 
surface power projection shoreward and armor-protected land mobility and 
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supporting fires provided by its organic weapons systems. One proposed 
design proposes a craft capable of water speeds of 25 knots compared to the 
AAV's 8 knots. 
3. Artillery 
A light-weight 155mm howitzer (LW155) will provide organic fire 
support to the MAGTF and replace the heavier M198 155mm howitzer. The 
L W 155 will retain the current range and lethality while providing improved 
transportability by ground and air systems. The L W155 will also eliminate 
reliance on the 105mm howitzer currently in MEU inventories. 
4. LCACs 
LCACs will p lay a key role in over-the-horizon, ship-to-shore transport 
of troops, equipment, and supplies. Operating in littoral regions, LCACs will 
provide the "sea-land bridge" which overcomes many of the obstacles to 
amphibious ships tha t come from working in shallow water areas. 
5. C31 
Integrated communications and tactical data systems will allow 
commanders real-time communications and data automation capability to 
process information to aid in decision making. Navigation Satellite Timing 
and Ranging (NAVSTAR) Global Positioning System (GPS) will provide the 
MAGTF with a significantly improved navigational capability and allow for 
encrypted satellite communications. Land based, Joint Surveillance Target 
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Attack Radar (JSTARS) under command of the Air Force, will provide the 
MAGTF with real-time ground intelligence information in an area of 
interest. A frequency-hopping digital VHF-FM radio will replace current 
radios and provide a secure voice and interoperability in joint operations. 
6. Weapons 
Reflecting reduced personnel strengths, MAGTFs will be task organized 
to meet the likely threat described previously. Weapons density for MAGTF-
2015 will decrease slightly but still provide the ability to project highly 
accurate and lethal fires through increased resupply capabilities. Increased 
cargo capacity and high speed logistical air mobility provide the ability to 
rapidly resupply and sustain higher rates of usage than before. The air 
transportable L W 155 howitzer will provide supporting fires in excess of 30 
kilometers with a much greater mobility. Table 4.1, on the following page, 
shows the estimate of major weapons possessed by MAGTF-2015. It is likely 
that advances in weapons systems engineering and development will have a 
great impact on future types and numbers of weapons systems held by the 
MAGTF. However, to facilitate measurements and comparisons between the 
current MAGTF and MAGTF-2015 this analysis assumes that MAGTF-2015 
will possess follow-on models of the same type weapons, and their 
capabilities, as the current baseline MAGTF. This assumption allows the 
analysis to and ~ocus on changes in combat power resulting from force 
structure changes. 
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MEU I MEB I MEF 
M1A1 I 4 I 14 I 44 
AAA V I 10 I 38 I 167 
LAV I 6 I 22 I 88 
LW 155 I 3 I 18 I 56 
81 nun Mortar I 6 I 18 I 56 
60nun Mortar I 9 I 27 I 86 
MK1lJ MG I 20 I 90 I 480 
TOWLR I 6 I 38 I 115 
DRAGON I 18 I 56 I 172 
.50 cal MG I 16 I 110 I 348 
7.62MG 40 I 164 I 480 
HAWK Lr -- I 5 I 10 
STINGER Lr I 3 I 24 I 48 
AV -8C I 7 I 43 I 66 
F/ A-1 8E I -- I 36 I 72 
A-6F I -- I 10 I 10 
EA-6C I -- I 6 I 6 
CH-53F I 4 I 30 I 46 
AH-1X I 4 I 13 I 26 
CH-46F I 12 I 50 I 64 
UH-l M I 4 I 13 I 26 
Table 4.1 Estimate of MAGTF-2015 Major Weapons 
I. AMPHIBIOUS LIFT 
Amphibious ships are designed from the keel up to transport and 
support NEFs. Requirements for amphibious ships are based on amphibious 
lift goals of transporting and supporting specified NEFs. 
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Transportation and logistics are fundamental elements of 
modern military power. They distinguish minor from major 
powers, and major powers can be reduced to minor status in 
some conflicts if they do not plan for sufficient transports and 
stocks of material. (Odom, 1992, p. 87) 
In a 4 November 1984, memorandum from the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps (CMC) to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the CMC agreed to 
accept operational risks and scale-down the then current amphibious lift 
requirements to fit the number and types of amphibious ships maintained by 
the Navy. It was recognized that these degradations in amphibious lift 
brought with them an increase to risk in the ability to conduct amphibious 
operations. This concept required the desired force levels of the MAGTF to be 
scaled down to conform to the amphibious shipping provided. The letter 
agreed that the Navy should count all active ships in matching lift to 
requirements, even if they are unavailable due to overhaul. (Barrow, 1982) 
1. Current Capabilities 
The current amphibious lift goal set by the NMS, is to provide 
sufficient lift for the assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. The current amphibious 
lift is nominally capable of 2.5 MEBs. To be effective, tomorrow's smaller 
forces will have to be more mobile, and to respond more quickly. (Planning a 
Navy for Austerity, CNA Study, 1991, p. 9-20) 
2. Future Capabilities 
Satisfying a requirement for 2.5 MEBs of lift in 2015 will be achieved by 
a planned reduction in the types and number of ships, replacing them with 
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newer ships of multipurpose design. As the result of budget trade-off 
decisions involving recapitalization of the Navy the amphibious fleet will 
shrink from 60 ships in 1991 to a projected 36 in 2015. The resulting 
amphibious fleet will be more homogeneous; as a result, some of the 
planning difficulties associated with a fleet comprised of ships of many types 
and ages may be reduced. Table 4.2 shows the estimated amphibious ship 
reductions for 2015. 
Shio Tvoes 1991 2015 
LPH I 7 I 0 
LHA 5 I 5 
LHD 2 7 
LPD-4 I 11 0 
LPD-17 I 0 I 12 
LSD-36 I 2 I 0 
LSD-36M I 3 I 0 
LSD-41 8 8 
LSD-49 I 0 4 
LST 18 I 0 
LKA 4 I 0 
TOTAL 60 I 36 
Table 4.2 Results of Amphibious Lift Reduction Strategy 
Information for Table 4.2 taken from "Integrated Amphibious Operations & U.S. Marine Corps 
Air Requirements Study", Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 26 September 1993. 
J. AMPHIBIOU~ READY GROUPS (ARGs) 
Built around the MEU, ARGs are made up of the combined Naval and 
Marine forces , and are trained, organized and equipped to perform specified 
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amphibious operations. As MAGTF-2015 is somewhat smaller in numbers 
than the notional baseline MAGTF, MEU ARGs will be composed of 3 ships, 
(LHA / LHD, LPD-17, LSD-41/49), and possess 30 days of sustainment. The 
MEB and MEF continue to be task organized for specific missions utilizing 
available amphibious shipping and assets. 
To meet the planned deployment schedule and provide 
for a means to respond to unplanned contingencies the Navy 
will require an increase from the current eleven ARGs to 
twelve. This will allow for adequate forward presence to reduce 
risk (gaps in presence) to an acceptable level. The National 
Defense Planning Guidance calls for an amphibious lift 
capability of 2.5 MEBs and a 12 ARG capability. (RAdrn Durr, 16 
Aug 1994) 
The Navy's current goal is to have 12 ARGs consisting of at least three 
ships; a large helicopter deck ship (LHA/LHD), a ship with a secondary 
aviation support and well deck capability (LPD), and one or more ships 
required to support ARG lift requirements (LSD,LST,LKA). 
K. ANALYSIS OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT 
1. Introduction 
The NMS has set a requirement for 2.5 MEBs of lift in a 2 MRC 
environment. A basic assumption of this analysis is that the 2.5 .!'AEB lift 
requirement will remain in effect in 2015. This author believes that there 
will be a close relationship between amphibious lift capabilities and MAGTF-
2015 structure. To gain an understanding of this relationship and determine 
the effect of amphibious ship neck-down on the structure of MAGTF-2015, 
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the lift capability of each type of ship was tabulated and then summed for each 
year. Tabulations included information on available ship capacities, 
including; troop space, vehicle stow, cargo stow, air spots, and LCAC spots. 
1. Air spots can be defined as the resting space required by an aircraft in 
CH-46E equivalents. For example a CH-46E has a spotting factor of 1, an 
aircraft that is 1.5 times larger than a CH-46E has a spotting factor of 1.5. 
2. Troop Space is based on total number of troops the ships can carry in 
normal berthing spaces plus surge capacity for short periods of time. 
3. Vehicle Stow capacity is measured in square footage, it includes the 
deck area available for vehicle stowage. 
4. Cargo stow capacity is measured in cubic feet and is determined by 
using the available deck area and all available stowage height of the 
compartment. 
5. LCAC spots are based on the number of LCACs that can be 
transported by the ship, in well-decks. Well-decks are areas in the rear 
of ships that open to the sea and can be flooded with water. Landing 
craft can be loaded through ramps that lead from vehicle and cargo 
stowage areas directly to the well-deck. Once loaded, landing craft can 
then depart out of the stern of the ship. 
2. Nominal Lift Capabilities 
Table 4.3 shows the nominal lift capacities of amphibious ship types 
based on class averages.10 It is important to note that nominal capacities do 
10Nominal capacities are only used for planning purposes. Each ship's actual capacity depends on 
configuration. and is reflected in the ship's loading characteristics pamphlet (SLCP). 
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/ 
no t reflect the application of broken stowage factors and tactical unit integrity 
factors , both of which can have significant impact on capacities . These factors 
are defined as follows : 
1. The broken stowage factor is that loss of vehicle or cargo capacity due 
to the relationship of the vehicle or cargo configuration to the shape of 
the cargo space. Examples of broken stowage losses are empty spaces 
needed for tie-downs between vehicles or space between the top of a 
pallet and the ceiling of a cargo compartment. 
2. The tactical unit integrity factor is that loss of troop or vehicle 
capacity which results when ships are loaded in accordance with an 
operation plan. A tactical integrity loss might result from the desire to 
load all of a unit's troops and equipment on the same ship, when there 
is available space for the troops on one ship and space for the 
equipment on a different ship. 
3. The net capacity for each ship class can be determined by applying 
standard planning factors to nominal lift values as defined in FMFM 4-
2, the Marine Corps embarkation manual. 
Standard planning factors for reductions are: 
1. Ship Vehicle Broken Stow 
2. Ship Cargo Broken Stow 
3. Tactical Unit Integrity 
4. Air Spots 




Same for Gross and Net 
Same for Gross and Net 
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Ship Class I Troops I Ksqft Veh I Kcuft Cargo I Air Spots LCAC Spots 
LHD / 1892 / 17.9 /125.0 146 3 
LHA 11713 120.1 / 105.9 / 43 11 
LPH 11489 / 3.4 / 40.5 / 27 I --
LPD-4 1788 1 9.8 / 38.3 14 11 
LPD-17 / 700 / 25.0 /25.0 /4 11 
LSD-36 1302 1 6.2 11.4 1-- 3 
LSD-36M 1302 113.8 11.4 1-- 12 
LSD-41 1454 110.2 15.1 1-- 14 
LSD-49 1454 114.1 150.7 1-- /2 
LST / 347 112.3 13.4 I -- --
LKA 1208 132.9 166.1 I -- I --
Table 4.3 Amphibious Ship Lift Capacities 
Note: Information for Table 4.3 taken from "Integrated Amphibious Operations & U.S. Marine 
Corps Air Requirements Study", Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 26 September 
1993. 
3. Baseline Factors 
To determine the impact on lift areas resulting from the neck-down, 
the author selected 1991 as a baseline year from which to gauge lift (e.g., Desert 
Shield/Storm time-frame). An arbitrary value of 1.0 was assigned to each of 
the baseline capabilities in amphibious lift areas. Changes to capacity in 
subsequent years is reflected in values greater or less than one. This simple 
method provides a quick sketch of changing capabilities over a period of time. 
Subsequent changes to baseline resulting from the neck-down strategy can 
now be measured as a function of the baseline capabilities. Results of this 
analysis are shown in Table 4.4. 1 
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LJFT 11 991 11993 I 2001 l 2o09 12015 
TROOPS 11 / .95 / .81 / .80 / .so 
VE HI CLES 11 /. 92 /.67 /.76 /.76 
CARGO 11 /. 98 / 1.05 / 1.01 / 1.01 
AIR SPOTS 11 /. 99 / .99 / 1.08 / 1.08 
LCACS 11 11.05 I 1.3o 11.1 8 11.18 
Table 4.4 Changes to Amphibious Baseline Capabilities 
Note: Information for Table 4.4 taken from "Integrated Amphibious Operations & U.S. Marine 
Corps Air Requirements Study," Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 26 September 
1993, and author's estimate. 
4. Impact of the Assault Amphibious Shipping Neck-down 
The graphical display of the impact of neck-down on assault 
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5. Estimated ARG Configurations 
Based upon the projected reduction in assault amphibious shipping, an 
estimate of amphibious ship assignments for MAGTF-2015 can be developed. 
These estimates reflect the types and numbers of ships that would be required 
to provide sufficient assault amphibious lift for MAGTF-2015. Table 4.5, on 
the following page, displays the estimated numbers and types of assault 
amphibious ships required to support MAGTF-2105. 
I LHA / LHD I LSD-41/49 LPD-17 jTOTAL I LCAC 
MEU 11 11 1 13 17 
MEB 14 13 17 114 l2s 
MEF 110 110 121 141 192 
2.5 MEBs 110 I 7.5 117.5 135 171 
Table 4.5 Estimated Amphibious Ship Requirements For MAGTF-2015 
Note: Information for Figure 4.5 taken from "Integrated Amphibious Operations & U.S. Marine 
Corps Air Requirements Study", Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 26 September 
llJlJ3, and author's estimate. 
6. Shipbuilding Implications 
The estimated effects of the neck-down strategy show decreases in troop 
lift by a factor of .2 and in vehicle lift by a factor of .24. Increases in cargo cube 
by a factor of .01, air spots by a factor of .08, and LCAC spots by a factor of .18 
are also shown. What implications can be drawn from these chcrnges for 
MAGTF force structure? One implication is that revised ship capacities will 
reflect smaller MAGTFs in terms of personnel and vehicles to support them. 
A second implication can be drawn from increases in cargo capacity, especially 
in light of fewer personnel, which may indicate a greater capacity to provide a 
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higher degree of organic sustainment for the MAGTF. Notable increases also 
occur in the number of air spots and LCAC spots, especially in light of the 
decrease number of personnel and vehicles. This may indicate a higher 
degree of tactical high-speed mobility and ship to shore projection capability. 
7. Readiness Versus Sustainment 
One approach to analyzing the implications of the amphibious neck-
down and its impact on MAGTF-2015 is to look at the issues of readiness 
versus sustainment. By their very definition, readiness and sustainment are 
interdependent. Changes to one of the variables of troop, cargo, vehicle, air 
and LCAC spots will affect the others. This can be examined by looking at 
how changes in troop capacity may effect unit readiness. Changes to troop 
strengths also affect the densities of weapons and vehicle operators, and thus 
weapons densities themselves as operators are required before systems can be 
used. Changes to Air Spots and Vehicle lift may affect overall combat 
readiness and sustainment of ground forces ashore by their impact on 
transportation densities and capacities. This analysis may lead one to 
consider if increased levels of sustainment, evidenced by increased cargo 
capacity, can offset deficiencies in troop strength (e.g., fewer mechanics, 
maintenance personnel) by providing the ability to carry larger organic supply 
blocks, repair parts, and spare equipment. Larger supply blocks may reduce 
the requirement for mechanics and maintenance personnel. The decrease in 
vehicle spots may be overcome by the increase in air and LCAC spots, 
reflecting greater high speed tactical/logistical transportation at the expense of 
tracked and wheeled vehicle mobility. 
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The general utility of surface and air capable platforms with significant 
personnel, vehicle and cargo stowage seems to have been realized by defense 
planners. The trend in procurement has been to acquire multi-purpose ships 
such as the LHA/LHD, and LPD-17 which provide a range of lift capabilities. 
But, from both an operational and ships design point of view, the current 
procurement trend has resulted in tradeoffs in balance between troop, 
vehicle, cargo, air and LCAC capabilities, all important factors affecting the 
structure of MAGTFs. 
L. FORCESTRUCTURE 
To come up with an estimate of MAGTF-2015 this analysis considered 
the likely effects of reduction in amphibious lift, changes to force structure 
recommended by the Force Structure Planning Group, and technological 
advances in weapons systems. Personnel strengths of the MAGTF will be 
greatly influenced by the availability of amphibious lift. MAGTF-2015 will see 
an overall reduction in personnel numbers by 20 percent. Within the overall 
20 percent reduction, it becomes apparent that there is a shift of personnel 
strengths among CSS functional areas due to the effects of vehicle lift 
reduction, increases in air spots and cargo capacity. It is likely that these shifts 
may equate to an increase in aviation personnel due to the increased in air 
spots and resultant capacity to handle aircraft. Likewise a decrease in vehicle 
personnel may result from the reduced vehicle lift capacity. It is_ the author's 
experience that moderate increases in cargo capacity does not necessarily 
equate to an increased need for supply personnel. At a macro level of analysis 
these shifting of strengths among CSS functional areas do not appear to affect 
the tooth-to-tail ratios calculated previously. Based on average ship 
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configuration and troop lift capacity the personnel strengths for MAGTF-2015 
have been es timated and are displayed in Table 4.6. 
I MEU I MEB I MEF 
STRENGTH 11900 112900 136400 
SUSTAINMENT l 15 days l3o days I 60 days 
Table 4.6 Estimated Personnel Strengths for MAGTF-2015 
M. DEVELOPMENT OF COSTS 
In developing costs for future weapons systems the simplifying 
assumption is made that systems will be represented by follow-on or upgrades 
to current weapons systems. This allows for the comparison of cost of 
MAGTFs in two different time periods. Cost Calculations for MAGTF-2015 
follow the same approach used in Chapter III for the Notional Baseline 
MAGTF. First, an estimated force structure is presented and the capital stock 
values are estimated. Next, the capital service values and O&S costs are 
estimated. Finally, ratios are developed to facilitate analysis and comparison 
of the Notional Baseline MAGTF and MAGTF-2015 in Chapter V. 
N. MILITARY CAPITAL 
The majority of MAGTF-2015's force structure includes platforms 
already developed for the notional baseline. As a result, the difference in 
capital service values between the notional baseline and MAGTF-2015 is 
modestly affected by two factors : first , a change in the number of existing 
assets in the capital stock inventory between the notional baseline MAGTF 
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and MAGTF-2015, and secondly, the addition of new assets developed and 
acquired to replenish capital stock inventory for MAGTF-2015. 
1. Changes To Existing Capital Stock 
Assuming that service lives remain constant, reduction of assets held 
in inventory result in future forces having a smaller capital services value 
(all else held constant). A smaller number of assets cause a reduction in the 
capital stock (inventory) value. 
2. New Capital Stock 
New capital stock developed and acquired for MAGTF-2015 includes, 
planes, vehicles, weapons, and amphibious shipping. Two major costs are 
associated with a new capital stock: RDT&E, and procurement. The difference 
in the value of capital stock from the notional baseline MAGTF to MAGTF-
2015 is attributable to changes in force structure and modernization efforts. 
Inventory changes result from procurement and retirement of military assets . 
Modernization is the result of the replacement of existing forces with 
improved assets and through expenditures on RDT&E. With the continued 
application of new technologies to weapons systems development, R&D costs 
have continued to increase as compared to procurement costs. FY 93 defense 
programs displayed a 1.5:1 ratio between procurement and R&D. Present 
trends indicate that this ratio will fall to 1:1 by the year 2000. (Carlisle, 1992, p. 
309) This analysis will treat ROT &E costs as sunk costs and does not factor in 
their impact when calculating capital stock value of assets . Presented in 
Appendix Dare the capital stock values of MAGTF-2015 assets . 
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a. Equipment 
Unit equipment for MAGTF-2015 is estimated by taking the 
current levels ofT IE equipment authorized by the baseline MAGTF and 
decreasing it by 20%. This 20% reduction in equipment is a direct result of the 
20% planned reductions in amphibious lift. Basically, the simplifying 
assumption is made that if the lift capacity for assault amphibious shipping is 
decreased by 20% then the size of the unit able to embark on that ship and the 
amount of equipment it can take along are also decreased by 20%. 
b. Aircraft 
Determining aircraft procurement cost to the year 2015 involves 
reviewing the USMC's long range avia tion plan, which calls for reduction in 
the numbers and types of aircraft and the achievement of an all- STOVL 
force. This long range goal is likely to impact on MAGTF-2015 by increasing 
the number of AV-8 and medium lift helicopters possessed by the MAGTFs. 
Since it is not clear what realistic future aircraft types and quantities will be 
utilized in the MAGTF-2015 all costing for this analysis is based on costs of 
current model aircraft or follow on model aircraft. Table 4.7, on the following 
page, shows the estimated cost of aircraft and ground support equipment for 
MAGTF-2015. 
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A/C TYPE I MEU I MEB I MEF 
AV-8C I $567 I $2,495 I $3,667 
F/ A-18E I $0 I $1 956 I $3 727 
A-6F I $0 I $763 I $763 
EA-oC I $0 I $317 I $317 
CH-53F I $339 I $1,107 I $1,672 
AH-1X I $98 I $206 I $382 
CH-46F I $408 I $1 242 I $1 513 
UH-1M I $176 I $274 I $441 
'TOTAl I $1 ~SRR I $R359 I $12.4R2 
Table 4.7 Estimated Capital Stock Value for MAGTF-2015 Aircraft 
(Costs in millions of FY 91 dollars) 
c. Assault Amphibious Shipping 
Estimated capital stock values for amphibious ships are shown 
in Table 4.8 and reflect the cost of the estimated ship mix requirements for 
MAGTF-2015 that are depicted in Table 4.5. 
SHIP TYPE I UNIT COST MEU I MEB I MEF 
LHA / LHD 1 $1,075 $1,075 1 $4,3oo 1 $10,750 
LSD-41 / 4':1 1 $245 $245 1 $735 1 $2,450 
LPD-17 1 $360 $360 1 $2,520 1 $7,560 
LCAC 1 $30 $210 1 $840 1 $2,760 
TOTAL I $1 890 I $8 395 I $23 52o 
Table 4.8 Estimated Capital Stock Value of MAGTF-2015 Amphibious shipping 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model, (CRM 93-158). (Alexandria, VA . 
C<: nter for Naval Analysis, August 1993), Costs are averages for ship types and are in millions 
of FY 91 d ollars. 
Table 4.9 depicts the estimated aggregate capital stock value of MAGTF-2015. 
106 
(Costs in millions of$) I MEU I MEB I MEF 
T I E EQUIPMENT I $35.83 I $284.25 I $952.53 
AND WEAPONS 
AIRCRAFT 1 $760.2 1 $6,546.6 1 $1,0230.8 
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 1 $1,890 1 $8,395 1 $23,520 
TOTAL I $2 686 I $15 226 I $34 703 
Table 4.9 Estimated Capital Stock Values For MAGTF-2015 
(Costs in millions of FY 91 dollars) 
3. Capital Services Value 
Table 4.10 shows the estimated capital services value for MAGTF-2015. 
The service life estimates are; 40 years for ships, 20 years for aircraft and 15 
years forT IE equipment and weapons. 
(Costs in millions of$) I MEU MEB I MEF 
TIE Equipment&Wpns 1 $2.39 $18.95 1 $63.50 
Aircraft I $38.oo I $327.33 I $511.5 
Amphibious Ships 1 $47.25 I $21o.oo I $588.oo 
Total I $87.64 I $556.28 I $1 163.oo 
Table 4.10 Estimated MAGTF-2015 Capital Services Value 
(Costs in millions of FY 91 dollars) 
0. O&S COSTS . 
Direct O&S costs for MAGTF-2015 are estimated using the cost factors 
method, explained in Chapter III, to obtain a comparative estimate of MAGTF 
O&S costs. Table 4.11 depicts representative O&S costs for MAGTF-2015. 
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(Cost in millions of FY 91 $) IMEU I MEB I MEF 
MAINTENANCE 1 $1.28 1 $2.56 1 $22.10 
TRNC ORDNANCE 1 $1.68 1 $5.12 1 $20.16 
FUEL 1 $.o11 1 $.041 1 $.242 
AIRCRAFT O&S 1 $81 .40 I $444.53 I $623.82 
AMPHIB. SHIP O&S I $51.30 I $23o.oo 1 $645.oo 
PERSONNEL 1 $52.72 1 $667.80 1 $1,016.5 
TOTAL I $188 .4o I $1 35o.oo I $2 327.8o 
Table 4.11 Estimated Aggregate 0&5 Costs for MAGTF-2105 
Table 4.12 shows the estimated cost ratios related to achieving and 
maintaining a MAGTF capability in the year 2015. 
IMEU I MEB I MEF 
CapSvcVal/CapStkVal 1·04 l.o5 l.o5 
O&M / CapStkVal 1.94 11.26 1.86 
O&M/CapSvcVal 1·04 1.o6 l.o4 
Tooth-to-Tail 11.66 11.39 1.90 
Table 4.12 MACTF-2015 Cost Ratio Presentation 
These ratios again serve a useful purpose in that they summarize the 
various costs associated with achieving and maintaining a MAGTF capability 
and a related tooth-to-tail ratio for the year 2015. The first ratio relates Capital 
Services Value to.Capital Stock Value of a particular size MAGTF and 
describes the average annual investment (in terms of a percentage of total 
capital value) required to maintain a constant inventory of capital 
equipment. The second ratio relates the direct O&S cost to the Capital Stock 
Value of a particular size MAGTF and describes the annual cost of operating 
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and supporting a given force as a percentage of the MAGTF's total capital 
value of equipment. The third ratio relates the direct O&S costs to the Capital 
Services Value of a particular size MAGTF and compares the direct cost of 
operating and supporting a force to the cost of maintaining a constant 
inventory of capital equipment. Table 4.12 depicts the relative significance of 
direct O&S costs utilizing the Cost Factors Method. The Quick Cost Method is 
not used in this comparison because it is not flexible enough to permit 
entering and costing out Primary AEs smaller than a Marine Division. The 
ratios displayed show very similar results to those obtained in Chapter III for 
the notional baseline MAGTF and point out the significance role that O&S 
costs play in achieving and maintaining a MAGTF capability. 
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V. EVALUATING THE MAGTF 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will concentrate on comparing the force structures and 
tooth-to-tail ratios of the MEU, the MEB, and the MEF. The comparison is 
focused at answering the research questions presented in Chapter I and 
res tated below: 
1. What is the tooth-to-tail ratio for a MAGTF and what are its costs in 
terms of capital stock value, capital services value and O&S Costs? 
2. How does a particular MAGTF's tooth-to-tail ratio play into the issue 
of readiness versus sustainment? 
3. What might be the force structure for a MAGTF configured for 
expeditionary warfare in the early 21st Century? 
The method used to conduct the analysis will focus on comparing several 
indicators of readiness and sustainment for a MAGTF. The indica tors are: 
1. Personnel Strength. 
2. Major Equipment Density. 
3. Logistic Sustainment. 
4. Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. 
5. Dollar Costs. 
The last two chapters developed the force structure, tooth-to-tail ratios, and 
cos t of a notional baseline MAGTF and MAGTF-2015. The notional baseline 
MAGTF was developed using a micro-level approach which estimated force 
structure for the major elements of a MAGTF (CE, GCE, ACE, CSSE). This 
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level of detail permitted units to be classified as combat or support. The units 
designated as performing support roles were further classified into eight 
major CSS elements. This level of force structure detail permits a fairly 
accurate estimation of a MAGTF's tooth-to-tail ratio. It also permits one to 
determine and analyze the cost associated with achieving and maintaining a 
MAGTF capability. Based on cost estimates one can take the analysis one step 
further and determine the cost of achieving and maintaining a certain tooth-
to-tail ratio for the various MAGTFs. For MAGTF-2015 a macro level 
approach was taken in estimating force structure, tooth-to-tail ratios, and 
costs. Based on several factors influencing MAGTF force structure, (e.g., 
endstrength, MTR, amphibious lift), a picture of MAGTF-2015 was developed. 
It should be noted that MAGTF-2015 estimates are broad, and as a result, do 
not contain the same accuracy as estimates of the notional baseline MAGTF. 
MAGTF-2015 does serve an important purpose in that it provides a "best 
estimate" picture of MAGTF capabilities and cost, factoring in the impact of 
current budgetary trends, NSS, and the geopolitical environment. 
B. TOOTH-TO-TAIL CONCEPT 
Key to this entire analysis is the issue of the MAGTF tooth-to-tail 
ratios . Each of the three MAGTFs looked at in this analysis possess different 
tooth-to-tail ratios . What are the benefits of a particular ratio for a particular 
size MAGTF? Perhaps the best way to address this question is to look at the 
capabilities possessed by the notional MAGTFs in terms of readiness and 
sustainment, and the cost associated with achieving and maintaining these 
capabilities. This type of analysis may serve as a useful evaluation of 
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investment strategy in achieving and maintaining a MAGTF capability now 
and in the future. 
A real difficulty exists in trying to measure a MAGTF's capability in 
terms of readiness and sustainment. Readiness is a measure of performance 
in peacetime that lacks a precise indicator. It is difficult to define and it is 
open to various interpretations. This analysis views readiness as an input 
variable which focuses attention on the operational potential offered from a 
specific force structure. Viewing the capacity to respond as readiness it can be 
seen that to be credible, a forward deployed force must encompass both a 
credible evidence of will and the capacity to respond. If the purpose of 
forward deployed forces is to threaten or apply violence to an opponent to 
alter his behavior, sustainment can be seen as providing the desired depth to 
readiness to make a forces capability credible. 
C. EVALUATION OF NOTIONAL MAGTFs 
1. Personnel Strength 
In comparing MAGTFs one sees that the personnel strengths increase 
with the size of the MAGTF. As discussed in Chapter III, the ratio of combat 
troops to support troops changes as the size, capability, and sustainment 
levels of MAGTFs increase. This analysis has shown that within those 
general increases the number of support personnel increases at a greater rate 
than combat personnel. In turn these increases in support personnel appear 
to add depth to and increase the level of support the CSS functional areas are 
capable of providing to the MAGTF. 
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Within the CSS structure for each MAGTF the eight functional ares 
must be considered. The particular tooth-to-tail ratios for MAGTFs are in fact 
the result of complex grouping and interaction between force structure 
elements. Figures 5.1 , 5.2, and 5.3 are charts which graphically depict the 
breakdown of personnel increases for a notional MEU, MEB, and MEF 
respectively. These charts further break down the CSS elements into the 
eight functional areas. From these charts one can gain an understanding and 
appreciation for the complexity involved in MAGTF organization and how 
the changes in personnel strength in each of the CSS functional areas 
contribute to the changes in densities and tooth-to-tail ratios for each 
particular size MAGTF. 
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2. Major Equipment Densities 
This analysis shows that as the size of the MAGTF increases so does the 
quantity of major equipment it possesses. However, these increases in 
equipment quantities are not proportional to the overall personnel increases 
in the MAGTF. Rather, weapons and equipment increases are proportional 
to the combat units that comprise the MAGTF and a degree of linearity can be 
seen in combat unit s tructure. For example, three infantry battalions and 
supporting attachmen ts make up a regiment and three regiments and 
supporting attachments form the basis for a division. However, as MAGTFs 
are task-organized to be self sustaining each successive size MAGTF possesses 
increasing command and control and combat support assets which cause the 
overall MAGTF structure to be non-linear. For example, three MEUs cannot 
make a MEB and three MEBs cannot make a MEF due to the increasing 
requirements at each higher MAGTF for command and control assets and 
support assets . In effect when moving from smaller to higher MAGTF 
capabilities the increases in non-combat assets begin to shift the balance 
between combat and support forces as sustainment capabilities increase. (See 
Figure 3.4) The resultan t effect being that even though the amount of 
equipment increases the calculated densities generally decrease. One point to 
note is that weapons densities start to increase again as one moves from a 
MEB to a MEF. The increase is attributed to the inclusion of fixed wing 
tactical aircraft which are not integral to the MEU structure. This analysis 
shows that the transportation densities decrease for successive MAGTFs. It 1s 
important to note that these densities reflect the MAGTFs ability to provide 
tactical as well as logis tical transportation to the MAGTF. Lower densities do 
not necessarily reflect a lesser capability to provide tactical and logistical 
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transport. The support capability depends on the size of the MAGTF that will 
be supported at any given time. Current employment doctrine suggests that 
in situations likely to be encountered on the lower end of the conflict 
spectrum, MAGTFs will deploy the smallest size force necessary to 
accomplish the mission. Thus the existent transportation assets may be 
entirely sufficient to provide the required support. 
3. Logistic Sustainment 
Sustainability rates, measured in days of organic sustainment 
capability, effectively double for each successive notional MAGTF, providing 
the ability to conduct a higher tempo of operations for greater periods of time. 
One can infer from the analysis that higher sustainment levels may reflect 
the assignment of higher intensity, longer duration missions that would 
likely be assigned to these type forces. The enhanced sustainment levels are 
facilitated by increases in the CSS functional area capabilities and the greater 
organic supply capabilities inherent to the larger MAGTFs. 
4. Tooth-to-Tail 
This analysis uses the tooth-to-tail ratios as order-of-magnitude 
measures of the particular MAGTF's readiness and sustainment capabilities. 
The tooth-to-tail ratios for notional MAGTFs decreases from 1.66:1 to 1.39:1 to 
.90:1 for the MEU, MEB, and MEF respectively as the MAGTFs themselves 
increase in size and move from a "small," to "medium," and "large" 
expeditionary capability. The resulting force structure changes for larger 
MAGTFs reveal increases in capability for sustainment. It is important to 
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note that these "decreasing" tooth-to-tail ratios do not reflect decreases in 
combat power but rather increases in combat power linked to greater increases 
in sustainment. In effect, the ratios are a measure of the operational tempo 
capabilities inherent to a particular MAGTF structure. When compared to 
the MEB and MEF a MEU possesses a relatively high tooth-to-tail ratio. Its 
force structure is designed to facilitate its mission of forward presence and 
rapid response. To perform such a mission successfully a high degree of 
readiness is required for rapid and credible initial response. A limited 
sustainment capability is adequate in situations where the most important 
factor is a quick response and a presence, albeit may possess relatively limited 
sustainment. Such a capability is best achieved by a MAGTF with a relatively 
high tooth-to-tail ratio. For situations requiring greater sustainment and 
resources, after the initial involvement, tooth-to-tail ratios reflecting 
increases in sustainment capability over readiness capability are appropriate. 
The MEB and MEF size MAGTFs possess forces which are designed to 
accomplish missions requiring greater combat power, resources and the 
ability to sustain those efforts for longer periods of time . 
5. Dollar Cost 
The spread of technology, and with it lethality, has tended to increase 
the cost of intervention . To maintain the capability for intervention at an 
acceptable cost the forward deployed force must possess a high level of 
readiness. This leads to a need for a determination of the fitness of a force in 
particular circumstances and the probability of these circumstances occurring. 
(See Figure 2.1, Spectrum of Conflict) A key point to consider is that the 
military power of a MAGTF influences cost. A stronger projection capability, 
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gained from increased forces and more capable weapons, should be able to 
project naval power ashore at a lower cost to human life, and destroyed 
equipment, than a weaker force. Thus, increases in readiness and 
sus tainment expenditures may ultimately reduce the total cost, and lower the 
risk, of actual force projection yet at the same time increase the level of O&S 
costs. The comparative cost estimates presented in this analysis make it clear 
that each successive size MAGTF is more expensive than the first and a good 
portion of the cost is attributable to achieving sustainment. While the 
maintenance and employment of MAGTFs possessing high tooth-to-tail ratio 
may be desired for forward presence missions there are likely to be tradeoffs 
involved. These tradeoffs will be in the form of the inherent risk of tailoring 
and deploying a more cost effective force capable of performing the likely 
forward presence missions against the probability of that force being 
unprepared to engage in unforseen, higher tempo actions. 
Current employment plans call for a MEU to be capable of performing a 
variety of roles, from forward presence and deterrence where readiness and 
potential combat power are key capabilities, to gaining a foothold for follow-
on forces in a situation where cost of intervention is high. Conversely, a 
larger MAGTF, committed after a MEU, requires a larger sustainment 
capability in its reinforcing role. This analysis indicates that further research 
is required to determine if the current practice of maintaining standing MEUs 
and of maintaining only the Headquarters element for larger MAGTFs on a 
permanent basis -~an be viewed as a cost effect method of dealing with 
MAGTF deployment requirements. 
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a. Capital Stock Value 
The capital stock value of major weapons possessed by MAGTFs, 
as displayed in Table 5.1, represents potential combat power that can be 
brought to bear on an enemy. This analysis shows that while capital stock 
values for MAGTFs increase for successively larger MAGTFs, they do so at a 
decreasing rate. When coupled with the corresponding increase in support 
personnel it can be seen that the investment in MAGTFs begins to shift from 
that of buying higher readiness through increased combat power to that of 
buying smaller increases in combat power and greater increases in 
sustainment, provided in large part by increases in personnel assigned to CSS 
functions . Table 5.1 presents a comparison of readiness and sustainment 
indicators, as well as cost comparisons, between the three notional baseline 
MAGTFs . 
MEU MEB MEF MEB/MEU MEF/MEB MEF/MEU 
Personnel 2395 16222 45501 6.77 2.80 19.00 
Combat Troops 1495 9429 21505 6.31 2.28 14.38 
Support Troops 902 6793 23996 7.53 3.53 26.60 
Major Wpns Density 77.24 50.24 60.22 .65 1.20 .78 
Transportation Density 17.53 9.25 6.79 .53 .73 .39 
Sustainment 15 30 60 2.00 2.00 4.00 
Tooth-to-Tail 1.66 1.39 .9 .84 .65 .34 
CapStkVal 2433 14674 33193 6.03 2.26 13.64 
CapSvcVal 117 616 1270 5.26 2.06 10.85 
O&S Costs 206 1566 2713 7.60 1.73 13.17 
CapSvcVai / CapStkVal .048 .042 .038 .88 .91 .79.2 
O&S / CapSvcVal 1.76 2.54 2.14 1.44 .84 1.22 
O&S / CapStkVal .085 .107 .081 1.26 .76 .95 
Table 5.1 Notional Baseline MAGTF Cost Comparisons 
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b. Capital Services Value 
The capital services value represents the amount of annual 
investment in procurement that is required to maintain a certain level of 
resources, and for purposes of this analysis, capability evidenced through 
combat power. By looking at the ratio of capital services value to capital stock 
value displayed in Table 5.4 one can see a fairly consistent investment is 
required to maintain a constant level of MAGTF readiness. 
c. O&S Cost Estimates 
(1.) The Cost Factors Method. O&S costs are viewed as the 
cost of achieving and maintaining a certain level of readiness and 
sustainment capability. This analysis shows that the ratios of O&S costs to 
capital services value and capital stock value of a MEU size MAGTF are 
relatively small when compared to those estimated O&S costs for a MEB and 
a MEF. Table 5.1 shows an 760% increase in O&S costs as one moves from a 
MEU to a MEB size MAGTF. O&S costs then increase at a much smaller rate 
(173%) going from a MEB to a MEF size MAGTF. This increase in ratios as 
one moves from a MEU to a MEB can be explained in part by the addition of a 
fixed wing tactical aircraft to MEB weapons inventories and the relatively 
large increase in personnel strengths. It is interesting to conduct a simple 
comparison between MAGTFs using direct O&S costs. Roughly ~ight MEUs 
can be deployed for the cost of one MEB, where in terms of size a MEB is six 
and a half times larger than a MEU. Roughly fourteen MEUs can be deployed 
for the cost of one MEF where a MEF is nineteen times larger than a MEU. 
This thumbnail comparison of O&S costs suggests that MAGTFs with greater 
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too th-to-tail ratios may be more costly in terms of O&S costs than the MEF 
size MAGTF with its lower tooth-to-tail ratio. Further research into this area 
would be required to determine if the larger size MAGTFs benefit from 
certain economies of scale relating to O&S costs. 
(2). The Quick Cost Model. The Quick Cost Model was 
used to estimate O&S costs for a MEF size MAGTF in Chapter IV. Because of 
the level of detail involved in this method compared to the cost factors 
method a strict comparison of results is impossible. However, several 
interesting observations can be drawn from the cost estimates obtained from 
the Quick Cost Model. O&S costs comprise a significant portion of the total 
expense of possessing and maintaining a MAGTF capability. The O&S 
/ CapStkVal ratio shows that O&S costs equate to 14% of the capital stock 
value of major weapons and equipment possessed by the notional MEF. The 
ratio of O&S/CapSvcVal shows that O&S costs exceed the annual investment 
in resources required to maintain a level of capital stock by a factor of 3.67:1, 
or by roughly three-and-a-half times. Within the total estimated O&S costs 
from a notional MEF manpower costs are the single largest contributor for 
both Marine and Navy force elements. 
O&S costs calculated using the cost factors method also show 
manpower as the single largest contributor to total O&S costs. The results 
obtained from the Quick Cost Model provide the opportunity to estimate the 
MEF tooth-to-tail_ ratio from a standpoint of O&S costs. Recall that O&S costs 
are separated into Primary, Related, and Support AEs. O&S costs for Primary 
AEs result from the direct operation of the major force elements such as 
flying aircraft or operating ships at sea. O&S costs for Related AEs result from 
support activities not directly associated with the major elements such as 
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operating support facilities ashore. O&S costs for Support AEs result from 
activities such as housing, medical support and maintenance. If one 
considers the Primary AE O&S costs as those that most contribute to the 
MAGTF "tooth" and the Related and Support AE O&S costs as those that 
most contribute to the MAGTF "tail" the following relationship can be used 
to express the tooth-to-tail ratio: O&S Cost (Primary AE)/O&S Costs(Related 
AE) + O&S Costs(Support AE) (Healy, 1994, p. 96) This relationship reveals a 
tooth-to-tail ratio of 1.23:1 for a notional MEF. 
D. MAGTF-2015 
MAGTF-2015 organization remains the same as the notional MAGTF. 
Some differences occur in force structure. The differences between MAGTFs 
are driven by the 64% decrease in the number of assault amphibious ships, 
which in turn produces a 20% personnel decrease due to troop lift constraints 
and an 8% increase in helicopter and VSTOL aircraft due to increased airspots. 
As discussed, personnel costs seem to have the greatest impact on total O&S 
cos ts in a MAGTF. The amphibious ship reduction and affects of the MTR on 
weapons systems will likely impact on MAGTF-2105 O&S costs in several 
ways. First, while the numbers of assault amphibious ships decrease they will 
be replaced by more modern and efficient platforms capable of providing 
multiple support to the MAGTF, such as troop and cargo lift, air spots, and 
well deck operations. Taking into account the changes in cost for MAGTF-
2015 caused by the amphibious ship neck-down some interesting results can 
be obtained by comparing representative costs of maintaining and operating 
MAGTF-2015. Table 5.2 presents the percent changes in estimated costs as 
one moves from the notional baseline MAGTF to MAGTF-2015. 
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%Change %Change %Change 
MEU MEB MEF 
Cap5 tkVal 149 152 175 
Cap5vcVal 155 172 209 
O&S Cost -5 -7 -9 
CapSvcVal / Cap5tkVal 105 113 121 
0&5 / CapStkVal -33 -33 -47 
0&5 / Cap5vcVal -37 -46 -56 
Table 5.2 Comparison of Notional Baseline MAGTF and MAGTF-2015 
The results of these comparisons between MAGTFs reveals that 
MAGTF-2015 displays noticeable increases in capital stock values and capital 
service values despite the fact that it possesses roughly 20% fewer major 
ground weapons and 64% fewer assault amphibious ships. These increases in 
values can be attributed to the increase in VSTOL and helicopter assets as well 
as impact of increased costs related to the upgrades of existing systems and 
procurement of next generation systems. The comparison also reveals a 
decrease in O&S costs for MAGTF-2015 which are likely attributed to troop lift 
reductions and reductions in the number of assault amphibious ships 




Presently, numerous dynamic events are impacting on the structure, 
roles, and missions of NEFs. Among these are; the recent demise of the 
Soviet Union and with it the perceived threat that has driven National 
Security Strategy for the past four decades, advances in technologies applied to 
weapons systems, fiscal and resources constraints, and the rise in 
requirements for U.S. involvement in Third World crisis. These events have 
played a significant role in redefining the NSS and within it the basic concepts 
for employment and structure of MAGTFs. This thesis has attempted to 
analyze the impact of these dynamic events on the MAGTF organization and 
structure. The MAGTF exists to fill the unique role of forward presence and 
deterrence and provides the United States with a global capability for 
projecting naval power ashore. Specifically, this analysis has looked at the 
tooth-to-tail ratios as a means of measuring the MAGTF's capabilities in 
terms of readiness and sustainment and to determine the various costs 
associated with possessing and maintaining these capabilities. This thesis has 
also attempted to incorporate the impact of the dynamic events currently 
shaping NEFs and come up with an estimation of what the MAGTF will look 
like as it enters the 21st Century. 
The Navy and Marine components of MAGTF-2015 are very similar in 
organization and structure to the current notional MAGTF. The roles and 
missions remain the same as they continue to engage in "operational 
maneuver from the sea." MAGTF-2015 possesses the forward deployment, 
deterrence and power projection capabilities equivalent to the current 
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notional MAGTF while utilizing smaller and equipment resources. 
Differences in size and costs exist between the two MAGTFs due to reductions 
in MAGTF-2015 force size and benefits resulting from technological 
advancements in weapons and equipment. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
While the total Marine Corps endstrength remains the same as the 
baseline MAGTF-2015 is smaller in troop strength by approximately 20% 
when compared to the current notional MAGTF. Composition of MAGTF-
2015 closely resembles the notional MAGTF. Some small force changes take 
place among ground combat units and include an estimated 8% increase in 
helicopter and VSTOL capabilities resulting from the assault amphibious ship 
neck-down. Force elements such as aircraft, ships and divisions continue to 
account for a large portion of each dollar invested in NEFs. As cost 
comparisons in Chapter V revealed, capital stock values for MAGTF-2015 
shows significant increases over the notional MAGTF and takes up a larger 
"share of the total cost pie." This occurs because MAGTF-2015 is affected by 
the increased costs applied to the upgrading of existing weapons and 
equipment and the development and procurement of new ones. Although 
MAGTF-2015 possesses smaller numbers of weapons and equipment, these 
cost increases will cause the capital stock and capital services values to be 
higher than those of the notional MAGTF. At this point it is important to 
recognize and appreciate the far reaching impacts that the assault amphibious 
ship neck-down will have not just on MAGTF organization and structure but 
also on costs. 
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MAGTF-2015 enjoys a small decrease in 0&5 costs and larger decreases 
in the ratio of O&S to capital stock value. The results of this analysis indicate 
that the savings in O&S costs are not all derived by the reduction in numbers 
of ships. The new, multi-function ships tend to have higher O&S costs than 
the older ships they replace. A large part of the reductions in O&S costs result 
from the reduction in personnel strengths for MAGTF-2015. These 
reductions in turn are driven by the 20% reduction in troop lift for assault 
amphibious ships. From these results one can see that additional reductions 
in numbers of assault amphibious ships will have significant impact on 
MAGTF force structure as well as O&S costs. At this point it may help to 
recall that this thesis deals with amphibious MAGTFs and does not consider 
MPF or other types of MAGTFs described in Chapter I. The "excess" forces 
resulting from the 20% decrease in amphibious lift may be utilized in 
manning and staffing a 12th ARG or fleshing out non-amphibious MAGTFs. 
MAGTF-2015 shows a large increase in the estimated capital services 
cos t. This may necessitate a shift in long-term funding strategy from O&S 
costs to capital stock investment. Such a situation would place increased 
importance on the need to recapitalize the MAGTF when planning the 
overall budget. The O&S costs to capital services value ratio decreases from 
the notional MAGTF to MAGTF-2105. This change in ratios may indicate an 
increased importance of recapitalization, and the reduced cost of operating 
and maintaining a smaller and more efficient force. 
Several challenges were encountered when attempting to estimate the 
costs of MAGTFs. Several simplifying assumptions had to be made with 
respect to the types and quantities of weapons and equipment possessed by 
notional MAGTFs and those that would likely be possessed by MAGTF-2015. 
While organizational structures and guidelines exist for all three size 
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MAGTFs, in practice the MEU is the only permanent standing MAGTF. As 
such, historical data from which to base comparisons and perform analysis is 
lacking for the MEB and MEF size MAGTF. In estimating O&S costs the cost 
factors method was used to arrive at a more micro level picture of O&S costs 
for each size MAGTF. The results of the Quick Cost Model provided accurate 
information for MEF size MAGTFs but does not possess the ability to input 
the major force elements of MEU and MEB size MAGTFs to perform analysis 
for comparisons.11 
This analysis calculated and examined the tooth-to-tail ratios of 
MAGTFs and used them as a measure of a MAGTFs readiness and 
sustainment capabilities. One of the keys to conducting this type of analysis is 
to first arrive at an acceptable and uniform definition of the terms "combat" 
and "support" and then to consistently apply them throughout the analysis. 
Determining the tooth-to-tail ratios for MAGTFs becomes increasingly 
difficult as the size of the MAGTF increases. This difficulty results from the 
increasing numbers of units which perform multiple functions . In order to 
make force comparisons this analysis developed a simple and straightforward 
method of categorizing units into combat or support roles. The benefit of this 
method is that it creates ratios that can be legitimately used as gross summary 
indicators of relative force capability within similar environments. One of 
the main learning point of this analysis is that meaningful tooth-to-tail ratio 
comparisons can be derived only by developing and applying a standard 
method of classifying combat and support personnel within a unit. 
11The Quick Cost Model did present several difficulties in that it d id not differentiate 
between classes of amphibious ships. In actuality each ship class varies in size, and often times 
mission, and do not incur the same O&S costs. For Marine forces the model did not list the O&S costs 
ilttributed to Marine A-6 aircraft so the data for EA-6 aircraft was substituted. 
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For purposes of this analysis the firepower and tactical maneuver units were 
the only ones generally classified as combat. All remaining functions were 
classified as support. 
NEFs assigned the roles of forward presence, deterrence an d rapid 
response missions must be configured differently than NEFs assigned roles 
requiring the conduct of in-depth, high-intensity offensive operations. NEFs 
equipped with technologically advanced weapons and equipment require 
carefully designed and trained support forces capable of providing a full range 
of combat service support functions. The depth of these assets or the 
"sustainment" capability depends on the duration and intensity of operations 
and the probable roles to be assigned to the force. A high state of readiness or 
"stored potential combat power" can be achieved while utilizing a relatively 
shallow depth in supporting forces. The MEU is a good example of this type 
arrangement. It possesses a relatively high degree of stored potential combat 
power and a capable, but limited, support structure which lacks a great deal of 
depth. In other words, the MEU possess a high degree of readiness and a 
lesser degree of sustainment. This is evidenced by the MEU's comparatively 
high tooth-to-tail ratio among MAGTFs. 
MAGTF task organization can depend on, to a great extent, the expected 
types of missions it will be required to undertake. The "tail" of the MAGTF is 
therefore greatly affected by the tactical employment envisioned for the 
MAGTF. This analysis has shown that O&S costs are major contributors to 
the overall cost of a MAGTF. Within the total O&S costs, manpower is the 
single greatest factor affecting costs. Based on the results of this analysis it can 
be assumed that for any given combat force the greatest return on investment 
would result from forces possessing a high tooth and a small tail. In reality 
this reasoning may prove valid only for certain roles such as forward 
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presence and deterrence, where the actual risk of violence is slight. In 
fulfilling the roles of forward presence and deterrence the appearance of 
capability and credibility may prove to be more important than the actual 
capabilities possessed by a force. For roles where the level of violence and 
intensity of operations is expected to be low, NEFs possessing high tooth-to-
tail ratios are appropriate. Unfortunately history has shown that the United 
States can not afford to discount the possibility of involvement in higher 
intensity conflicts. To maintain standing forces tailored to deal with higher 
intensity and longer duration roles requires a significant investment in both 
combat power and support structure and may not prove cost effective when 
compared to the probability of its actual use. The opportunity cost of 
maintaining such a force, for use just in case a contingency arises, is 
prohibitive under any form of analysis. A better method of preparing for and 
dealing with higher intensity conflicts may be found in the MEB and MEF 
size MAGTFs. Each of these possess sufficient increases in combat power 
along with significant increases in support infrastructure and capability which 
allow them to effectively deal with roles calling for higher levels of violence 
and duration than normally encountered in forward presence and deterrence 
roles. These MAGTFs are organized and structured for contingency purposes 
and are not necessarily comprised of standing organizations. The MEU size 
MAGTF serves as the building block which provides the ability to merge 
smaller forces into significantly larger ones. MAGTF task organization 
proves to be an efficient approach to minimizing the opportuni~ costs 
associated with maintaining large standing forces . The MEU possesses a high 
tooth-to-tail ratio and can be viewed as being efficient in terms of maximizing 
the investment return in combat power. Since the Vietnam War MEU size 
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MAGTFs have been used to respond to the majority of contingencies 
requiring U.S. involvement. 
From this analysis no imbalances appear to exist between the MAGTF 
force structures and the resultant tooth-to-tail ratios. Ratio changes can be 
directly tied to readiness and sustainment capabilities needed to perform 
specific expeditionary roles. From this analysis one can understand that tooth-
to-tail ratios are best used as order-of-magnitude measures of capabilities, and 
must be understood within the context of specific force structures. The tooth-
to-tail ratio of a specific force should no t be used as a hard and fas t 
specification for developing a force. These ratios are probably best employed 
as a monitoring device to assist defense planners in determining the right 
amount of readiness and sustainment required to perform certain roles. 
There is not necessarily an optimum tooth-to-tail ratio that will meet all the 
requirements of diverse contingencies. Savings in dollars and personnel can 
be made by reducing combat or support structures in units but the efficiency 
and effectiveness and ultimately success of an operation may be placed in 
jeopardy if NEFs are not provided with the appropriate support structure to 
adequately accomplish their assigned roles. 
No matter what roles MAGTFs are assigned to perform, the principle 
of sustainability cannot be overlooked. Sustainment plays a deciding role in 
deciding what forces can be used where, how they can be employed, and for 
how long. NEFs continue to command a distinct advantage over land based 
contingency forces due to their ability to deploy world wide, unincumbered by 
international boundaries and project naval power ashore at the decisive place 
and time. Sustainment is the critical enabling factor for NEFs. 
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This analysis indicates that the impact of decreases in the assault 
amphibious ship fleet will have significant impact on force structure, 
capabilities and costs of future NEFs. One potential area of study may be to 
analyze this subject in greater detail to determine the impact on Navy and 
Marine Corps investment strategies for forces of the future. Another area of 
interest would be to examine potential economies of scale for O&S costs 
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Each internal factor is a linear combination of from one to seven Ris. The 
complete internal factor for one combination of resources (e.g., on of the 13 
internal factors) for a specific AE is as follows : 
for Primary AE; 
(Linear Combination of Ris)/(Number of Forces) 
for Related AE; 
(Linear Combination of Ris)/(Proxy resources summed over all 
Primary AEs to which it is linked) 
for Support AE; 
(Linear Combination of Ris)/(Proxy resources summed over AEs in 
higher categories) 
For example: Internal Factor 10 (Primary AE) for Military 
Construction is; 
Internal Factor 10 (Primary AE) = 4410(MCN)+4450(MCNR)/Number 
of Forces of the Structure. 
Internal Factors are part of the Force Cost Equation for Primary, 
Related, and Support AEs. The formula for a change in the cos t of a particular 
AE is lis ted on the following page: 
for Primary AE; 
(Change in Force Level) X (Internal Factor) X (Fixed/ Var. %) 
for Related AE; 
(Change in Proxy Res. summed over all Primary AEs to which linked) 
X (Internal Factor) X (Fixed/Var. %) 
for Support AE; 
(Changes in Proxy Res. summed over AEs in higher categories) X 
(Internal Factors) X (Fixed/Var. %) 
136 
APPENDIX B. NOTIONAL MAGTF ORGANIZATION AND COSTS 
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NOTIONAL MEU RESOURCE COSTS ($000 FY91 USMC 
I OFF ENL AN. RATES OFF 
TYPE ORGANIZATION 
I 
Ca.IMAND ELEMENT 15 94 $3 234 014 .00 1 
HO. MEU I S/C31 13 25 $1 392 783 .00 1 
DET. SCAMP. HQBN S/C31 0 4 $99 ,884 .00 0 
DET. RADIO BN S/C3 1 1 26 $708 .362 .00 0 
DET. FORRECON CO S/C31 1 6 $208 ,942 .00 0 
' DEl . COMM BN S/C31 0 33 $824 .043.00 0 
I 0 0 $0.00 0 
GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT 61 1276 $35,469,072 .00 3 
INF BN (REINi 44 861 $24 101 135 .00 3 
ARTY BN (REIN) 12 223 $6 277.925 .00 3 
RECON PLT (REIN) S/C31 1 25 $683 ,391.00 0 
TANK PLT !REIN) 1 26 $708 362.00 0 
MV PLT (REIN) 1 41 $1 082 927 .00 0 
DET. CEB I 1 45 $1.182 811 .00 0 
DET. TRK COl SiTRANS 1 33 $883 ,169.00 0 
ANTI·TANK SECT 0 22 $549 ,362 .00 0 
I 0 0 $0 .00 0 
AVIATION COMBAT ELEMEN 69 487 $15 ,648 721 .00 1 
HMM SOON (12 CH-46) S/TRANS 32 173 $6,211 ,695 .00 1 
HMH DET (4CH-53E) S/TRANS 9 71 $2 ,304 ,985.00 0 
HML/A DET (4UH-1/4 AH -1 18 115 $3,935 ,753 .00 0 
MALS SPT ELEMENT S/SUPPLY 0 28 $699 188 .00 0 
MWSS SPT ELEMENT $/SERVICES 0 67 $1 .673.057.00 0 
MASS SPT ELEMENT S/C31 0 17 $424 507 .00 0 
LAOD SECTION 0 16 $399 536 .00 0 
I 0 0 $0.00 0 
COMBAT SERV SUPT ELEMENT 11 293 $7 ,966 779 .00 2 
DET. H&S BN. FSSG S/C31 7 58 $1 .862 .130 .00 0 
DET ENGR SPT BN. FSSG S/ENG 1 61 $1.582 347 .00 0 
DET. MAINT BN . FSSG S/MAINT 1 33 $883.159 .00 0 
DET. SUPPLY BN. FSSG S/SUPPLY 1 24 $658 ,420 .00 0 
DET. LANDING SPT BN. FSSG S/ENG 1 82 $2 .106 ,738 .00 0 
DET MED BN. FSSG S/HEALTH 0 8 $199 768 .00 1 
DET. DENTAL BN FSSG S/HEALTH 0 0 $0.00 1 
DET. MOTOR TRANS BN . FSSG S/TRANS 0 27 $674 217 .00 0 
I 
TOTAL MEU I 146 2150 $62 ,318 .586 .00 7 
USN TOT ALPERS 
ENL AN. RATES oosrs 
1 $91 169.00 $3 325 183 .00 
0 $63 761 .00 $1 456,544.00 
0 $0.00 $99 884 .00 
0 $0.00 $708 .362 .00 
1 $27 .408 .00 $236 ,350 .00 
0 $0.00 $824.043 .00 
0 $0.00 $0.00 
67 $2 027,619.00 $37.496 ,691 .00 
66 $2 000 211 .00 $26 101 346 .00 
67 $2 ,027.619.00 $8 305,544 .00 
1 $27.408 .00 $710 799.00 
1 $27 .408 .00 $735 ,770.00 
1 $27,408.00 $1 110 ,335.00 
1 $27 .408 .00 $1,210 219 .00 
1 $27 .408 .00 $910.567.00 
0 $0.00 $549 .362 .00 
0 so.oo $0.00 
5 $200 ,801 .00 $15 ,849 .522 .00 
3 $145 ,985 .00 $6 .357 ,680 .00 
1 $27.408.00 $2 ,332 393 .00 
1 $27 ,408 .00 $3 ,963 161.00 
0 $0.00 $699 ,188 .00 
0 $0 .00 $1 ,673.057 .00 
0 $0 .00 $424,50 7 .00 
0 $0.00 $399 536 .00 
0 $0 .00 $0.00 
21 $703.090 .00 $8 .669 ,869.00 
2 $54 .816 .00 $1 ,916 .946.00 
0 $0 .00 $1 .582 .347 .00 
0 $0 .00 $883.159 .00 
1 $27 ,408 .00 $685.828 .00 
0 $0.00 $2 106 ,738 .00 
16 $502 289 .00 $702 057 .00 
2 $118 .577 .00 $118.577 .00 
0 $0 .00 $674.217.00 
94 $3 .022.679 .00 $65 ,341 .265 .00 
INDIV MAINT TOTAL 
rosrs PEAS 
$49 728.00 111 
$17 472 .00 39 
$1 ,792 .00 4 
$12 .096 .00 27 
$3 ,584 .00 8 
$14 .784 .00 33 
$0.00 0 
$630 .336 .00 1407 
$436 352 .00 974 
$136 .640.00 305 
$12 096 .00 27 
$12 544.00 28 
$19 264 .00 43 
$21 056 .00 47 
$15 .680 .00 35 
$9 ,856 .00 22 
$0 .00 0 
$24 7 .296 .00 652 
$93 .632 .00 209 
$36 .288 .00 81 
$60,032 .00 134 
$12,544 .00 28 
$30 ,016 .00 67 
$7 ,616 .00 17 
$7 168 .00 16 
$0.00 0 
$146 .496 .00 327 
$30 ,016 .00 67 
$27 776 .00 62 
$15,232 .00 34 
$11 .648 .00 26 
$37 ,184.00 83 
$11 200 .00 25 
$1,344.00 3 
$12 .096 .00 27 
$1 ,073 .856 .00 
TiE EQUIP 
COSTS 
$5 .eee 212.00 
$754 ,528.00 
$376 208 .00 
S234 .e04 .oo 
$164 .416.00 
$4 .436 .216 .00 
$0.00 
$29 .101.664.00 
$8 .256 648 .00 
$7 ' 124.360.00 
S323.e04.00 
S4 .32e .456 .oo 
$4 234 736 .00 




$2 ,249 .704 .00 
s33e .368.oo 
$153.712.00 
s3 7 .ee8 .oo 
$351 ,456 .00 
se22.e84 .oo 
$437.384 .00 
$306 832 .00 
$0.00 
$7 .4 76 504 .00 
s1 .079 ,e84 .00 
s2 .8e 1,224 .oo 
$1 ,148 768.00 




$1 ,737.1104 .00 
$0.00 














COMMAND SECT S/C31 
COMM CO COMM BN StC31 
DET. SUP CO COMM BN S/C31 
DET. HQ CO COMM BN S/C31 
DET. CO A RADIO BN S/C31 
DET. CO B RADIO BN S/C31 
DET H&S CO RADIO BN $/SERVICES 
DET. FORCE RECON CO S/C31 
DET, CIVIL AFF GAP. FMF S/C31 
DET. TOPOGRAPHIC PL T S/C31 
I 
GAND COMBAT ELEMENT 
H&S ELEMENT S/C31 
DET TAK CO HQ BN S/TAANS 
RADAR BCN TM COMM CO S/C31 
DET. MP CO HQBN S/SERVICES 
DET. SVC CO HQBN S/SERVICES 
DET HQ CO (NBC) S/SERVICES 
DET. ITI. HQ CO HOBN l2l S/C31 
DET. HQ CO !SCAMP) S/C31 
I 
INFANTRY AEGT 
REGTHQS I S/C31 
INFANTRY BN (3) 
l 
DIS ARTY BN (REIN) 
DET. HQ BTAY, ARTY REGT S/SERVICES 
DIS ARTY BN 
HQ BTRY, DIS ARTY BN S/C31 
155 0/S HOW BTRY (T) (3 
GIS ARTY BN SP (· ) 
DET. HQ STAY GIS BN S/C31 
155 SP BTRY GIS BN 
8" SP BTRY. GIS BN 
DET. TAB I 
I 
COMBAT ENGR CO (REIN) S/ENG 
COMBAT ENGR CO S/ENG 
DET, ENGR SPT CO S/ENG 
DET H&S CO CEB S/SERVICES 
I 
AAV CO (REIN) 
DET. H&S CO AAV BN S/SERVICES 












































ENL AN. RATES a:F ENL 
14442 $431 .629 ,498 .00 95 464 
$0.00 
626 S20 . 774 .936 .00 7 14 
116 $6 ,020 .610 .00 5 6 
192 $5 .385 .592.00 0 0 
138 $3 ,564 .230 .00 0 0 
25 $683,391 .00 1 4 
25 $742 ,507.00 0 0 
32 $799 .072 .00 0 0 
48 $1 612 420 .00 0 2 
32 5976,420 .00 0 0 
14 $940 754 .00 1 0 
2 $49 .942 .00 0 0 
$0.00 
4760 $133 .700 .076.00 16 238 
204 $5,507 .896 .00 0 0 
79 $2 150 057 .00 0 0 
4 $99 .884 .00 0 0 
30 $808.246 .00 0 0 
26 $649 .246 .00 0 0 
13 $383 .739.00 0 0 
20 S617,652.00 0 0 
12 $299 652.00 0 0 
$0.00 
2879 $81 113 605 .00 11 205 
296 $8,810 .200 .00 2 7 
2683 $72,303 406 .00 9 198 
$0.00 
963 $27.712 .265.00 5 19 
27 $733 ,333 .00 0 0 
700 $20,494 .616.00 5 13 
172 $5 ,369, 100 .00 5 4 
528 $15 135 516 .00 0 9 
227 $6,259.577 .00 0 6 
24 $599,304 .00 0 0 
98 $2.742 738 .00 0 3 
105 $2 917,535 .00 0 3 
9 $224 ,739 .00 0 0 
$0.00 
157 $4 .218 .027 .00 0 3 
109 $3 017 419 .00 0 0 
32 $799 ,072 .00 0 0 
16 $399 ,536 .00 0 3 
$0.00 
230 $6,157,142 .00 0 5 
11 $274.661 .00 0 5 
219 $5 ,882 ,461 .00 0 0 
USN TOT ALPERS INDIV MAINT TOTAL 
AN. RATES rosrs (X)Sl'S PEAS TIE EQUIP 
COSTS 
$401 ,663 .631 .00 $633 513 . 129.00 $7 166.346 .00 16222 $28 .1 72 .524.654 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0 .00 
$17.603.735.00 $38,376,673 .00 $325,162.00 734 $20 ,449.838 .00 
$3 .552,949.00 $9 ,573,569 .00 $81 069 .00 183 $2 .125.931.00 
$5 ,262,336 .00 $10.647 .928.00 $69 .486 .00 202 $3 ,999.514.00 
$3 762.304 .00 $7,346,534 .00 $62 020.00 140 $8 ,951 .980.00 
$748.961.00 $1.432.362 .00 $13,733 .00 31 $161 ,267.00 
$685 .200 .00 $1,427,707 .00 $11,961.00 27 $1 .216.0311.00 
$877,056 .00 $1 ,676.128.00 $14 .176.00 32 $1 .092.824.00 
$1 315 584 .00 $2 928 004 .00 $25 251.00 57 $1 511 7411.00 
$877.056.00 $1 ,853 ,476 .00 $15 .505.00 35 $1 .115.495.00 
$44 7,4 73 .00 $1 ,388 .227 .00 $11 ,075 .00 25 $1114.925.00 
$64,816 .00 $104 .758 .00 $886 .00 2 $80,1 14.00 
$0.00 so.oo $0.00 0 $0.00 
$131 ,482 .256.00 $265 182.332.00 $2 332,395 .00 5265 $132.449.805 .00 
$5 591 232 .00 $11 ,099,126 .00 $93 ,473 .00 211 $6 .4 70,527 .00 
$2 165 232 .00 $4 315 289 .00 $36 326.00 82 $3 ,124 674 .00 
$109 .632.00 $209 .516 .00 $1 ,772 .00 4 $186.228.00 I 
$822.240 .00 $1.630 ,486 .00 $13 .733.00 31 $159.267.00 
$712 .608.00 $1,361 ,864 .00 $11 ,518 .00 26 $964,482.00 
$356.304 .00 $740 043 .00 $6 .202 .00 14 $357,798.00 
$548,160 .00 $1 165 612 .00 $9 ,746 .00 22 $562 254.00 
$328 896.00 $628,548 .00 $5 318 .00 12 s 1 ' 124.684.00 
so.oo $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00 
$79 609 003.00 $160 722 608 .00 ·$1 440 193.00 3251 $33 886 807.00 
$8,240 .290 .00 $17 ,050,490 .00 $146747.00 329 $11,102,253 .00 
$71 ,388 ,713 .00 $143,672,118 .00 $1 294,446.00 2922 $24 .784,554.00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00 
$26,712,709 .00 $54,424 974.00 $464,707.00 1049 $35 .854.2113 .00 
$740 .016.00 $1 ,4 73.349 .00 $12,404.00 28 $2 ,063.596 .00 
$19 504 ,405 .00 $39 ,999 021.00 $340 667.00 769 $25 ,835.333.00 
$5 ,032.981.00 $10 ,392 ,081 .00 $88 157.00 199 $4,364.843 .00 
$14471424.00 $29 606 940 .00 $252 510.00 570 $21 ,4 70 490 .00 
$6 221 .616 .00 $12 461 193 .00 $107 649 .00 243 $7 .959.351 .00 
$657 792 .00 $1 257 096 .00 $10 ,632 .00 24 $422.368.00 
$2,685 984 .00 $5 ,428 722 .00 $48,958 .00 106 $2 ,591 ,042 .00 
$2 .877.840 .00 $6 ,795 375 .00 $50,059.00 113 $4.945,941 .00 
$246 872.00 $471411 .00 $3,987.00 9 $0.00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00 
$4 ,303 056 .00 $8,519,083 .00 $73 096 .00 185 $2 .832,905 .00 
~2 987 472 .00 $6 004 891 .00 $50 502 .00 114 $785 498.00 
$877.056.00 $1 ,676 . 128 .00 $14 ,178.00 32 $1 ,810,824.00 
$438 528.00 $838,064 .00 $8 417.00 19 $236.583.00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00 
$6 ,303.840 .00 $12 ,460,982 .00 $107 .206 .00 242 $23 .770.794.00 
$301 ,468.00 $576 .169.00 $7.088 .00 16 $837.912 .00 
$8 .002 352 .00 $11,884 ,813.00 $100 ,118.00 226 $22 .932 ,882 .00 
TANK CO (REIN) 6 189 $5.074 215 .00 0 
DET. H&S CO TKBN S/SERYICES 0 11 $274 681 .00 0 
MEDTANKCO 5 105 $2 ,917 535.00 0 
TOW CO{·) 1 73 $1.881,999.00 0 
$0 .00 
RECON CO (REN) SIC31 6 79 $2 ,268 289.00 0 
DET. H&S CO RECONBN SISERYICES 0 4 $99 ,884 .00 0 
AECONCO SIC31 5 75 $2 168 406 .00 0 
$0.00 
LAI CO (REIN 3 69 $1 660.637 .00 0 
DET. H&S CO. LAY BN SISERYICES 0 9 $224 .739 .00 0 
LAY CO {·) 3 50 $1 .425 898.00 0 
$0.00 
COMBAT SERY SPT ELEMEN $0.00 
BSSG s 125 2409 $67 544 639 .00 34 
$0 .00 
HO BN {·) SIC31 81 549 $18 .497 .475 .00 9 
DET. H&S CO. HO BN S/SERYICES 45 242 $8 703 202 .00 8 
MP CO (-) H&S BN S/SERYICES 1 40 $1 .057 956 .00 0 
DET. SYC CO. H&S BN S/SERYICES 16 102 $3.611 .130 .00 1 
DET. SYC CO H&S BN {DISP1 SISERYICES 17 165 ~5 125 187 .00 0 
$0.00 
LANDING SPT BN (·) SIENG 7 226 $6 057 ,258 .00 0 
DET. LANDING SPT EQUIP CO SIENG 1 47 $1.232 ,753 .00 0 
BEACH&TERM OPS CO(·) 6/ENG 2 116 $2 ,969 897 .00 0 
LANDING SPT CO. LSB S/ENG 4 64 $1.834 .608.00 0 
I $0.00 
MAINTENANCE BN (-) SIMAINT 7 414 $10 761.806 .00 0 
DET. H&S CO MAINT BN SISERYICES 2 79 $2 090 941 .00 0 
DET . MT MAINT CO SIMA INT 2 177 $4,538 099.00 0 
DET. ENGR MAINT CO SIMAINT 2 41 $1 .142.043.00 0 
CONTACT TM (3) SIMAINT 0 20 $1 .496 .260 .00 0 
DET. ELEC MAINT CO SIMAINT 1 45 $1 .162,811 .00 0 
DET. GS MAINT CO S/MAINT 0 12 $299 652 .00 0 
$0.00 
SUPPLY BN (·} SISUPPLY 6 257 $6 .772 .243 .00 0 
DET. H&S CO SUPPLY BN S/SERYICES 0 12 $299 652 .00 0 
DET. SUP CO. SUP BN S/SUPPLY 4 127 $3 .407 781 .00 0 
DET. H&S CO. SUP BN S/SERYICES 0 29 S724 169.00 0 
DET. AMMO CO, SUP BN S/AMMO 2 85 $2,240 .767 .00 0 
DET. MEO LOG CO. SUP BN $/SUPPLY 0 4 $99 884 .00 0 
I $0.00 
ENGINEER SUPT BN (·) SIENG 17 663 $17.660.745.00 1 
DET H&S CO. ENGR SUPBN S/SERYICES 3 19 $651 ,797 .00 1 
DET BRIDGE CO ESB SIENG 0 42 $1 048 782 .00 0 
BULK FUEL CO. ESB S/ENG 6 290 $7,596.286 .00 0 
ENG CO. ESB S/ENG 5 136 $3 .691.636 .00 0 
DET. ENGR SUP CO. ESB SIENG 3 176 $4 ,572 .244 .00 0 
I $0.00 
DENTAL CO CREINl SIHEAL TH 0 2 $49 .942 .00 24 
DET. H&S CO. DENTAL BN SISERYICES 0 2 $49 .942 .00 0 
DENTAL CO, H&S BN SIHEALTH L. Q_ 0 $0 .00 24 
3 $5 .180 ,112.00 $10,254 .327 .00 
3 $301.488 .00 $576.169 .00 
0 $2,877 ,8-40 .00 $5 ,795,375 .00 
0 $2 ,000 784 .00 $3 882,783.00 
$0.00 $0 .00 
1 $2 .165 232 .00 $4 433 ,621.00 
1 $109 ,632 .00 $209 ,516.00 
0 $2 055 .600 .00 $4,224 .005 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 
2 $1 617 ,072 .00 $3 ,267 709 .00 
2 $246 ,672.00 $471 .411 .00 
0 $1 370 ,400 .00 $2 796 ,298.00 
$0.00 $0.00 
$0.00 $0.00 
125 $68 193 ,746 .00 $135 .738 385 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 
45 $15 ,620 .8-41 .00 $34 ,118 316.00 
45 $7 .142 ,824.00 $15 .846 .026 .00 
0 $1 .096 ,320.00 $2 154 ,276 .00 
0 $2 ,869.377.00 $6 .4 70 .507 .00 
0 $4 522 320 .00 $9 647 507 .00 
so.oo $0.00 
0 $6 ,194 .208.00 $12 251 466 .00 
0 $1.288 ,176.00 $2 ,520 .929.00 
0 $3 .161 920 .00 $6 .141 ,817 .00 
0 $1 .754 ,112.00 $3 .688.720 .00 
$0 .00 $0.00 
0 $11.346 ,912 .00 $22 ,098.718 .00 
0 $2 166 232.00 $4 266 173 .00 
0 $4 .851.216 .00 $9 ,389 .315.00 
0 $1 .123 .728 .00 $2 ,265.771 .00 
0 $1,644 480.00 $3 ,142 740 .00 
0 $1 .233 ,360.00 $2 ,416 .171 .00 
0 $328 .896 .00 $628,648 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 
24 $7 .043 .856 .00 $13 .816 .099 .00 
0 $328 896 .00 $628 548 .00 
0 $3 .480 .816 .00 $6 .888 ,597 .00 
0 $794,832.00 $1 518 991 .00 
0 $2 .329 ,680 .00 $4 570 .447 .00 
24 $109 .632 .00 $209.516 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 
7 $18 .235 .265 .00 $35 796,010 .00 
7 $584 513 .00 $1,236 .310 .00 
0 $1 151 186.00 $2 199 918.00 
0 $7.948 ,320 .00 $15 .644 .606 .00 
0 $3 ,727 488 .00 $7 .419 .124 .00 
0 $4 .823 ,808 .00 $9 .396 .052.00 
$0.00 $0 .00 
49 $1 ,585 .080 .00 $1 .635 .022 .00 
1 $54 .816 .00 $104 .758 .00 
-~ $1 ,530.264 .00 $1 .530 ,264 .00 
$87 ,714 .00 198 
$6 202 .00 14 
$48 730 .00 110 
$32 782 .00 74 
$0 .00 0 
$37 ,665 .00 85 
$2 .215 .00 5 
$35 .440.00 80 
$0 .00 0 
$28 .352 .00 64 
$4 .873 .00 11 
$23 ,479 .00 53 
$0.00 0 
$0.00 0 
$1192999 .00 2693 
$0 .00 0 
$303 ,012 .00 684 
$150.620 .00 340 
$18 ,163.00 41 
$63 603 .00 121 
$80 626 .00 182 
$0 .00 0 
$103 .219 .00 233 
$21 264 .00 48 
$51 .831 .00 117 
$30 124 .00 68 
$0.00 0 
$186 .603 .00 421 
$35 883 .00 81 
$79 297.00 179 
$19 049 .00 43 
$6 .860 .00 20 
$20 ,378 .00 46 
$5.316 .00 12 
$0 .00 0 
$127141 .00 287 
$5 316 .00 12 
$66 ,033 .00 131 
$12 847.00 29 
$38 541 .00 87 
$12 404 .00 28 
$0.00 0 
$304 .784 .00 688 
$13 .290 .00 30 
$18 606.00 42 
$131 .128 .00 296 
$62 .463 .00 141 
$79 .297 .00 179 
$0 .00 0 
$33 .225 .00 75 
$1 .329 .00 3 
$31 .896 .00 72 
$23 .370 .286.00 
$586 .7118 .00 
$17 .321 .270 .00 






$5 .289 .646 .00 
$643 .127.00 
$4 .646.521 .00 
$0.00 
$135 .1 1 1 .000 .00 
$66 ,6110 .001 .00 
$0.00 
$6 .883 .1188.00 
$4,926 .380.00 
$230 .83 7.00 
$6811 .397.00 
$1 037 374.00 
$0.00 
$3 .504 .781 .00 
$2 .1 19.736 .00 
S91 e. 1 611.oo 
$4!56 .876.00 
$0.00 
se . 760.4117.00 
$2 0611 .117.00 
$1 .747.703.00 
$545 851 .00 
$760 .140.00 
$1 .252.622 .00 
$382.664.00 
$0.00 





$2 .733 .5116.00 
$0.00 
$25 .420 216 .00 
$255 .710.00 
$7 .455 .394 .00 
$5 .370.872.00 
$2 .693 .537.00 
$11 .644 .703 .00 
$0 .00 
$621 .775 .00 
544 .671 .00 







MEDICAL CO (REIN) 
OET H&S CO MEO BN 
COLLECT & CLEAR CO 
I 
MOTOR TRANSPORT BN 
OET. H&S CO, MT BN 
DIS MT CO, MT BN 
DET. GIS MT CO. MT BN 
AIR COMBAT ELEMENT 
I 
MAR AIR CNTRL GAP (-} 
HQ, MACG I 
OET.MWCS (2) 
UNIT. MWCS 
OET. MASS I 
MACSfTOAM 
OET. MATC (2) 
LAAM BTRY (REIN) 
OET. HQSVC BTRY 
MISSILE BTRY 
LAAO BTRY REIN)_ 
OET. HQSVC BTRY 
FIRING BTRY 
MAG (FIXED WING! 
HQ MAG {V) 
MALS (FW) 
MWSS (V} 
OET. 6 KC-130 
SOON 12 F/A-1 8 (21 
SOON (·) 14 AV-88 {2) 
VMA (AW) 10 ABE 
OET. EAe-8 I 
OET. VMFP-3 




HMM SOON 12 CH-4614) 
HMH SOON 12 CH53AIO 
HMH (·) OET CH·53E 4A/C 








































49 $1 .282,695 .00 17 83 
31 S833 217.00 3 6 
18 $449,4 78.00 14 77 
$0.00 
298 $7 855 170 .00 0 0 
33 $883 ,159 .00 0 0 
154 $4 ,141 . 114 .00 0 0 
111 $2 ,830.897 .00 0 0 
$0.00 
6647 $209 .609 ,845 .00 38 107 
$0.00 
1377 $41.301 .639 .00 4 8 
27 $1 442 725 .00 4 3 
382 $10 .839 ,474.00 0 0 
44 $1 ,216 ,956 .00 0 0 
96 $3 ,402 . 166 .00 0 1 
166 $6,418 .086 .00 0 2 
144 $4 ,068 . 752 .00 0 0 
326 $9 ,002 315 .00 0 0 
182 $6 0 76 ,766 .00 0 0 
143 $3 925 549 .00 0 0 
173 $4 ,911.143 .00 0 2 
32 $1 .094 .652 .00 0 1 
141 $3 ,816 .491 .00 0 1 
$0 .00 
2970 $92,135 134 .00 17 48 
77 $3 ,282 .435 .00 5 5 
282 $8 ,578 ,838 .00 1 3 
674 $18 485 702 .00 5 20 
159 $5,211,825 .00 0 1 
480 $14 .705 ,416 .00 2 6 
630 $19.988 ,082 .00 2 6 
273 $8 ,708 ,795 .00 1 3 
235 $8 ,173 709 .00 1 2 
160 $5 ,000 332 .00 0 2 
$0.00 
2300 $76 173 072 .00 17 51 
77 $3 ,262 435 .00 5 5 
253 $7 ,795,563 .00 1 3 
589 $16,304 ,061.00 5 20 
692 $24 .846,780 .00 4 12 
253 $8 ,741 .419 .00 1 3 
77 $2 ,513 .927 .00 0 4 
359 512 ,688 .897 .00 
- _1. 4 
$2 426 .929 .00 $3 .709 824 .00 $66 ,450 .00 150 $3 .205.550 .00 
$1 ,040 .931 .00 $1,874 .148 .00 $18 , 163.00 41 $592.83 7.00 
$1 385 ,998.00 $1 835,476 .00 $48 .287 .00 109 $2 ,612.71 3.00 
$0 .00 $0 .00 $0.00 0 $0.00 
$8 167 584 .00 $16 022 .754 .00 $135 115 .00 306 $16.548,885 .00 
$904 ,464.00 $1 ,787 ,623 .00 $15 ,062 .00 34 sao 1.93e.oo 
$4 ,220 ,832.00 $8,361 .946 .00 $70 .437 .00 159 $4 .684,563 .00 
53 ,042 ,288 .00 $5 ,873,185 .00 $49 ,616 .00 112 $11 .062,384.00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0 .00 
$184 ,603 ,894 .00 $394 ,213 .739 .00 $3 ,336 ,790 .00 7530 $135.707.210 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00 
537 996 .860 .00 $79.297.499 .00 $667.158 .00 1506 $88 .077.842 .00 
$995 060.00 $2 437 786.00 S20 821 .00 47 $7 444 179.00 
$10.489 .856.00 $21 309 .330 .00 $178 972 .00 404 $13,913.028 .00 
$1 206 962 .00 $2 422 ,908 .00 $20.378.00 46 $1 ,110.622.00 
$2 ,631 168 .00 $6 .033.356 .00 $50 ,502 .00 114 $7 .508.498 .00 
$5,097 ,888 .00 $11 .515.974 .00 $96 ,574 .00 218 $22 .334,426 .00 
$3 ,946,752 .00 $8,015 .504 .00 $67,336.00 152 $690.664.00 
$8,907.600 .00 $17 909 .915.00 $150.620 .00 340 $26 .931 ,360 .00 
$4 988 ,256 .00 $ 10 065 ,022 .00 $84 ,613.00 191 $19 .179 387.00 
S3 919 344 .00 $7 844 893 .00 $66 007.00 149 $7 751 993 .00 
S4 . 741.584.00 $9 ,652 .727 .00 $81.955.00 185 $8 ,145,045 .00 
$877.056 .00 $1 .971 .708 .00 $16.834 .00 38 $1 .01 1,166.00 I 
$3 ,864 ,528 .00 $7 ,681 019 .00 $65 121 .00 147 $7 ,133.879 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00 
$82 485 ,697.00 $174 ,620 831 .00 $1 .4 79,177 .00 3339 $26 .796 .823 .00 
$2 .429 221 .00 S5 711 ,658.00 $48 730 .00 110 $342,270.00 
$7 ,792 ,817 .00 $16 .371 .655 .00 $136 .216.00 312 $623.784.00 
$18 791 797 .00 $37 277 499 .00 $322 081 .00 727 $16 444 939.00 
$4 357 872 .00 $9 569,697 .00 $80 183.00 181 $380 .817.00 
$13 283 ,362 .00 $27 988.778.00 $236,562 .00 534 $1 ,1 21 ,438.00 
$17,394 562 .00 $37 ,382 ,644 .00 $314 ,530 .00 710 $1,437,4 70 .00 
$7 ,546 145.00 $16 254 .940 .00 $136 ,887.00 309 $720.11 3.00 
$6 504 641 .00 $14 678 350 .00 $122 711 .00 277 $4 806 .289 .00 
$4 386 280 .00 $9 385 ,612 .00 $79 297 .00 179 $9 19,703.00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0 .00 0 so.oo 
$64 122 337 .00 $140 295 409 .00 $1 189 455 .00 2665 $20 832 545 .00 
$2 .429 .221 .00 $5 711 ,656.00 $48 730.00 110 $328.270.00 
$6 997 ,985 .00 $14 ,793.548.00 $124 926 .00 282 $1 ,637,074 .00 
$16 462.117 .00 $32 .766 ,168 .00 $283.963.00 641 $15 .339.037 .00 
$19 .221 .380 .00 $44 .068 ,160.00 $370 .348 .00 836 $2 .209.652 .00 
$6 997 985 .00 $15.739 .404 .00 $132 .014 .00 298 $650,988 .00 
52 .110 ,416 .00 $4 ,624 .343 .00 $40 .313 .00 91 $175 .887.00 
$9,903 ,233.00 $22 .592,130 .00 $189.161 .00 427 
-
$ 4~1_. 839 . 00 
NOTIONAL MEF RESOURCE C (FY90 -$000 ' USMC 
OFF ENL AN. RATES OFF 
TYPE ORGANIZATION $0.00 
NOTIONAL MEF 3200 39788 $1 .182 .717 .348.00 410 
I $0.00 
COMMAND ELEMENT S/C31 224 1880 $80.187,464 .00 18 
HQ, MEF S/C31 60 86 $5.694 ' 466 .00 7 
H&S CO (NUC) MEF S/C3 1 9 107 $3.203 941 .00 2 
SRI GRO.JP I S/C31 118 1417 $42 ,359 ,695 .00 6 
LONG LINES CO. COMM BN S/C31 9 199 $5,501,273.00 0 
CIVIL AFF,.IRS GAP S/C31 28 71 $3.428 .189 .00 3 
$0.00 
GROUNOCOMBAT ELEMENT 1066 17221 $492 984 131 .00 73 
HQBN. OIV S/SERVICES 136 1098 $35 .467 ,934 .00 7 
INF REGT (3 ) 468 8637 $243.340 ,815 .00 33 
"'RTY REGT 257 3577 $104.614 079 .00 22 
: AAV BN 47 1097 $30 ,171 639 .00 2 
LAI BN 38 786 S21 .873 .614 .00 3 
CBT ENGRBN S/ENG 43 814 $22.868,382.00 2 
RECONBN S/C31 32 391 $11 ,656 ,373 .00 2 
T"'NK BN 44 821 $23 102 295 .00 2 
$0.00 
' AVIATION COMBAT ELEMEN 1471 12523 $399,671 ,469.00 83 
MAW CMO ELEMENT S/C31 108 367 $16 .299 ,176 .00 9 
HQMAW S/C31 94 249 $11 ,774 .683 .00 8 
MAR WIIIG HQSQON S/C31 10 63 $2.164.333.00 1 
MAR WIIIG WPNS UNIT S/SUPPL Y 4 45 $1 360 169.00 0 
$0 .00 
MAR AIR CNTRL GAP S/C31 244 2680 S78 849 484 .00 6 
MACGHO S/C31 13 27 $1 ,442 .725 .00 4 
MAR TAC AIR CMO SQDN S/C31 30 121 $4 ,794.971 .00 0 
MARATCSQON S/C31 23 306 $8.976 823 .00 0 
MAR WIIIG COMM SOON S/C31 33 506 $14 .586 154 .00 0 
MAR AIR CONT SOON (2) S/C3 1 46 474 S14 656 .690 .00 0 
MAR AIR SPT SOON S/C3 1 44 223 $8 .169.637 .00 0 
LAAOBH 24 363 $10 .233 547 .00 0 
LAAM BN 31 671 S16 091 037 .00 2 
$0.00 
MAR WING SPT GAP $/SERVICES 125 2685 S71 .939 ,636.00 22 
H&H SCXJN $/SERVICES 15 59 $2.360 .029 .00 2 
MAR WING SPT SOON FfW (2) S I 56 1348 $36.971 ,404 .00 10 
MAR WING SPT SQDN RIW 2) S I 54 1178 $32 .608 ,102.00 10 
I $0.00 
MAR AIR GAP (HELO) 543 3259 $113 .480 .4 77 .00 23 
MAG HO (2) S/C31 46 154 $6.564 870 .00 10 
MAR "'VN LOG SOON (2) S/SUPPL Y 50 506 $16.591 126 .00 2 
MAR 06S SOON (VMO) S/C31 38 198 $7,190,666 .00 1 
HMUA SOON (2 ) 126 718 626 .377 ,794 .00 2 
HMM SOON (5 ) S/TRANS 160 865 S31 .058 .475 .00 5 
HMH SOON (2) $/TRANS 82 506 S17 .482 ,838 .00 2 
HMH SOON (1) $/TRANS 41 312 510.214 .708 .00 1 
USN TOT ALPERS 
ENL AN. RATES rosrs 
$0.00 $0 .00 
2103 $83 .781.084 .00 $1 ,266 ,498.382 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 
40 $2.244.018 .00 $62 431 .482 .00 
6 $610.775 .00 $6 305.241 .00 
7 $319.378 .00 $3 623 .319 .00 
26 $1 ,095.174 .00 $43 454 ' 769.00 
0 $0.00 $5 .601 273 .00 
1 $218 ,691 .00 $3 ,646 880.00 
$0.00 $0.00 
873 $28 581 .-nl7.00 $521 565 868 .00 
32 $1 .323 .S83 .00 $36 ,781 ,317.00 
616 $18 960,083 .00 $262.300.848 .00 
76 $3.485 .750 .00 $107,999 .829 .00 
20 $675 .682 .00 $30 .847.321 .00 
66 $2 .000 211 .00 $23 ,873 ,826.00 
16 $538 .642.00 $23 .407 ,024 .00 
32 $1 004.578.00 $12 .669 951 .00 
17 $693 458 .00 $23 695 763 .00 
$0 .00 $0.00 
215 $11 .184 883 .00 $410 ,856 ,352 .00 
8 $793 .113.00 $16,092 ,288 .00 
7 $701 .944.00 $12 .476.627 .00 
1 $91 169.00 $2 .266.602.00 
0 $0 .00 $1.360 .169 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 
24 $1 040 358.00 $79 889 842.00 
3 S337 .268.00 $1 ,779 .993 .00 
2 $54.816 .00 $4 .849 .787 .00 
2 $54,816 .00 $9 .030 .639 .00 
0 $0.00 $14 .586 .154 .00 
6 $164 .~8 . 00 $14 .720 .038 .00 
3 $82.224 .00 $8 .251 .86 1.00 
4 $109.632 .00 $10 343 179 .00 
4 S237 154.00 $16 328 191.00 
$0.00 $0.00 
84 $3 .705 .014 .00 $75 .644 ,649 .00 
4 $237.154 .00 $2 .597 ,183 .00 
40 $1 ,733 .930.00 $38 .705 '334 .00 
40 $1 '733.930 .00 $34 .342 032 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 
51 $2 ,864 .311.00 $116 .344 ,788 .00 
10 $911 690 .00 $7 .476 560 .00 
6 $291 .970 .00 $16 .883 ,096 .00 
3 $145 ,985 .00 $7 .336 .651 .00 
8 $346.786 .00 $25 ,724 .680.00 
15 $729.925 .00 $31 .788 .400 .00 
6 $291 .970 .00 $17 .774 .808 .00 




$20 .156 ,943 .00 
$0 .00 




$92 ,144 00 
$45 629 .00 
$0.00 
$8 519 776.00 
$663.939.00 
$4.320 .679 .00 
$1,741 876 .00 
$616 .638 .00 
$396 .699 .00 
$387 .182 .00 
$202 .461 .00 
$391 612 .00 
$0.00 
$6 .331 .366 .00 
$213 .626.00 
$168 ,594 .00 
$33 .226.00 
$21 .707 .00 
$0.00 
$1 264 322.00 
$20 .821 .00 
$67 .779 .00 
$146 .190.00 
$238 '777 .00 
$233 ,018 .00 
$1 19 .610 .00 
$168 .783 .00 
$269 344 .00 
$0 .00 
$1 .247 .488 .00 




$1 .717 .068.00 
$97 460 .00 
$249 .862 .00 
$106 .320 .00 
$378 .322 .00 
$462 .936 .00 
$264 .028 .00 
S158 , 1~Ul() 
TOT ALPERS 
0 T/E EQU IP 
0 COSTS 
45501 $1 .210 .828 .000 .00 
0 $0 .00 
2162 $85 ,433 234 .00 
159 $602 .563 .00 
126 $2 .595 625 .00 
1667 $76 .890 819.00 
208 $4 .538 .856 .00 
103 $805 ,371 .00 
0 $0 .00 
19232 $603 .607 224 .00 
1273 $38 ,182.061 .00 
9753 $101 .663 .421 .00 
3932 $145,599 ,124 .00 
1166 $105 .450,462 .00 
893 $83 .316 .401 .00 
874 $19 .739.818 .00 
467 $9 .289 .549 .00 
884 $100 364 388 .00 
0 $0.00 
14292 $278 .743 .644 .00 
482 $2 .742 474 .00 
368 $182 .406 .00 
75 $2 .393.775.00 
49 $166.293.00 
0 $0.00 
2854 $190 053 678.00 
47 $7 .754 .179.00 
163 $70 221 .00 
330 s1 ,613.81 o.oo 
539 $18.305 223 .00 
526 $77 .418 .982.00 
270 $19 .156.390.00 
381 . $15,280 ,217.00 
608 $50 .454 656.00 
0 $0.00 
2816 $63 .944.512 .00 
80 $376.560.00 
1454 $32 .889 ,878 .00 
1282 $30 .678 .074 .00 
0 $0.00 
3876 $8 .472.932 .00 
220 $656 .540.00 
564 $3 .274 .148 .00 
240 $632 .680.00 
854 $981 .678.00 
1045 $907.065 .00 
696 $1 .303 .972 .00 







MAR AIR GAP (FIXED) 
MAG HO (2) I 
MAR AVN LOG SOON (2) 
SOON VMFA 12 F/A 18 {4) 
SOON VMA 20 AV-88 (3) 
SOON VMA(AW) (2) 
SOONVMGR I 
DET, VMAO 8 EAe 
I 
CBT SERV SPT ELEMENT 
H&S BN . FSSG 
ENGR SPT BN. FSSG 
MAINT BN FSSG 
SUPPLY BN. FSSG 
MEO BN . FSSG 
DENTAL BN. FSSG 
MT BN . FSSGI 
LSB. FSSG I 
451 
S/C31 48 















3742 $120.102 .798 .00 23 
154 $8 .584 .870 .00 10 
564 $17 . 157.676 .00 2 
960 529 .410 ,832 .00 4 
946 S29 982 123 .00 3 
548 $17.417,590.00 2 
333 s 11 .212 .027 .00 1 
240 $8,357,680 .00 1 
$0.00 
8184 $229 .874.284 .00 236 
1485 $48 373 091 .00 17 
1538 $41 ,656,778 .00 3 
1762 $4 7 427 630 .00 2 
1292 $35 ,691 .260 .00 6 
233 $8 ,172.939.00 132 
5 $124 855 .00 75 
915 $24.621 945.00 0 
934 $25 .805,786.00 1 
48 $2,782 ,087 .00 $122 884 .885 .00 $1 ,1188,952 .00 4284 $13 530 048 .00 
10 $911 ,690.00 $7.476 ,560.00 $97,460 .00 220 $882,540.00 
6 $291 .970 .00 $17 449 646 .00 $276,432.00 624 s1 24a. 588 .oo 
12 $563.940.00 $29 .994 ,772 .00 $473 ,124.00 1068 $2 242 ,878 .00 
9 $437 955.00 $30 420 078 .00 $471 796.00 1065 $2 156 205.00 
6 S291 970 .00 $17 ,709 560 .00 $273 774 .00 618 $1 438,226.00 
3 $145 ,986.00 $11356012.00 $170 998.00 386 $8 13,002.00 
2 $118 ,577.00 $8 ,4 76.257.00 $125 369.00 283 $4 .947,831 .00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0 .00 0 $0.00 
975 $41 ,770 .396 .00 $271 644 ,680 .00 $4,348 .045.00 9815 $222 884,955 .00 
91 $3 ,578,085 .00 $51 ,951 156 .00 $790 312 .00 1784 $21 .282.688 .00 
20 $739 443 .00 $42 .396 221 .00 $715 888.00 1816 s5a .397.112.oo 
2 $182 338 .00 $47 609 968 .00 $808 032.00 1824 $38 903 988.00 
80 $2 .575 .206 .00 $38 .266 ,466 .00 $636 .148.00 1436 $14 .537.852 .00 
628 S25 ,628 ,676 .00 $31 .801 .615 .00 $442 ,55 7.00 999 $15 .861 ,443.00 
153 $8 ,975 ,499 .00 $9 100,354 .00 $103,219.00 233 $1 ,984.781 .00 
0 $0.00 $24 ,621 ,945 .00 $418 ,635 .00 945 $52 ,123.385 .00 
1 $91 .169.00 $25 896 ,955 .00 $433.254.00 978 $18,793 .748 .00 
144 
APPENDIX C. CAPITAL STOCK VALUES 
I UNIT COST IMEu ME8 I MEF 
Tanks M60Al 1 $1.s 1 $6.o 1 $21 1 $65 
AAV I $.Y69 1 $12 1 $46 1 $202 
LAY 1 $.762 1 $6.o 1 $21 1 $84 
155 HOW 1 $.ss3 1 $2.2 1 $20 1 $53 
105 HOW 1 $.021 1 $.084 1-- 1--
81mrn Mortar 1 $.013 1 $.11o $.33 1$1.0 
60mmMortar 1 $.o11 1 $.139 1$.42 1 $1 .3 
Mk-19MG 1 $.oo9 1 $.234 $1.0 I $5.4 
TOW Msl Lr 1 $.ns 1 $.920 1 $5.5 1 $16.6 
DRAGON Lr 1 $.014 1 $.340 1$1.0 1 $3.1 
HAWK Msl Lr 1 $.517 I $0 1 $4.14 1 $8.28 
STINGER Msl Lr I $.027 1 $.135 $1.22 1 $2.4 
.SOCal MG 1 $.o1s 1 $.304 1 $2.1 1 $6.6 
M60MG 1$.003 1 $.167 $.688 1 $2.oo 
AV-88 1 $25.2 1 $353 1 $1,562 1 $2,293 
F/ A-18 1 $36.9 I $0 1 $1,956 1 $3,727 
A-6E 1 $44.9 I $0 1 $763 1 $763 
EA-68 1 $39.6 I $0 $317 1 $317 
CH-53 1 $22.6 1 $316 $1,062 1 $1,ss9 
AH-1W 1 $9 .8 1 $88 1 $196.o l $363 
CH-46E 1 $17.o 1 $391 1 $1,156 1 $1,411 
UH-1N 1 $9.8 1 $167 1 $265 1 $412 
TOTAL I I $1 343.633 I $7 401.398 I $11 295.68 
MAGTF Weapons Systems Capital Stock Value 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model. (CRM 93-158). (Alexandria, VA. 
Center for Naval Analysis, August 1993), Table 2. and Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO 
P7000.14), Washington, D.C., HQMC, 14 june 1991 Table 481. Costs in millions of FY 91 dollars. 
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1----------------------------liTC W/SUPT TC Of ACon 
MEU TYPE REO. TRN3 PIPELINE INV. ADJ INV L.C l.t>e TI E 
AV-88 6 0.2 0.1 8.33 
F/A-18 0 0 0 0.00 
A-GE o o o o.oo 
EA-68 0 0 0 0.00 
CH-53 4 0.15 0.1 5.23 
AH -1W 4 0.16 0.1 5.29 
CH-46E 12 0.11 0.1 14.98 











































































































Table 3.8 Capital Stock Value Of Aircraft 









































































Requirements = number of aircraft+training requirements+maintenance requirements based on .90 
Opperational Availability (Ao) . 
Ex For MEU AV-88 1.00/(1 .00-. 20)=1 .25 . 1.25/ (1 .00- .10)=1 .39 , 1.39X6=8.34, 
9.0+5=14 .00 
Costs estimated from "The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model. (CAM 93-158)." (Alexandria, VA. , 
Center for Naval Analyses , August 1993) , Table 2 . Factors obtained from "Naval Combat Aircraft: 
Issues and Options ." Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, November 1987, p. 38. 
All costs in thousands of FY 91 dollars. 
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NOTIONAL MAGTF 
CAPITAL STOCK VALUE qty MEU qty MEB qty MEF 
UNIT COST 
TANKS M60A1 $1,468.441 .00 4 $5,873 ,764.00 14 $20,558,174.00 44 $64,611 ,404.00 
AAV $969,140.00 10 $9,691 .400.00 38 $36,827,320.00 167 $161 ,846,380.00 
LAV $762.154.00 6 $4 ,572.924.00 22 $16.767,388 .00 88 $67,069,552.00 
155HOW $553, 714 .00 6 $3 ,322.284.00 18 $9,966,852.00 56 $31,007.984.00 
105 HOW $21 ,000.00 4 $84,000.00 0 $0.00 0 $0.00 
81mmMortar $1 3,753.00 6 $82,518.00 18 $247,554.00 56 $770.168.00 
60mmMortar $11 ,602.00 9 $104,418.00 27 $313,254.00 86 $997,772.00 
MK19MG $9,006.00 20 $180,120.00 90 $810,540.00 480 $4,322,880.00 
TON $11 ,970,861 .00 6 $71 ,825,166.00 38 $454,892,718.00 115 $1 ,376,649,015.00 
Cfl.<lG:l\J $14,194.00 18 $255.492.00 56 $794,864.00 172 $2,441 ,368.00 
.50cal MG $15,243.00 16 $243 ,888.00 110 $1 ,676,730.00 348 $5,304,564.00 
M60MG $3,342.00 40 $133 ,680.00 164 $548,088.00 480 $1 ,604,160.00 
HAWK Lr $517.000.00 0 $0.00 8 $4,136,000.00 16 $8,272,000.00 
STINGER $27 ,000.00 5 $135,000.00 45 $1 ,215,000.00 90 $2,430,000.00 
AV-88 $25,200 ,000.00 14 $352,800,000.00 62 $1 ,562,400,000.00 91 $2,293,200,000.00 
F/A-18AID $36,900,000.00 0 $0.00 53 $1 ,955, 700,000.00 101 $3 ,726,900,000.00 
A-6E $44 '900 '000. 00 0 $0.00 17 $763,300,000.00 17 $763,300,000.00 
EA-66 $39,600,000.00 0 $0.00 8 $316,800,000.00 8 $316,800,000.00 
CH-53E $22,600,000.00 14 $316,400,000.00 47 $1 ,062,200,000.00 69 $1 ,559,400,000.00 
AH-1W $9,800,000.00 9 $88,200,000.00 20 $196,000,000.00 37 $362,600,000.00 
CH-46E $17,000,000.00 23 $391 ,000,000.00 68 $1 '156,000,000.00 83 $1 ,411 ,000,000.00 
UH-1N $9 800 000.00 17 $166 600 000.00 27 $264 600 000.00 42 $411 600 000.00 
TOTALWpns $96,504,654.00 $548,754,482.00 $1 ,727,327,247.00 
TOTALAIC $1 ,315,000,000.00 $7,277,000,000.00 $10,844,800,000.00 
TOTAL $1 411 504 654.00 $7 825 754 482.00 $12 572 127 247.00 
MAGTF-2015 
CAPITAL STOCK VALUE qty MEU qty MEB qty MEF 
UNIT COST 
TANKS M1 (a) $2.643,193.80 3.2 $8,458,220.16 11 .2 $29,603,770.56 35.2 $93,040,421 .76 
AAAV(b) $1 ,938, 280.00 8 $15.506.240.00 30.4 $58,923 ,712.00 134 $258,954,208.00 
LAV(a) $1,143,231 .00 4.8 $5,487,508.80 17.6 $20,120,865.60 70.4 $80,483,462.40 
LW 155HOW(b) $1 '1 07.428.00 4.8 $5,315,654.40 14.4 $15,946,963.20 44.8 $49,612,774.40 
81 mmMortar(a) $20,629.50 4.8 $99,021 .60 14.4 $297,064.80 44.8 $924,201 .60 
60mmMortar(a) $17,403 .00 7.2 $125,301.60 21 .6 $375,904.80 68.8 $1 '197,326.40 
MK19 MG(a) $1 3,509.00 16 $216,144.00 72 $972,648.00 384 $5,187,456.00 
TOW(a) $172,500.00 4.8 $828,000.00 30.4 $5,244,000.00 92 $15,870,000.00 
DRAGON( a) $21 ,291 .00 14.4 $306,590.40 44.8 $953 ,836.80 138 $2,929,641 .60 
.50cal MG(a) $22,864.50 12.8 $292.665 .60 88 $2,012,076.00 278 $6,365,4 76.80 
M60 MG(a) $5,013 .00 32 $160,416.00 131 $657,705.60 384 $1 ,924,992.00 
HAWK Lr(a) $775,500.00 0 $0.00 6.4 $4,963,200.00 12.8 $9,926,400.00 
STINGER( a) $40,500.00 4 $162,000.00 36 $1 ,458,000.00 72 $2,916,000.00 
AV-8C(c) $37,800,000.00 15 $567,000,000.00 66 $2,494,800,000.00 97 $3 ,666,600,000.00 
FIA-18(e) $36,900,000.00 0 $0.00 53 $1 ,955, 700,000.00 101 $3,726,900,000.00 
A-6F(e) $44.900,000.00 0 $0.00 17 $763,300,000.00 17 $763 ,300,000.00 
EA-6C(e) $39,600,000.00 0 $0.00 8 $316,800,000.00 8 $316,800,000.00 
CH-53F(c) $22,600,000.00 15 $339,000,000.00 49 $1 ,107,400,000.00 74 $1 ,672,400,000.00 
AH-1X(c) $9,800,000.00 10 $98,000,000.00 21 $205,800,000.00 39 $382,200,000.00 
CH-46F(c) $17,000,000.00 24 $408,000,000.00 73 $1 ,241 ,000,000.00 89 $1 ,513 ,000,000.00 
UH-1M(c) $9 800,000.00 18 $176 400 000.00 28 $274 400 000.00 45 $441 000 000.00 
TOTALWpns $36,957,762.56 $141 ,529,747.36 $529,332,360.96 
TOTALAIC $1 ,588,400,000.00 $8,359,200,000.00 $12,482,200,000.00 
lDTAL $1 625,357 762.56 $8 500 729 747.36 $13 011 ,532,360.96 
Note : (a) current qty x .8 x 1.5(cost) 
(b) current qty x .8 x 2(cost) 
(c) current qty x 1.08 x 1.5(cost) 
(d) current qty x 1.08 x 2(cost) 
I e) current otv x 1 .51 cost \ 
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APPENDIX D. AMPHIBIOUS SHIP PROJECTIONS 
SHIP CLASS TROOPS VEHKSQFT CARGOKQJFT AIR SPOTS LCACSPOTS 
LPH 1654 4.8 54 27 0 
LHA 1903 28.7 141.2 43 1 
LHD 2102 25.5 166.6 46 3 
LPD-4 876 14 51 .1 4 1 
LPD-17 700 25 25 4 1 
LSD-36 336 8.8 1.8 0 3 
LSD-36M 336 19.7 1.8 0 2 
LSD-41 504 14.6 6.8 0 4 
LSD-49 504 20.2 67.6 0 2 
LST 386 17.5 4.5 0 0 
LKA 231 47 88.1 0 0 
Ship Class 9 1 93 95 97 99 0 1 03 05 07 09 1 1 1 3 1 5 
LPH 7 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LHA 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
LHD 2 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 
LPD-4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 2 0 0 0 0 
LPD-17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
LSD-36 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
LSD-36M 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 
LSD -41 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
LSD-49 0 0 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
LST 1 8 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LKA 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 60 55 37 38 39 39 39 38 36 36 36 36 36 
Note: Information for Appendix D taken from "Integrated 
Amphibious Operations & U.S. Marine Corps Air Requirements 
Study", Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 26 September 




LIFT 91 93 95 97 99 01 
TROOPS 48517 45922 3 7587 38539 39491 394 91 
VEHOOFT 1078 .6 995 643 683 .9 724 . 8 724 .8 
~ 24 76 . 1 2433.1 2241 .1 2421 . 3 2601 .5 2601 . 5 
AIR SPOTS 540 532 497 516 535 535 
LCACS 66 69 76 8 1 86 86 
LIFT 91 93 95 97 99 0 1 
TROOPS 1 0 .95 0 .77 0 .79 0 .81 0 .81 
VEHOOFT 1 0 .92 0.60 0 .63 0 .67 0.67 
~ 1 0 .98 0 .91 0 .98 1.05 1.05 
AIR SPOTS 1 0 .99 0 .92 0 .96 0 .99 0 .99 
LCACS 1 1.05 1 .15 1 .23 1 .30 1 .30 
03 05 07 09 
394 91 38275 38665 386 77 
724 . 8 760 . 1 792 . 3 819.6 
2601 .5 2469 .2 2526 2497 
535 535 581 585 
13_§_ ~4 - 7!L __ ___ LIL 
03 05 07 09 
0 .81 0 .79 0 .80 0 .80 
0 .67 0.70 0 .73 0 .76 
1 .05 1.00 1 .02 1 .01 
0.99 0.99 1.08 1 .08 
1.30 1.27 1 .20 1 .18 
1 1 1 3 
386 77 38677 
819.6 819 . 6 
2497 2497 
585 685 
78 __78 _ 
1 1 1 3 
0 .80 0 .80 
0 .76 0 .76 
1 .01 1.01 






























































APPENDIX E. O&M COST CALCULATIONS 
ANNFLTHR REWOA< Af\1\JCOST OP RAllO TEMPO O&M/AC 
282.3 $1 ,039,500.00 $1 ,565,340.21 0 .891 1 $1 ,363 ,197.50 
391.5 $657,740.00 $1 ,349,951 .15 0.87 1 $1 ,147,914 .76 
291.5 $842,700.00 $1 ,557,545.45 0.781 1 $1 ,188,951 .38 
951 .6 $840,410 .00 $2,836,486.16 0.835 1 $2,314,938.61 
294.6 $411 ,700 .00 $985,993.24 0.877 1 $845.173.49 
219.6 $457,870 .00 $574,126.24 0.9 1 $505,035 .89 
284.4 $437,800.00 $4 ,234,795.96 0 .912 1 $3 ,774,849.69 
219.6 $457 870.00 $574 104.28 0.9 1 $505 016 .57 
O&M$ O&M$ O&M$ 
MEU ME8 MEF 
$12,268,777.48 $76,339 ,059.86 $114,508 ,589.78 
$0.00 $55,099,908.53 $110,199,817.05 
$0.00 $16,645,319.39 $16 ,645,319.39 
$0.00 $18,519,508.91 $18,519,508.91 
$5,071 ,040.93 $31 .271,419.07 $49,020,062.32 
$3,030,215 .33 $8,080,574.21 $16,161 '1 48.42 
$56,622,745.34 $226,490,981 .34 $283 ,113,726.68 
$3.030,099.43 $8 080 265.14 $15,655,513 .70 
$80,022,878 .50 $440,527,036.43 $623,823,686.25 
O&M$ O&M$ O&M$ 
MEU ME8 MEF 
$0 .00 $0.00 $0.00 
$0 .00 $0.00 $0.00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
$0 .00 $0.00 $0.00 
$0 .00 $0.00 $0.00 
$0 .00 $0.00 $0.00 
$0 .00 $0.00 $0.00 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 













SHIP TYPE UNIT O&M Cost MEU MEB MEF 
LP $25 .3 $25.3 $126.5 $354.2 
LPD $12.1 $12.1 $48.4 $133.1 
LSD $9.9 $9 .9 $49.5 $128.7 
LST $6.9 $6.9 $48.3 $124.2 
LCAC $.33 $1 .98 $7.92 $25.7 
TOTAL $56.18 $280.62 $765.9 
O&S Costs For Amphibious Ship Mix 
Costs estimated from The Revised Fiscal Requirements ModeL (CRM 93-
158).(Aiex:mdria, VA. Center For Naval Analysis, August 1993), Costs in millions of 
FY 91 dollars . 
UNIT COST Steam Hill $per steam Steam hill $/steam hr 
millions $ a=F ENL Underway hr Underway not underway not underway Depot Cost 
396 49 593 2225 2 .845 1451 0 .615 8021 
990 58 818 2237 5.308 1485 1.199 13869 
1160 65 956 1325 3 .918 1388 0 .568 13869 
299 28 377 2163 1.063 1697 0.667 6609 
360 26 377 2163 1.063 1697 0 .567 6609 
245 21 314 2039 2 .106 1700 0 .493 4063 
265 21 314 2039 2 .106 1700 0 .493 4053 
245 23 311 2039 2 .106 1700 0 .493 4053 
245 33 370 2039 2.106 1700 0 .493 4053 
103 16 217 2214 1.407 1237 . 0 .197 4172 
Note: Information taken from The Revised Fiscal Requirements Model, Appendix B. p. 60. 
O&MN=(Shlp lnvenlory)x(Steamlng Hrs UnderwayxOpTempo factorxO&MN Cost Per Steaming Hr 















APPENDIX F. DENSITY ANALYSIS 
The change in weapons and transportation densities displayed in 
Figure 3.5 was not expected. Instead of a roughly linear relationship, a 
pronounced "V" marks the transition from the small, MEU-size MAGTF 
capability to that of a full-fledged MEF. This unexpected finding deserves 
furter comment. 
The density dis tribution can be analyzed by looking at the changes in 
force s tructure and the quantities of major weapons associated with each 
MAGTF. Figure F.l shows the force structure for each MAGTF broken down 
intoits four basic elements; CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE. For the MEU, the GCE 
constitutes the major portion of total personnel strength, followed by the 
ACE, then CSSE, and finally the CE. The relatively large GCE and small CSSE 
indicate a high readiness and lower sustainment capability. 
The MEB structure reveals personnel increases in all four elements. 
H owever, it is interesting to note that the ACE surpasses the GCE as the 
largest component of the MEB. The large increase in the ACE can be 
explained by the inclusion of fixed wing tactical aircraft to the MEB T /E. This 
is not present in the MEU. Adding to the increased size of the ACE are the 
additional aircraft support and maintenance personnel required to support 
the additional tactical aircraft. It is important to note that for this analysis all 
units organic to the GCE are classified as "tooth;" this is not true for the ACE. 
That is to say, that increases in GCE personnel strengths directly add to the 
" tooth" but increases to the ACE may add to either the "tooth" or the "tail", 
depending on the functions they perform i.e., combat or suppor t. (See 
Appendix B for the detailed assignment of ACE units to combat or support 
functions.) While Figure F.l shows that in the case of the MEB the ACE 
153 
comprises the largest percentage of personnel, it must be understood that the 
ACE structure is actually divided into combat and support functions. When 
Appendix B is examined in detail, it can be seen that the increases in the ACE 
actually represent an increase in both combat functions (tactical aircraft) and 
combat support functions (C3I, Supply, Maint, etc.) The force structure for the 
MEB ACE contributes to a tooth-to-tail ratio which reflects increases in 
sustainment over readiness. 
The MEF breakdown shows that the personnel strengths have shifted 
so that the GCE is again the largest element, followed by the ACE, the CSSE, 
and finally the CE. In moving from the MEB to the MEF on sees an 
increasingly larger portion of the ACE dedicated to support of tactical aircraft. 
Units assigned to these support functions in effect contribute to increased 
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As discussed in Chapter III, the size of the CSSE grows as the size of the 
MAGTF increases. Changes to CSSE structure play an important role in 
establishing a support capability that directly contributes to the level of 
readiness enjoyed by each MAGTF. Figure F.2 shows the changes that occur 
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Figure F.2 MAGTF CSSE Functional Area Plot (Not to scale) 
The plot shows that services and transportation exhibit linear growth, 
while the remaining functional areas show large increases when moving 
from the MEB to MEF size MAGTF. These large growths appear to contribute 
to the shift in the MEF' s readiness and sustainment as evidenced in its tooth-
to-tail ratio of . 90:1. 
The number and types of weapons possessed by the MAGTF play an 
important role in the determination of the densities. The representative 
major weapons systems for the notional MAGTF used in this analysis were 
developed from tables contained in "Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A 
Global Capability (FMFRP 2-12)." The types of weapons used in this analysis 
are not meant to be all inclusive of the weapons held in the MAGTF arsenal, 
but serve as a representative measure and basis for making comparisons . A 
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drawback to this method is that very different weapons (e .g., tanks, and 
machineguns) are "homogenized." In calculating densities the number of 
major weapons possessed by each MAGTF are divided by certain troop 
strengths as explained in Chapter III. In examining the quantities of major 
weapons possessed by MAGTFs the analysis again shows the non-linearity 
between MAGTFs. Figure F.3 graphically show the changes in the numbers of 
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Figure F.3 MAGTF Major Weapons Plot (Not to scale) 
Figure F.3 shows the sharp growth in weapons inventories when the 
MAGTF expands from a MEU to a MEF. Figure F.3 shows two plots of 
MAGTF weapons quantities. The first plot shows the changes in ground 
weapons (no tactical aircraft included) and the second plot shows the changes 
in to tal weapons (ground weapons and tactical aircraft). Both plots follow the 
same general trends. 
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At this point it is interesting to examine the issue of non-linearity in 
MAGTF structure again. As discussed in Chapter III, MAGTF force structure 
is not linear, 3 MEUs can not make a MEB and 3 MEBs can not make a MEF. 
This point can be emphasized by taking the quantities of weapons and 
personnel in a MEU, and multiplying that quantity by 3 to arrive at the 
quantity of weapons and personnel for the MEB. This same exercise can be 
done using the MEB to extrapolate a MEF. The results of this "linear 
extrapolation" exercise are displayed in Figure F.4. It is interesting to see that 
MAGTFs structured in this fashion would be much smaller than the notional 
MAGTFs, again pointing out the non-linearity in MAGTF force structure. 
MAGTF Weapons Plot 
(Linear Extrapolation) 
3 
2 . 5 
~~ 
(/) //I c 0 
0.. 2 ctl (f) f Q) '0 • Ground Wpns ~ c <U 0 (f) 1 . 5 ::l / • Grund Wpns& T AC AJC .... 0 Q) ..r:::. .0 I- 1 E v ::l z .... 0 . 5 
.... 
0 
MEU 2395 MEB 7185 MEF 21555 
Troop Strength 
Figure F.4 MAGTF Weapons Plot (Linear Extrapolation, Not to scale) 
No te: Results were obtained by multiplying weapons and personnel quantities possessed by 
the MEU by 3 for MEB estimates. MEF estimates were obtained by multiplying weapons and 
personnel quantities possessed by the MEB by 3. 
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Figure F.4 shows that the MAGTFs created by this "linear 
extrapolation" method follow the same pattern as those shown in Figure F.3 
but possess a smaller increase in total quantities of weapons and personnel. 
Again, these results show that the notional baseline MAGTFs enjoy an 
increase in readiness over that of sustainment as the size of the MAGTF 
increases. To understand the impact that individual weapons systems can 
have on the MAGTF densities each aircraft has been plotted in Figure F.S, and 
each ground weapons system has been plotted in figure F.6. 
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Figure F.S shows the changes in quantities of aircraft possessed by 
MAGTFs. It is interesting to observe that several type aircraft follow a linear 
increase (AH-1W, UH-1N, F/ A-18) while others do not. Figure F.6 shows the 
individual plots of ground weapons possessed by each MAGTF. 
MEU 2395 
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Figure F.6 shows the changes in quantities of ground weapons 
possessed by each MAGTF. It is interesting to note that the M-60, MK-19 and 
.50 Cal machineguns show changes that do not follow the pattern of the rest 
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of the weapons . One reason for the disparity in machinegun changes is that 
many CSS units possess all three machine guns as a means of providing 
organic self defense, while the remaining weapons systems are possessed by 
combat units only. So, increases in supp ort units also effects the increases of 
machine guns which in turn effects the aggregate weapons density. Figure F.7 
shows the weapons plot for MAGTF weapons with the number of machine 
guns included in total weapons numbers and again with the machineguns 
removed. The results of this plot show that the large numbers of 
machineguns possessed by the MEB and the MEF could account for density 
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Figure F.7 MAGTF Weapons Plot (Not to scale) 
Figure F.8, on the following page, shows the plot of MAGTF weapons 
densities when machineguns are included in the total weapons and when 
they are not. The plot shows that the number of machineguns does have a 
significant effect on the overall weapons density. 
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Figure F.8 MAGTF Weapons Density Plot (Not to scale) 
To gain an understanding of the magnitude of capital investment 
involved in achieving and maintaining a MAGTF capability the capital stock 
value and capital services value of all MAGTF ground weapons (less aircraft) 
have been plotted in Figure F.9, on the following page. The plot shows 
increase in capital stock value and capital services value that occurs in 
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Figure F.9 MAGTF Capital Cost For Ground Weapons (Not to scale) 
While the number of machineguns has an impact on the MAGTF 
weapons density the capital stock value and resulting capital services value 
do not have that much of an effect on investment cost associated with 
achieving and maintaining a MAGTF capability. Figure F.lO, on the 
following page, ~hows the plot of capital stock value and capital services 
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Figure F.10 MAGTF Capital Cost For Aircraft (Not to scale) 
The plot shows a steeply increasing curve reflecting the significant 
increase in aircraft assets that occurs in moving to larger MAGTFs. The 
capital services value plot reflects a much shallower increase, due to the 20 
year service life of all aircraft, compared to a 15 year service life for vehicles 




















Navy / Marine Attack Jet 
Marine Amphibian Assault Vehicle, amphibious light 
armored personnel carrier currently in service. 
Marine Advanced Amphibian Assault Vehicle, 
development program designed to replace the AA V. 
Aviation Combat Element, aviation component of a 
MAGTF. 
Assault Echelon 
Assault Follow-on Echelon 
Marine Attack Helicopter 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 
Marine VSTOL Attack Aircraft 
Budget Authority 
The "Bottom Up Review" -DoD document 
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence 
Congressional Budget Office 
Command Element, provides command and contml for a 
MAGTF 
Navy and Marine Medium Lift Transport Helicopter 
Marine Heavy Lift Helicopter 
Combat Service Support Element, provides logistical 
sustainment functions to a MAGTF. 
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DoD Department of Defense 
DRAGON Man Portable Wire Guided Missile 
EA-6B Navy and Marine Electronic Warfare Aircraft 
F/ A-18 Navy and Marine Fighter and Attack Aircraft 



















Fleet Marine Force, deployable forces of the Marine Corps 
Fiscal Year 
Global Positioning System 
Marine Surface-to-Air Missile 
Thousands of Units 
Marine Light Armored Vehicle 
Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
Tarawa-class Amphibious Assault Ship 
Wasp-class Amphibious Assault Ship 
Amphibious Assault Ship 
Landing Ship Dock 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force, a task organized and 
integrated combined arms team 
Marine main battle tank 
Marine Abrams battle tank 
Military Construction Navy 
Military Construction Naval Reserve 
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MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade, reinforced regimental 
landing team 
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force, reinforced Marine division 
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit, reinforced battalion landing 
team 
MPMC Military Personnel, Marine Corps 
MPN Military Personnel Navy 
MRC Major Regional Conflict 
MTR Military Technological Revolution 
NEF Naval Expeditionary Force 
NMS National Military Strategy 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
O&M, MC Operations and Maintenan ce, Marine Corps 
O&M, N Operations and Maintenance, Navy 
OPN Other Procurement, Navy 
O&S Operating and Support Costs 
PE Program Element 
PMC Procurement Marine Corps 
RI Resource Identifier 
RICs Resource Identification Codes 
RPMC Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps 
RPN Reserve Personnel, Navy 
SPMAGTF Special Purpose MAGTF, task organized to perform 
specific missions as required 
167 
SLEP Service Life Extension Program 
STINGER Marine Shoulder-Launched Anti-Air Missile 
TO W Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided Anti-
Tank Missile 
V-22 Advanced Tilt-Wing VSTOL Replacement Aircraft for the 
CH-46 
WPN Weapons Procurement, Navy 
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